From intentional consciousness to progressive regressive method in Husserl

The paper examines the cognitive and phenomenological nature of consciousness, starting with the phenomenal conditions and concluding by its cognitive dispositional activities. The goal is to point out the limits and potentials of the phenomenological method. Thus, we examine the concepts of flow of experience, intentional flow model, and accuracy of self-evidence to specify the problem of method. It is argued that the reflexive activity is limited, not being able to cover the whole floating of meanings and experiences in its margins in the flow. It deals with the limits paying attention to two reflexive movements: 1) the progressive leading to timely and exhaustive description of static elements of experience, and 2) the regressive exploring the origins, expectations, and potential failures of the intentional activity. We conclude that the phenomenological method, despite its limitations, is a valuable resource to guide the researcher in how to think the thought itself.

phenomenology; method; consciousness; perceptual syntheses