SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND PERFORMANCE OF BRAZILIAN PUBLIC COMPANIES

ARANHA, CEZAR EDUARDO; ROSSONI, LUCIANO; MENDES-DA-SILVA, WESLEY

doi:10.1590/1678-69712016/administracao.v17n1p15-39

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Gestão Humana e Social • RAM, Rev. Adm. Mackenzie 17 (1) • Feb 2016 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-69712016/administracao.v17n1p15-39 copy

SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND PERFORMANCE OF BRAZILIAN PUBLIC COMPANIES

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

ABSTRACT

Purpose:

We analyze the effect of social capital of the board of directors on the market value of Brazilian public companies listed in BM&F Bovespa. Therefore, we use as an indicator of social capital, relational resources present in the direct, indirect and heterogeneous ties to the board.

Originality/gap/relevance/implications:

Our pioneer study indicates that inconsistent results of studies evaluating board interlocking often occur because most studies only consider the centrality and the position of the companies in the network. In doing so, they disregard that relations may have greater or lower degree of social capital.

Key methodological aspects:

Empirically evaluate the relationship between companies through the directors and managers that they share,. Using social network analysis, we identified which are the directand indirect relations, as well as the structural gaps of the companies. We also measured the capital represented by each relationship from the market value of these relationships, which composed our measurement of relational resources. Then, through econometric models, we investigated the effects of relational resources on market value.

Summary of key results:

Our results showed that heterogeneous relational resources have stronger and more significant influence than available resources in the direct relations of the board, while available resources in indirect relations were not significant.

Key considerations/conclusions:

We demonstrated that the social capital really matters, because the resources provided by the alters are potential resources that can be used for the benefit of a firm, individually, It was found that structural gaps are ways to get information and various resources, enabling greater competitive advantage.

KEYWORDS
Social capital; Administrative Council; Social network analysis; Performance; Capital markets.

	Modelo 1	Modelo 2	Modelo 3	Modelo 4	Modelo 5	Modelo 6	Modelo 7
Capital social do board: relações diretas^a a Valores em bilhões (R$).				1,217^* * p < 0,1 (0,658)			-1,904 (1,227)
Capital social do board: relação indiretas^a a Valores em bilhões (R$).					0,368 (0,360)		0,486 (0,384)
Capital social do board: relações heterogêneas^a a Valores em bilhões (R$).						1,909^ p < 0,05 (0,895)	4,280^ p < 0,05 (2,085)
Capital social: propriedade cruzada^a a Valores em bilhões (R$).			0,552 (0,394)				0,765 (0,469)
Centralidade de grau		0,068 (0,079)
Eigenvector		-16,357^* * p < 0,1 (8,736)
Lacunas estruturais		-0,096 (0,125)
VARIÁVEIS DE CONTROLE
Idade da empresa (ln)	1,709^* ***** p < 0,01. (0,638)	1,624^* ***** p < 0,01. (0,621)	1,227^ p < 0,05 (0,614)	1,198^ p < 0,05 (0,606)	1,191^ p < 0,05 (0,601)	1,194^* * p < 0,1 (0,606)	1,214^ p < 0,05 (0,613)
Tamanho (ln do ativo)	0,031 (0,030)	0,033 (0,030)	0,886 (0,606)	0,903 (0,610)	0,880 (0,607)	0,907 (0,611)	0,895 (0,611)
Constante	-2,987 (1,702)	-2,634 (1,623)	-14,222 (8,949)	-14,400 (9,011)	-14,061 (8,949)	-14,448 (9,012)	-14,385 (9,014)
Teste de White	61,448^* ***** p < 0,01.	64,849^* ***** p < 0,01.	78,179^* ***** p < 0,01.	78,563^* ***** p < 0,01.	79,383^* ***** p < 0,01.	78,842^* ***** p < 0,01.	81,122^* ***** p < 0,01.
Tesde F de Chow	49,332^* ***** p < 0,01.	48,640^* ***** p < 0,01.	49,277^* ***** p < 0,01.	49,327^* ***** p < 0,01.	49,164^* ***** p < 0,01.	49,312^* ***** p < 0,01.	48,495^* ***** p < 0,01.
Teste de Breusch-Pagan	254,32^* ***** p < 0,01.	251,97^* ***** p < 0,01.	258,60^* ***** p < 0,01.	258,99^* ***** p < 0,01.	258,78^* ***** p < 0,01.	258,79^* ***** p < 0,01.	258,37^* ***** p < 0,01.
Teste de Hausman	23,444^* ***** p < 0,01.	25,539^* ***** p < 0,01.	13,941^* ***** p < 0,01.	13,938^* ***** p < 0,01.	14,473^* ***** p < 0,01.	14,123^* ***** p < 0,01.	14,622^ p < 0,05
Modelo	Fixo	Fixo	Fixo	Fixo	Fixo	Fixo	Fixo
Número de casos	513	513	501	501	501	501	501
Empresas	283	283	282	282	282	282	282
Critério de Akaike	1890,96	1894,79	1837,03	1836,89	1837,05	1836,71	1842,06
F	53,53^* ***** p < 0,01.	52,50^* ***** p < 0,01.	54,29^* ***** p < 0,01.	54,30^* ***** p < 0,01.	54,28^* ***** p < 0,01.	54,32^* ***** p < 0,01.	53,08^* ***** p < 0,01.
R²	0,985	0,985	0,986	0,986	0,986	0,986	0,986
R² ajustado	0,967	0,967	0,968	0,968	0,968	0,968	0,968

Editora Mackenzie; Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie Rua da Consolação, 896, Edifício Rev. Modesto Carvalhosa, Térreo - Coordenação da RAM, Consolação - São Paulo - SP - Brasil - cep 01302-907 - São Paulo - SP - Brazil
E-mail: revista.adm@mackenzie.br

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[TFN01] Nota: Erro padrão entre parênteses. Dummies dos setores e dos anos ocultadas.

[TFN02] ^a
Valores em bilhões (R$).

[TFN03] ^*
p < 0,1

[TFN04] ^**
p < 0,05

[TFN05] ^***
p < 0,01.

[TFN06] Fonte: Elaborada pelos autores.