Comité de Auditoría y Control Regulatorio

Hesarzadeh, Reza; Bazrafshan, Ameneh; Aqel, Saher

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Revista de Administração de Empresas

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ARTICLES • Rev. adm. empres. 62 (06) • 2022 • https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-759020220603 copiar

Comité de Auditoría y Control Regulatorio

Autoría SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

RESUMEN

Este documento examina la relación entre las características del comité de auditoría y el escrutinio regulatorio. Para medir el escrutinio regulatorio, el presente documento utiliza cartas de comentarios emitidas por la Organización de Bolsa y Valores de Irán. Los resultados empíricos muestran que la experiencia financiera del comité de auditoría aumenta (disminuye) el escrutinio regulatorio cuando la independencia del comité de auditoría es baja (alta). Este documento informa el debate costo-beneficio sobre la experiencia financiera del comité de auditoría y contribuye a la literatura al mostrar que el escrutinio regulatorio está influenciado conjuntamente por la experiencia e independencia financiera del comité de auditoría. El documento es de interés tanto para investigadores como para accionistas, consejos de administración y otros profesionales que deseen mejorar la composición y calidad de los comités de auditoría, especialmente en mercados emergentes donde los códigos de gobierno corporativo aún se están desarrollando.

Palabras clave:
experiencia financiera; independencia; carta de comentarios; comité; de Auditoría; control Regulatorio

Variable	Definition
Regulatory scrutiny = CL	1= Company received an SEO CL in year t, 0 = otherwise
Expert	The percentage of financial expert members on the company’s audit committee
Indep	The percentage of independent members on the company’s audit committee
Control variables:
AT	Auditor tenure in years
EM	The earnings manipulations computed exactly as in Dechow et al. (1995)Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/248303 https://www.jstor.org/stable/248303...
Age	The number of years the company has been listed on TSE
BIndep	The percentage of independent (non-executive) directors
BR	1= Altman’s Z score (DeFond & Hung, 2003DeFond, M. L., & Hung, M. (2003). An empirical analysis of analysts’ cash flow forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(1), 73-100. doi: 10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00098-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00... ) is greater than median, 0= otherwise
Big	1= auditor is a big audit firm, 0= otherwise
CP	1= CFO is an executive director, 0= otherwise
Dual	1= CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, 0= otherwise
EF	Sum of external financing (equity + debt) divided by total assets
Vol	The volatility of daily returns for the year t
IO	The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors
Loss	1= operational profit is negative, 0= otherwise
MC	Market capitalization, i.e., Ln (the number of shares outstanding × share price)
ICW	1= audit report is revealed an internal control weakness in year t, 0= otherwise
Rest	1= company with restatement, 0= otherwise
ROA	Operational profit divided by total assets
SG	Change in sales from year t-1to year t

	CL= 1					CL= 0
	Mean	Median	S.D	Max	Min	Mean	Median	S.D	Max	Min	p-value
Expert	0.476	0.330	0.404	1.000	0.000	0.454	0.660	0.404	1.000	0.000	0.396
Indep	0.460	0.330	0.380	1.000	0.000	0.816	1.000	0.380	1.000	0.000	0.028^ p < 0.05,
EM	-0.005	0.020	0.098	0.200	-0.313	0.005	0.005	0.098	0.220	-0.313	0.218
ICW	0.263	0.000	0.442	1.000	0.000	0.060	0.000	0.442	1.000	0.000	0.000^* ***** p < 0.01,
Rest	0.212	0.000	0.410	1.000	0.000	0.066	0.000	0.410	1.000	0.000	0.000^* ***** p < 0.01,
Vol	0.015	0.008	0.016	0.106	0.000	0.013	0.007	0.018	0.116	0.000	0.918
MC	11.625	11.740	1.689	16.540	8.234	11.771	11.620	1.689	16.668	8.234	0.578
Age	21.812	21.000	10.042	50.000	10.000	21.236	19.000	10.348	51.000	6.000	0.946
Loss	0.088	0.000	0.284	1.000	0.000	0.099	0.000	0.284	1.000	0.000	0.345
ROA	0.157	0.150	0.163	0.520	-0.514	0.157	0.152	0.158	1.320	-0.520	0.378
BR	0.511	1.000	0.502	1.000	0.000	0.486	0.000	0.502	1.000	0.000	0.620
SG	0.784	0.264	1.966	11.720	-0.990	0.789	0.170	1.966	14.270	-0.990	0.893
EF	0.028	0.000	0.087	0.420	-0.130	0.021	0.000	0.087	0.620	-0.130	0.099^* * p < 0.1.
Big	0.373	0.000	0.386	1.000	0.000	0.399	0.000	0.460	1.000	0.000	0.201
AT	2.595	4.000	2.056	9.000	1.000	3.871	4.000	2.003	11.000	1.000	0.058^* * p < 0.1.
IO	73.503	80.660	24.410	98.480	9.180	72.581	80.660	23.596	95.574	8.180	0.993
Dual	0.160	0.000	0.368	1.000	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.208	1.000	0.000	0.000^* ***** p < 0.01,
CP	0.109	0.000	0.313	1.000	0.000	0.121	0.000	0.327	1.000	0.000	0.236
BIndep	0.592	1.000	0.396	1.000	0.000	0.879	1.000	0.340	1.000	0.000	0.085^* * p < 0.1.
N	137					484

CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁Expert_it + γ₂ Indep_it + ∑_γkControls_it + ∑_γiFirm_i + ∑_γtYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	VIF	p-value
Expert	?	0.483	1.262	0.138
Indep	-	-1.988^ p < 0.05,	1.654	0.017

Controls:
EM	+	2.743	2.083	0.102
ICW	+	2.073^* ***** p < 0.01,	1.151	0.000
Rest	+	1.482^* ***** p < 0.01,	1.104	0.000
Vol	+	-1.534	1.120	0.814
MC	+	-0.186^ p < 0.05,	1.299	0.035
Age	+	0.019	1.283	0.131
Loss	+	-0.585	1.625	0.276
ROA	+	2.648^* * p < 0.1.	1.534	0.056
BR	+	0.606^* * p < 0.1.	1.710	0.057
VA	+	-0.038	1.157	0.448
SG	+	1.240^ p < 0.05,	1.657	0.045
Big	-	-0.548	1.686	0.104
AT	-	-0.103	1.284	0.250
IO	-	-0.008	1.093	0.167
Dual	+	1.254^* ***** p < 0.01,	1.283	0.009
CP	+	-0.121	2.698	0.803
BIndep	-	-0.148^ p < 0.05,	1.068	0.046
Constant		1.382		0.263

∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	621
Cox and Snell	31%
Nagelkerke	45%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0.341
ROC curve	81%

CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	1.305^ p < 0.05,	0.000
Indep	-	-1.182^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.002
Expert×Indep	-	-1.525^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	621
Cox and Snell	33%
Nagelkerke	48%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0.386
ROC curve	84%

Panel A. Audit committee characteristics and CL
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁Expert_it + γ₂ Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	0.215	0.539
Indep	-	-1.073^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.007

∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	284
Cox and Snell	23%
Nagelkerke	30%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0,185
ROC curve	77%
Panel B. Moderating role of audit committee independence
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	1.007^ p < 0.05,	0.038
Indep	-	-1.679^ p < 0.05,	0.016
Expert×Indep	-	-1.857^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000

∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_YYear_t	Included
N	284
Cox and Snell	26%
Nagelkerke	37%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0,216
ROC curve	79%

Panel A. Audit committee characteristics and CL
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁Expert_it + γ₂ Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	0.103	0.689
Indep	-	-0.563^ p < 0.05,	0.012

∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	-
N	102
Cox and Snell	20%
Nagelkerke	28%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0,142
ROC curve	75%
Panel B. Moderating role of audit committee independence
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	0.716^ p < 0.05,	0.047
Indep	-	-0.783^ p < 0.05,	0.024

Expert×Indep	-	-0.995^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.009
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	-
N	102
Cox and Snell	22%
Nagelkerke	31%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0,192
ROC curve	78%

Panel A. Company-years with low agency conflicts
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	0.125	0.431
Indep	-	-0.645^* * p < 0.1.	0.058
Expert×Indep	-	-0.683^ p < 0.05,	0.045
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	298
Cox and Snell	25%
Nagelkerke	36%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0.241
ROC curve	79%
Panel B. Company-years with high agency conflicts
CC_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	-0.984^* * p < 0.1.	0.057
Indep	-	-1.084^ p < 0.05,	0.039
Expert×Indep	-	-1.738^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	298
Cox and Snell	30%
Nagelkerke	43%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0,329
ROC curve	81%

Panel A. firms with an Esfand fiscal year-end
CL_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑γ_kControls_it + ∑γ_iFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it
Indep. Var.	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	1.466^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000
Indep	-	-1.455^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000
Expert×Indep	-	-1.936^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.000
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm_i	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	432
Cox and Snell	36%
Nagelkerke	51%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0.593
ROC curve	87%
Panel B. Companies with a non-Esfand fiscal year-end
*CC_it = γ₀ + γ₁ Expert _it + γ₂₁ Indep_it + γ₂₂ Expert_it × Indep_it + ∑_γkControls_it + ∑_γiFirm_i + ∑γ_tYear_t + ɛ_it*
Indep.Var	Exp.	Coef.	p-value
Expert	?	0.983^ p < 0.05,	0.024
Indep	-	-1.468^ p < 0.05,	0.038
Expert×Indep	-	-1.154^* ***** p < 0.01,	0.008
∑γ_kControls_it	Included
Constant	Included
∑γ_iFirm	Included
∑γ_tYear_t	Included
N	189
Cox and Snell	30%
Nagelkerke	43%
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	0.303
ROC curve	80%

Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola de Administração de Empresas de S.Paulo Av 9 de Julho, 2029, 01313-902 S. Paulo - SP Brasil, Tel.: (55 11) 3799-7999, Fax: (55 11) 3799-7871 - São Paulo - SP - Brazil
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