Article

Power and Influence in the Green Agenda: Stakeholders and Advocacy Coalitions in Brazil

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This study identifies the types of stakeholders in advocacy coalitions within the Brazilian national green agenda subsystem from 2012 to 2021. Data were collected through documents and 17 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Additionally, 41 transcripts of National Congress hearings were coded and analyzed. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the stakeholder analysis model served as the theoretical approaches. Results show that 143 organizational stakeholders actively participated in the subsystem's political process, mostly classified as discretionary stakeholders who act as collaborators and legitimizers. The most influential stakeholders, classified as definitive stakeholders, act as agenda setters, regulators, and/or controllers. The four advocacy coalitions within the subsystem – enlightened technocrats, socio-environmentalists, modern developmentalists, and traditional developmentalists – seek to attract and influence these stakeholders. The coalitions with more definitive stakeholders achieved dominance within the subsystem. The studied period was divided into three phases. Phase 1 (during President Dilma Rousseff's government'), where control was shared between socio-environmentalists and modern developmentalists; Phase 2 (President Michel Temer's government), during which modern developmentalists took control; and Phase 3 (President Jair Bolsonaro's administration), with traditional developmentalists as the dominant coalition. This research contributes to the field of public administration by showing how coalitions build political influence through the mobilization of organizational stakeholders. Coalition dominance within the subsystem is directly related to their capacity to mobilize definitive stakeholders, highlighting the relevance of understanding stakeholder configurations and repositioning to analyze policy change and continuity.

Keywords: environmental policy; environment; advocacy coalitions; stakeholders; biodiversity and forest policy.

Poder e influência na agenda verde: *stakeholders* e coalizões de defesa no Brasil

O objetivo deste trabalho é identificar os tipos de *stakeholders* que atuaram em coalizões de defesa no subsistema nacional da agenda verde no período de 2012 a 2021. Os dados foram coletados por meio de documentos e de 17 entrevistas semiestruturadas em profundidade. Ainda, foram codificadas e analisadas 41 notas taquigráficas de audiências do Congresso Nacional. Os modelos teóricos que deram suporte ao estudo foram o *Advocacy Coalition Framework* (ACF) e modelos de análise de *stakeholders*. Os resultados mostram que 143 *stakeholders* organizacionais participaram ativamente do processo político do subsistema, sendo que a maioria foi classificada como *stakeholders* discricionários que se comportam como colaboradores e como legitimadores. Já os *stakeholders* definitivos são os mais influentes do subsistema e atuam como definidores de agenda, como reguladores e/ou como controladores. As quatro coalizões de defesa do subsistema – tecnocratas esclarecidos, socioambientalistas, desenvolvimentistas modernos e desenvolvimentistas tradicionais – buscam atrair e influenciar esses *stakeholders*. As coalizões com mais *stakeholders* definitivos conseguiram o domínio do subsistema. Na fase 1 (governo Dilma), o domínio do subsistema esteve dividido entre socioambientalistas e desenvolvimentistas modernos. Na fase 2 (governo Michel Temer), os desenvolvimentistas modernos assumiram o controle. Por fim, na fase 3 (governo Jair Bolsonaro), os desenvolvimentistas tradicionais foram a coalizão dominante. O estudo contribui para o campo da administração pública ao evidenciar como coalizões constroem influência política por meio da mobilização de *stakeholders* organizacionais. O domínio das coalizões no subsistema está diretamente relacionado à sua capacidade de mobilizar *stakeholders* definitivos, destacando a importância de compreender a configuração e o reposicionamento desses atores para a análise das mudanças e continuidades nas políticas.

Palavras-chave: política ambiental; meio ambiente; coalizões de defesa; *stakeholders*; política de biodiversidade e florestas.

Poder e influencia en la agenda verde: *stakeholders* y coaliciones de defensa en Brasil

El objetivo de este trabajo es identificar los tipos de *stakeholders* que actuaron en coaliciones de defensa dentro del subsistema nacional de la agenda verde en el período de 2012 a 2021. Los datos se recopilaron mediante documentos y 17 entrevistas semiestructuradas en profundidad. Además, se codificaron y analizaron 41 notas taquigráficas de audiencias del Congreso Nacional. Los modelos teóricos que respaldaron el estudio fueron el Marco de Coalición de Defensa (ACF) y modelos de análisis de *stakeholders*. Los resultados muestran que 143 *stakeholders* organizacionales participaron activamente en el proceso político del subsistema, de los cuales la mayoría fueron clasificados como *stakeholders* discrecionales que actúan como colaboradores y legitimadores. Los *stakeholders* definitivos son los más influyentes del subsistema y actúan como definidores de agenda, reguladores y/o controladores. Las cuatro coaliciones de defensa del subsistema –tecnócratas ilustrados, socioambientalistas, desarrollistas modernos y desarrollistas tradicionales– buscan atraer e influenciar a estos *stakeholders*. Las coaliciones con más *stakeholders* definitivos lograron el dominio del subsistema. En la fase 1 (Gobierno de Dilma Rousseff), el control del subsistema estuvo dividido entre socioambientalistas y desarrollistas modernos. En la fase 2 (Gobierno de Michel Temer), los desarrollistas modernos asumieron el control. En la fase 3 (Gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro), los desarrollistas tradicionales fueron la coalición dominante. Este estudio contribuye al campo de la administración pública al evidenciar cómo las coaliciones construyen influencia política mediante la movilización de *stakeholders* organizacionales. El dominio de las coaliciones en el subsistema está directamente relacionado con su capacidad de movilizar *stakeholders* definitivos, lo que destaca la importancia de comprender la configuración y el reposicionamiento de estos actores para analizar los cambios y las continuidades en las políticas públicas.

Palabras clave: política ambiental; medio ambiente; coaliciones de defensa; *stakeholders*; política de biodiversidad y bosques.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) aims to analyze public policy change by providing insights into the political process. The ACF allows the examination of significant technical disputes and conflicts involving multiple actors, both governmental and non-governmental (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018; Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Stakeholder analysis has been presented and used as a complement to the ACF (Siddiki & Goel, 2015; Vieira, 2021; Weible, 2006). While the ACF focuses on coalitions and their shared beliefs, stakeholder analysis focuses on the

various individual and organizational actors and their characteristics. This analysis complements the ACF by specifying the composition of advocacy coalitions. It also helps to understand how actors perceive the severity, causes, and solutions of a given problem, how resources are distributed among coalitions, and which political venues are accessible for influencing public policies (Van den Bulck, 2019; Vieira, 2021; Weible, 2006).

Stakeholder analysis has its roots in management and organizational studies from the 1970s and has since been adopted across various fields to understand the role of actors involved in specific processes (Van den Bulck, 2019). The classic definition of stakeholder, presented by Freeman (1984, p. 25), refers to "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives." Gomes and Gomes (2007, p. 82), influenced by Freeman (1984), define stakeholders as "people, groups and organizations that have some interest in an organization's success. They have power to influence the organization's behavior and performance and they are affected by the organization's operation and outcomes." In the definition provided by Gomes and Gomes (2007), the term "organization" could be replaced with "subsystem" to better fit the field explored in this study.

This article presents the empirical application of both theoretical models to *identify the types of stakeholders involved in advocacy coalitions within the national green agenda subsystem from 2012 to 2021*. This identification allows for a better understanding of power and influence mechanisms within the subsystem by analyzing how different stakeholder profiles contribute to the formation, stability, and dominance of coalitions. This mapping enables a more refined analysis of the subsystem's internal dynamics and the conditions that favor either public policy change or continuity.

Thematic focus is given to the green agenda, as defined by Araújo (2013), who characterizes it as the set of public policies aimed at protecting flora and fauna and conserving biodiversity. This conceptual delimitation ensures consistency and comparability with previous studies conducted within the same subsystem (Araújo, 2007, 2013). The ten-year timeframe aligns with recommendations from ACF scholars, who suggest policy change should be analyzed over a decade or more (Sabatier, 1988).

The green agenda includes topics related to biodiversity and forest policy. Although Brazil has an extensive body of environmental regulations, such as the National Environmental Policy (Law No. 6,938/1981), the New Forest Code (Law No. 12,651/2012), the Environmental Crimes Law (Law No. 9,605/1998), and the Wildlife Protection Law (Law No. 5,197/1967), governmental actors in this field face several challenges. Araújo (2013) identifies critical issues in environmental policy, including: excessive centralization of responsibilities in federal agencies; insufficient attention to economic instruments in environmental policy; lack of coordination between the National Environmental System (Sistema Nacional do Meio Ambiente - Sisnama) and sector-specific environmental management systems; the predominance of a utilitarian view of natural resources over an environmentalist perspective in high-impact government decisions; and a high degree of noncompliance with the legal framework.

The applicability of the ACF to environmental policies is supported by a broad range of research conducted in different countries (Bailey et al., 2023; Figueroa & Mohle, 2024). Pierce et al. (2017) reviewed 161 ACF applications published in peer-reviewed English-language journals between 2007 and 2014. Their analysis found that most ACF studies address environmental and energy issues at the national level in different continents. These applications confirm the framework's relevance to environmental topics.

In Brazil, however, environmental public policy remains relatively underexplored by public

administration scholars (Oliveira et al., 2021). A review of national public administration journals from 2013 to 2017 found that studies addressing environmental public policy accounted for only 0.69% of published articles during that period (Oliveira et al., 2021).

Thus, this study contributes to the theoretical advancement of both models by proposing a joint analysis within the national green agenda subsystem. It also aligns with the research agenda proposed by Menezes et al. (2022), employing two stakeholder analysis models simultaneously: Mitchell et al. (1997) and Gomes et al. (2010). Within the Brazilian public administration field, this study aims to advance academic discussions on environmental issues. Despite the existence of an extensive legal and regulatory framework, the environmental area continues to face several challenges, as highlighted by Araújo (2013). By identifying organizational stakeholders and mapping their involvement in coalitions vying for control of the subsystem, this research provides evidence and interpretations that support both theoretical understanding and practical reflection on how these actors influence the national green agenda.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Advocacy Coalition Framework

The ACF is based on three core premises: (1) understanding the policy change process requires a time perspective of a decade or more; (2) the policy subsystem is the primary unit of analysis for understanding political processes; and (3) public policies and programs embody implicit theories about how to achieve their goals and can therefore be conceptualized in the same way as belief systems (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018; Sabatier, 1988).

A focus on ten-year timeframes is necessary to capture at least one cycle of formulation/implementation/reformulation and to obtain a reasonably accurate picture of a policy or program's success or failure (Sabatier, 1988). Policy subsystems are defined by a specific policy issue or topic, a given territorial scope, and the presence of actors who influence the subsystem's affairs directly or indirectly.

Policy subsystems exhibit at least five defining characteristics that help interpret and apply the ACF. The first is that subsystems consist of various components that interact dynamically to produce outputs and outcomes related to a specific policy topic. These components include physical and institutional features, attributes of the actors, belief systems, and political resources. The second characteristic is the delimitation of actors who are part of a given policy issue. A policy subsystem does not include all individuals interested in or affected by policy decisions, but rather the group of actors who regularly attempt to influence the subsystem's affairs. The third characteristic is that policy subsystems are semi-independent but often overlap and interact with other subsystems. Fourth, subsystems typically hold some authority or potential for political authority. Finally, the fifth characteristic is that policy subsystems go through periods of stasis, incremental change, and major change (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).

Within a subsystem, individuals are assumed to aggregate into one or more advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions are groups of actors who share a set of beliefs and act in a coordinated way to influence public policies within a subsystem. According to Nohrstedt and Heinmiller (2024), advocacy coalitions can also be considered political organizations, insofar as they engage as collective entities

in political processes. Coalitions may be characterized as dominant—those that largely control the subsystem's policies—or minority—those that attempt to influence the political process but achieve little or no success (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).

Within the subsystem, coalitions are composed of individuals from various organizations (private sector representatives, members of nonprofit organizations, media professionals, scientists and researchers, consultants, lobbyists, among others). The ACF's conception of the individual is grounded in the premise that change in the world is primarily driven by people, not organizations. The framework assumes that individuals are boundedly rational—they are goal-oriented but do not clearly know how to achieve those goals. As a result, individuals in the subsystem process stimuli through their belief systems. Because members of coalitions share belief systems, their actions exhibit a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time.

Beliefs are divided into three levels (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018; Sabatier & Weible, 2007):

- **Deep core beliefs**: These involve very general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature, the relative priority of fundamental values such as freedom and equality, the relative importance of different social groups' well-being, the appropriate role of government versus markets in general, and who should participate in government decision-making. Deep core beliefs are not policy-specific and may apply across multiple policy subsystems.

- **Policy core beliefs**: These are specific to a given policy subsystem and therefore reflect both territorial scope and political topics. Policy core beliefs can be normative—reflecting fundamental orientations and value priorities for the policy system and for those whose well-being is a major concern in that subsystem—and empirical—providing general assessments of problem severity, underlying causes, and preferred solutions.

- **Secondary beliefs**: These have a narrower scope (a subset of the subsystem or specific instrumental means) and address, for example, detailed rules and budget applications within a specific program, the severity and causes of problems in a particular location, or public participation guidelines within a specific statute.

Based on these three premises—time, subsystem, and beliefs—the ACF can be represented by the following flowchart (Figure 1):

FIGURE 1   FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK (ACF)

Source: Jenkins-Smith et al. (2018).

The two boxes on the left side of Figure 1 represent stable and dynamic variables that constrain viable alternatives or affect the resources and beliefs of actors within the subsystem. Between these boxes lies an intermediate set of concepts addressing the nature of long-term coalition opportunity structures. On the right side, the public policy subsystem is depicted with two competing coalitions, each possessing its own beliefs and political resources and employing various strategies to influence the decisions of governmental authorities. These decisions affect institutional rules and policy outcomes. The decisions feed back into the policy subsystem but may also influence areas outside it (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018; Nohrstedt, 2011).

The ACF proposes four conceptual pathways for policy change: (1) external shocks or perturbations; (2) internal events; (3) policy-oriented learning; and (4) negotiated agreements between rival coalitions. External shocks or perturbations include events beyond the control of subsystem participants and can be found in the categories of dynamic external events or relatively stable parameters in the ACF flowchart (Figure 1). These events may involve changes in socioeconomic conditions, shifts in the

governing coalition, developments in other policy subsystems, or extreme events such as crises and disasters. Internal events, which occur within the boundaries of the subsystem and are more likely to be influenced by its participants, represent another pathway to policy change. These include crises, scandals, and policy failures that may affect coalition beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).

The third pathway to policy change is policy-oriented learning, which generally occurs incrementally over longer periods. Learning is more likely to occur in conjunction with an external or internal shock. Finally, negotiated agreements between rival coalitions constitute the fourth pathway for policy change under the ACF. These agreements can take many forms but are often facilitated by collaborative organizations that mediate negotiations (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).

1.2. The ACF and stakeholder analysis

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is an open theoretical framework that accommodates complementary approaches (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018), such as network analysis (Babon et al., 2014), stakeholder analysis (Siddiki & Goel, 2015; Vieira, 2021), institutional theory (Vieira, 2021), among other models. Stakeholder analysis has already been used by scholars applying the ACF (Siddiki & Goel, 2015; Vieira, 2021; Weible, 2006), and it helps to understand actors' perceptions of the severity, causes, and proposed solutions to a given problem, the distribution of resources among coalitions, and the political venues accessible for influencing public policy (Weible, 2006).

The ACF helps address some of the gaps and limitations of stakeholder analysis, such as the difficulty of conducting a systematic analysis, the lack of a theoretical foundation to explain the interdependence among variables that influence policy, and its limited application to a single location or policy alternative. The first limitation, presented by Weible (2006), is the challenge of systematically analyzing stakeholders due to the rapid changes in their coalitions, beliefs, strategies, and resources. The ACF, in contrast, argues that changes in the policy subsystem occur due to external and internal shocks, policy-oriented learning, and negotiated agreements between coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018). Changes driven by learning and negotiated agreements may take years to materialize. Therefore, coalitions, beliefs, resources, and strategies tend to remain stable over extended periods, allowing for systematic analysis (Weible, 2006).

Another limitation of stakeholder analysis is that typologies covering alliances, interests, policy positions, and resources typically lack a theoretical foundation to explain the interdependence among these variables and how they influence policy. In this regard, the ACF is proposed as a theoretical model that integrates these essential components of stakeholder analysis in an interconnected way. The final gap identified by Weible (2006) is that stakeholder analysis is often limited to a single location or alternative. The ACF, therefore, expands the scope of analysis to the broader political subsystem.

Stakeholder analysis can also complement the ACF by identifying the individuals, organizations, institutions, and other actors involved in a given political process and examining their characteristics. The ACF's emphasis on coalitions and shared beliefs may obscure the role that stakeholders and their actions play in the political process. Stakeholder analysis can serve as a tool for identifying the composition of advocacy coalitions within the subsystem (Van den Bulck, 2019). In this sense, the ACF combined with stakeholder analysis can offer important contributions to the systematic analysis of a political context.

There are several models for analyzing and classifying stakeholders. One is based on their potential for threat and cooperation (Savage et al., 1991); another focuses on the dimensions of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997); and a third is grounded in stakeholder behavior (Gomes et al., 2010). This study adopts two of these models: the one developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) and the one by Gomes et al. (2010).

The typology proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) classifies stakeholders based on the possession of the following attributes: (1) the power to influence the organization; (2) the legitimacy of their relationship with the organization; and (3) the urgency of their claims on the organization. According to the authors, the relevance of stakeholders within the subsystem is related to the cumulative possession of these attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) as perceived by decision-makers (Box 1).

BOX 1 **SUMMARY OF ATTRIBUTES PRESENTED IN THE TYPOLOGY OF MITCHELL ET AL. (1997)**

| Attribute	Definition	Bases
Power	A relationship between social actors in which actor A can lead actor B to do something that B would not otherwise do.	Coercive – force/threat Utilitarian – material/incentives Normative – laws/regulations
Legitimacy	A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.	Individual Organizational Social
Urgency	The degree to which stakeholder claims require immediate attention.	Time sensitivity – the degree to which administrative delay in addressing the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder Criticality – the importance of the claim or the relationship with the stakeholders

Source: Adapted from Mitchell et al. (1997).

Based on the combination of the attributes—power, legitimacy, and urgency—Mitchell et al. (1997) identify seven types of stakeholders (Figure 2). Of these, three possess only one attribute (Dormant, Discretionary, and Demanding stakeholders), three possess two (Dominant, Dangerous, and Dependent), and one type possesses all three attributes (Definitive).

Stakeholders who possess only one attribute are referred to as Latent stakeholders. This group includes Dormant, Discretionary, and Demanding stakeholders (areas 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 2). Dormant stakeholders have the power to impose their will on the organization but lack a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim; thus, their power remains unused. Discretionary stakeholders possess legitimacy but do not have the power to influence the organization or urgent claims. Demanding stakeholders possess only the attribute of urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997).

The second group, known as Expectant stakeholders, includes Dominant, Dangerous, and Dependent stakeholders, each of whom possesses two attributes (areas 4, 5, and 6 in Figure 2). Dominant stakeholders have both power and legitimacy. Dangerous stakeholders possess power and urgency, while Dependent stakeholders have legitimacy and urgency. Finally, the last group (area 7) consists of Definitive stakeholders, who possess all three attributes in the typology (Mitchell et al., 1997).

FIGURE 2   STAKEHOLDER TYPOLOGY

Source: Mitchell et al. (1997).

The model proposed by Gomes et al. (2010) classifies stakeholders into five categories based on their behavior: Regulators, Collaborators, Agenda Setters, Controllers, and Legitimizers. Regulators are those who exert influence over the budget. This group includes the central level (federal or national) and other levels of government, which are typically the main funders of public policies, as well as the

financial sector, which encompasses national and international banks, financial institutions, investment funds, and other entities that influence budget allocations.

Collaborators are internal and external agents who assist in the implementation of public policies and the delivery of public services. This group includes a wide range of stakeholders, such as the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, researchers and scientists, institutional partners, and journalists. Agenda Setters are government representatives at the central and subnational levels who can influence decision-makers by establishing goals, targets, and priorities for specific policies.

Controllers are actors who use formal and informal control mechanisms to hold public managers accountable to society. Stakeholders who play the role of Controllers include the Judiciary and oversight and auditing bodies.

Finally, Legitimizers are citizens who, through their right to vote, influence and legitimize the decisions of public officials. Local associations and other groups from civil society that organize with the goal of influencing a particular policy subsystem are stakeholders who act as Legitimizers.

3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

A qualitative research design was adopted, using a case study strategy focused on the national green agenda subsystem in Brazil, which encompasses flora protection and biodiversity conservation. This subsystem was chosen as the case study due to the applicability of the ACF to environmental issues (Araújo, 2013; Pierce et al., 2017) and because this policy field remains underexplored by public administration researchers in Brazil (Oliveira et al., 2021).

Most studies that apply the ACF as a theoretical framework use interviews and documents as their main data sources (Pierce et al., 2017). The ACF's original authors also recommend the use of documentary data for its application (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Accordingly, this study employed both documents and interviews as data collection instruments.

For the documentary research, transcripts of public hearings were collected from the Environment and Sustainable Development Committee (CMADS) of the Chamber of Deputies and the Environment Committee (CMA) of the Federal Senate, covering the period from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. In 2020, the activities of congressional committees were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and thus, no transcripts were available for that year. The transcripts were accessed through the respective committee pages on the official websites of the legislative houses. All hearings held during the study period (2012–2021) in the aforementioned committees were reviewed.

To select the relevant transcripts, the titles of the hearings—and, in some cases, the opening pages of the transcripts—were reviewed to identify those addressing one of the four major themes of the green agenda: (1) Conservation Units (CUs); (2) Forest Code; (3) Deforestation; and (4) Genetic Resources. These themes were selected based on a prior study of the green agenda subsystem (Araújo, 2013) and the frequency with which they appeared in hearings held during the analysis period (2012–2021). In some cases, transcripts of hearings were not available online. In such instances, the research team contacted the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate to request the missing records, but the response indicated that the transcripts did not exist because the committee chair had not requested their transcription. In total, 41 transcripts were selected, totaling approximately 2,202 pages.

The collected documents were analyzed using the three phases of content analysis proposed by Bardin (1977): (1) pre-analysis; (2) material exploration; and (3) treatment of results, inference, and interpretation. The analytical categories were derived from the theoretical models that guide this study (Box 2).

BOX 2   ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES

Theoretical Model	Categories	Types
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)	Beliefs	Deep core, policy core, and secondary
Stakeholder analysis	Stakeholder behavior	Regulators, Collaborators, Agenda Setters, Controllers, and Legitimizers
	Attributes	Power, Legitimacy, and Urgency

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

For this study, an operational definition of stakeholder was adopted as any organizational actor with a direct or indirect interest in the decisions, regulations, and actions related to national biodiversity and forest policy. Stakeholders were considered to be those who, between 2012 and 2021, participated in public hearings, issued formal statements, or submitted regulatory proposals to the Environment and Sustainable Development Committee (CMADS) of the Chamber of Deputies and the Environment Committee (CMA) of the Federal Senate. This includes, for example, ministries, environmental agencies, companies, NGOs, professional associations, trade groups, universities, and others.

The coding scheme for beliefs present in the green agenda subsystem, developed and validated by Araújo (2013), was imported into NVivo software using the "codes" feature. All transcripts were read in full and coded according to the components of the three levels of beliefs with the support of NVivo. The coding process aimed to define the position of each stakeholder within the analyzed subsystem. This analysis did not rely on keywords or semantic similarity techniques, but instead followed an interpretive approach aligned with Weber's Verstehen, as applied by Araújo (2013). Thus, the objective was to understand stakeholder statements in the context of the political debate under analysis.

In addition to the transcripts, bills, reports, laws, decrees, and provisional measures cited during the hearings were also reviewed to better understand and code stakeholder beliefs. Some hearing videos were also watched to complement the analysis. Statements that were ambiguous or contradictory regarding a belief within a given hearing were not coded.

After coding, the transcripts were grouped in NVivo into three phases. These phases were defined based on changes in the head of the Federal Executive Branch. The first phase corresponds to the Dilma Rousseff administration and includes hearings held between January 1, 2012, and May 12, 2016, when the president was removed from office. The second phase refers to the Michel Temer administration, from May 13, 2016, to December 31, 2018. The third and final phase corresponds

to the Jair Bolsonaro administration, from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2021. It is important to note that earlier periods were not included in the analysis, as the subsystem had already been examined in Araújo's (2013) study.

After grouping the transcripts by phase, a query was run in NVivo to cross-reference all cases (individual stakeholders) with the codes (beliefs) for each study period—that is, identifying which actors expressed which beliefs during the hearings in each phase. These queries were then exported to Microsoft Excel. Box 3 below presents an example of how the data were organized in the query. The numbers in the box represent how many times a given stakeholder expressed that particular belief across the set of hearings held during the period.

BOX 3   EXAMPLE OF QUERY GENERATED IN NVIVO FOR CASES RELATED TO CODES

Belief Code/Individual Stakeholder	Actor A	Actor B	Actor C	Actor D	Actor E
DC1. View on the human–nature relationship	0	0	0	0	0
DC1.1. Pure anthropocentric view	0	3	0	0	0
DC1.2. Moderate anthropocentric view	0	1	0	0	1
DC1.3. Ecocentrism	0	0	0	1	0
DC1.4. Biocentrism	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Next, each individual was linked to the organization they represented during the period under analysis. Based on this, a spreadsheet was created for each organization, listing the beliefs expressed by its representatives in each phase of the study. The organizations that were most frequently present in the hearings were analyzed individually. However, several organizations participated only once in the legislative debate or did not express a significant number of beliefs to allow for separate analysis. These organizations were grouped based on their similarities, such as representatives of municipal governments. As a result, it was not possible to determine the coalition of representatives from Quiterianópolis/CE specifically, but it was possible to identify the beliefs—and therefore the coalition— of the majority of municipal representatives who participated in the hearings during that period.

This study followed the procedures developed and validated by Araújo (2007, 2013) to identify the members of each coalition within the green agenda subsystem. The author applied a scale system to "measure the degree of deviation in the positions of the main actors from the standard stance associated with the coalitions identified as potentially existing through purely qualitative analysis" (Araújo, 2007, p. 102). The use of such a scale system is recommended by the original authors of the ACF (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993).

The scale system employed values ranging from 0 (zero) to -3 (minus three). A value of zero represents the expected belief for a given coalition, while -3 represents the greatest possible divergence. For example, it is expected that the traditional developmentalist coalition will hold a purely utilitarian view of natural resources, coded as DC3.1. Therefore, for this code (DC3.1), the expected value for

that coalition is 0 (zero). Conversely, the socio-environmentalist coalition is expected to be completely opposed to that belief, and therefore its value for that code is -3 (minus three).

Because the components of the documentary analysis code contain a variable number of items, the initial scale system developed by Araújo (2007) applied the following values: for components with three items: 0, -1.5, and -3; for components with four items: 0, -1, -2, and -3; and for components with five items: 0, -0.75, -1.5, -2.25, and -3. In her second application of the coding system within the subsystem, the author made specific adjustments to the scales used (Araújo, 2013).

The identification of stakeholder membership in each coalition across the three phases of the study was carried out by assigning each stakeholder to the coalition for which they had the lowest average deviation from the expected belief profile—that is, the coalition for which their belief profile was closest to zero.

As previously mentioned, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was created for each organizational stakeholder, listing the codes of their beliefs and the number of times each belief was coded for that organization. Based on this spreadsheet, the average deviation of each stakeholder's position relative to each coalition was calculated. This calculation was replicated for all stakeholders across all identified coalitions.

Following the procedure adopted by Araújo (2013, p. 199), "the component value (C) represents the weighted average of the items that comprise it and that were observed for each actor" (Figure 3).

FIGURE 3   **COMPONENT CALCULATION FORMULA**

$$C = \sum_{j=k}^{l} (I_j \times Q_j) \bigg/ \sum_{j=k}^{l} Q_j$$

Where:
I represents the value assigned to each component item;
Q represents the number of occurrences of each component item;
k represents the first item with a frequency, and l the last item with a frequency for each actor.

Source: Araújo (2013, p. 199).

The score value was established based on the scale system. The average deviation of the position (AD) is the simple mean of the components, as shown in the formula in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4   **CALCULATION FORMULA OF THE AVERAGE DEVIATION FROM EXPECTED POSITIONING**

$$DM = \sum_{i=m}^{n} C_i / T$$

Where:

C represents each observed component;

T represents the total number of components calculated for each political actor;

m represents the first calculated component, and *n* the last calculated component.

Source: Araújo (2013, p. 202).

The analysis of coalitions within the subsystem was complemented by stakeholders' statements during the analyzed hearings, by the actions carried out by these actors throughout the study period, and by interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 17 actors who were active in the subsystem during the analyzed period. These actors were identified through the documentary analysis. The interviews complemented the document analysis and provided deeper insight into the green agenda subsystem from the perspective of those directly involved. The interviews were conducted in July and August 2022, with an average duration of 1 hour and 14 minutes. Authorization was requested from the interviewees for audio recording, and the interviews were subsequently transcribed. Content analysis was applied to the interview data.

4. RESULTS

4.1. Stakeholder analysis

In the public hearings held by the National Congress between 2012 and 2021 that addressed biodiversity and forest policy, 300 individual stakeholders participated in the debates, representing 143 organizations (collective or organizational stakeholders). These stakeholders held varying degrees of importance and influence within the subsystem. In light of this, Mitchell et al. (1997) propose a classification of stakeholder salience based on three attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Below is the classification of the organizational stakeholders within the analyzed subsystem based on the combination of these three attributes defined by Mitchell et al. (1997).

The first attribute is the power to influence the subsystem, which may be coercive, normative, or utilitarian. Some organizational stakeholders within the subsystem exhibited more than one type of power, such as the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, the Ministry of the Environment (Ministério do Meio Ambiente - MMA), the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis - Ibama), the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade - ICMBio), and the Brazilian Forest Service (Serviço Florestal Brasileiro - SFB), all of which hold normative power, based on laws and regulations, as well as utilitarian power, based on

financial or material resources. In contrast, the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento - Mapa), the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio - MDIC), the Ministry of Agrarian Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário - MDA), the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público da União - MPU), and legal experts have only normative power. The Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação - MCTI) and its affiliated research institutes—the National Institute for Amazonian Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia - INPA) and the National Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais - INPE)—along with the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management, the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES), the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq), and the Boticário Group Foundation for Nature Protection, all provided financial and material resources to the subsystem and therefore hold utilitarian power. The armed forces, in turn, possess coercive power, grounded in physical force or control mechanisms (Mitchell et al., 1997).

Legitimacy was attributed to all analyzed stakeholders. Since these organizations and their representatives were identified through public hearings in the National Congress, they are considered legitimate by the subsystem and, therefore, are invited to participate in legislative debates. Although stakeholders hold divergent beliefs and perceptions about the subsystem—as will be shown in the analysis of advocacy coalitions—they are still regarded as legitimate within the constructed social system. This does not mean, however, that there are no illegitimate stakeholders within the subsystem. Actors involved in environmental crimes in Brazil are examples of illegitimate stakeholders. The MMA itself experienced a decline in legitimacy in the subsystem during the 2019–2021 period, as identified by other authors (Capelari et al., 2020). Moreover, other stakeholders stated during the hearings that this was the worst period for environmental policy and that the Minister of the Environment acted against the sector. "The truth is, Minister, with your arrival at the Ministry in 2019, we experienced the worst year environmentally in Brazil, the worst" (Delgado, Federal Deputy, public hearing on October 9, 2019, at CMADS in the Chamber of Deputies).

Finally, the last attribute analyzed is the urgency of the stakeholder's claims within the subsystem (Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholders with this attribute include: the Chamber of Deputies; the Federal Senate; the MMA; Ibama; ICMBio; SFB; the Office of the Chief of Staff; Mapa; MDA; MPU and legal experts; the National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (Confederação Nacional da Agricultura e Pecuária - CNA); the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa); the Institute for Agricultural Thought; the National Indigenous Foundation (Fundação Nacional do Índio - Funai); the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária - Incra); the Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União - TCU); BNDES; the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management; and the government of the state of Mato Grosso. It is noteworthy that most stakeholders who demonstrate urgency in their demands are linked to branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary). Within the analyzed subsystem, civil society representatives (NGOs, associations, institutes, etc.) rarely succeeded in imposing urgency on the policy process. The CNA and the Institute for Agricultural Thought are exceptions to this pattern, as their strong ties to members of Congress—particularly the agribusiness parliamentary front—enable them to demand urgency

for their policy agendas. In the green agenda subsystem, out of the 143 organizational stakeholders identified, only 13 were classified as Definitive stakeholders (Box 4).

BOX 4   CLASSIFICATION OF THE MAIN STAKEHOLDERS ACCORDING TO MITCHELL ET AL. (1997) AND GOMES ET AL. (2010)

Definitive (power, legitimacy and urgency)	
Federal Senate (Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller)	MDA (Agenda Setter)
Chamber of Deputies (Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller)	Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management (Regulator)
MMA (Agenda Setter and Regulator)	Office of the Chief of Staff (Agenda Setter)
IBAMA (Agenda Setter and Regulator)	Representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office and legal experts (Controller)
ICMBio (Agenda Setter and Regulator)	TCU (Controller)
SFB (Agenda Setter and Regulator)	BNDES (Regulator)
MAPA (Agenda Setter and Regulator)	
Dominant (power and legitimacy)	
ABRAMPA (Controller)	MDIC (Collaborator)
Boticário Group Foundation for Nature Protection (Regulator)	MCTI (Collaborator)
INPA (Collaborator)	CNPq (Regulator)
INPE (Collaborator)	Armed Forces (Collaborator)
Dependent (legitimacy and urgency)	
CNA (Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer)	FUNAI (Collaborator)
EMBRAPA (Collaborator and Agenda Setter)	INCRA (Collaborator)
State of Mato Grosso (Collaborator and Agenda Setter)	Institute for Agricultural Thought (Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer)

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Dominant stakeholders possess both power and legitimacy, lacking only the attribute of urgency to be classified as Definitive. Organizations placed in this group are also considered relevant to the analyzed subsystem and may be part of the dominant coalition. Dependent stakeholders, on the other hand, hold legitimacy and urgency but lack power within the subsystem, and therefore must align with those who do possess power. The National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) is classified as a Dependent stakeholder because, although it has legitimacy and urgency, it lacks any of the three types of power—normative, utilitarian, or coercive. However, CNA forms alliances with members of the National Congress and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply (Mapa)—who do possess power—and thereby manages to influence the policy process.

Finally, most stakeholders were classified as Discretionary, as they possess only the attribute of legitimacy and therefore have less influence over the subsystem. This group includes representatives of municipal and state governments (with the exception of the state of Mato Grosso), NGOs, associations, councils, federations, universities, research institutes, professional organizations, among other institutions. Although state and municipal governments may hold power at their respective levels, in the context of the national green agenda they have not acted as stakeholders with power. As noted by Interviewee 6: "This increased environmental activism by state governments is very welcome. I think it's very important, but still incipient. Municipal governments are still not very active in these biodiversity and forest-related environmental agendas." The state of Mato Grosso, unlike other states, had a significant presence in the hearings, addressing topics related to its Conservation Units (CUs) as well as the implementation of the Forest Code and deforestation. Therefore, this stakeholder, in addition to legitimacy, was the only state to exhibit the attribute of urgency within the subsystem.

Another way to classify these actors is by their behavior within the subsystem. Gomes et al. (2010) propose a classification of stakeholders into five categories based on their behavior: Regulators, Collaborators, Agenda Setters, Controllers, and Legitimizers. Most stakeholders classified as Definitive behaved as Agenda Setters, as they are representatives of the federal government who make decisions or influence decision-makers by establishing goals, targets, and priorities for the green agenda. Although not Definitive stakeholders, CNA, Embrapa, the Institute for Agricultural Thought, and the state of Mato Grosso also acted as Agenda Setters during the period analyzed, as they were able to influence decision-makers regarding subsystem priorities. The Institute for Agricultural Thought brings together various producer and livestock associations, agricultural and livestock federations, CNA, and other agribusiness-related institutions and, through this collective effort, is able to influence decision-makers on its policy priorities, as described by Interviewee 12:

> […] from the moment the Forest Code was introduced, there was a shift in the pattern of the debate, where attacks on environmental issues became much more coordinated and structured, using the strength of the agribusiness caucus within Congress. It was at that point that the agribusiness caucus and the agribusiness sector organized themselves through an institute called IPA—the Institute for Agricultural Thought—which is heavily funded by companies and, therefore, began to advocate for commercial interests using state apparatus and power to establish those interests as part of the legislative agenda.

Among the Definitive stakeholders, some organizations, in addition to behaving as Agenda Setters, also act as Regulators due to their financial influence over the subsystem. This is the case for the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), Ibama, ICMBio, the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply (Mapa). Controllers are stakeholders who use oversight and accountability mechanisms over the government (Gomes et al., 2010). The National Congress (Federal Senate and Chamber of Deputies), the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and legal experts behave as Controllers within the subsystem.

Finally, all stakeholders classified as Discretionary—including representatives of municipal and state governments, NGOs, associations, councils, federations, universities, research institutes, professional entities, and other institutions—possess only the attribute of legitimacy and therefore

behave as Collaborators and/or Legitimizers. Legitimizers are citizens or civil society groups who influence and legitimize government decisions (Gomes et al., 2010). Most stakeholders acting as Legitimizers were also classified as Collaborators, since they contribute to the implementation and delivery of services related to biodiversity and forest policy. This pattern differs from that observed in other subsystems, such as health and education, where most Legitimizers (e.g., students and patients, along with their associations) do not directly implement public policy—this being the role of Collaborators. However, in biodiversity and forest policy, small-scale farmers who legitimize the policy are also involved in its implementation.

Stakeholders classified as Definitive, Dominant, and Dependent according to the model of Mitchell et al. (1997) are the most important and influential actors in the subsystem. They predominantly behave as Agenda Setters, Regulators, and Controllers, according to the typology proposed by Gomes et al. (2010).

4.2. Advocacy Coalitions

The following section presents the beliefs and stakeholders that compose each coalition by phase of the study. The phases were defined based on changes in the head of the Federal Executive Branch.

4.2.1. Enlightened Technocrats

The Enlightened Technocrats were present in the decision-making processes of the green agenda in the National Congress throughout all three phases of the study and are characterized by the following set of beliefs (Araújo, 2013): biocentrism or ecocentrism; a focus on intergenerational equity; a focus on the preservation of natural resources; prioritization of technical-scientific knowledge; support for a strong state in environmental protection; prioritization of government decisions made by a ruling elite; advocacy for public policies guided by deontological ethics; centralization of major governmental decisions at the federal level; emphasis on regulatory instruments in environmental policy; limited consideration of the private sector's role in solving environmental problems; reinforcement of monitoring and enforcement to prevent and control deforestation; fulfillment of social and environmental obligations as a constitutive element of property rights; prioritization of Strict Protection Conservation Units; and an omission regarding the rights of traditional populations.

In the first phase, which corresponds to the Dilma Rousseff administration (2012–2016), the Enlightened Technocrats coalition was composed of seven stakeholders: three classified as Definitive, one as Dominant, one as Dependent, and two as Discretionary (Box 5). Thus, more than half of the coalition's members had power within the subsystem. However, when analyzing their behavior, only Ibama and Mapa were classified as Agenda Setters and Regulators. Therefore, analyzing only the attributes of the stakeholders that make up the coalition may give the impression that it was the dominant coalition in the subsystem during that period. However, the behavior of the stakeholders suggests a different scenario. While the coalition includes important actors within the subsystem, it does not have sufficient influence to be considered the dominant coalition.

BOX 5   STAKEHOLDERS OF THE ENLIGHTENED TECHNOCRATS COALITION BY PHASE

Phase	Stakeholders	Stakeholder classification
Phase 1 – Dilma (2012 – May 2016)	Academics and research organizations	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Embrapa*	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
	IBAMA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	IMAZON	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	MAPA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	MDIC	Dominante; Collaborator.
	Public Prosecutor's Office	Definitive; Controller.
Phase 2 – Temer (May 2016 – 2018)	Embrapa*	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
	MCTI	Dominante; Collaborator.
	CNA*	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator and Legitimizer.
Phase 3 – Bolsonaro (2019 – 2021)	State Governments	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Municipal Governments	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	IPAM	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	MCTI	Dominante; Collaborator.
	OAB	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Environmental NGOs	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	UFMG	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	USP*	Discretionary; Collaborator.

*Stakeholders classified in more than one coalition during the same period

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

During the Michel Temer administration (2016–2018), which corresponds to the second phase of the study, only three organizations were classified as part of the Enlightened Technocrats coalition: Embrapa, CNA, and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MCTI). However, in this phase, CNA also supported beliefs aligned with the Modern Developmentalist coalition, and Embrapa with both the Traditional Developmentalist and Socio-environmentalist coalitions. The classification of these organizations into more than one coalition reveals the ambiguity of their positions in the hearings analyzed. CNA is the only Dominant stakeholder in the coalition during this period, but it behaved as a Collaborator within the subsystem. Thus, Phase 2 can be considered the period of greatest weakening of the Enlightened Technocrats, at least within the scope of debates in the National Congress.

In the Jair Bolsonaro administration (2019–2021), the third phase analyzed in the national green agenda, the Enlightened Technocrats coalition included the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia - Ipam), MCTI, the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil - OAB), the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), environmental NGOs, and also representatives from state and municipal governments. The University of São Paulo (USP) was classified as both Enlightened Technocrat and Socio-environmentalist. In this third phase, the coalition had the largest number of organizations represented in National Congress hearings. However, most stakeholders in the coalition were Discretionary and behaved as Collaborators. Therefore, having a greater number of actors supporting the coalition's beliefs in the hearings was not enough for the coalition to exert significant influence on the political process related to the green agenda.

As in the study by Araújo (2013), the Enlightened Technocrats coalition did not dominate the subsystem in any of the phases analyzed. In fact, in Phases 2 and 3, the coalition had even less influence in the subsystem, primarily due to the absence of Definitive stakeholders defending its beliefs.

4.2.2. Socio-environmentalist

The Socio-environmentalist coalition is represented by the following set of beliefs: ecocentrism or moderate anthropocentrism; a focus on both intragenerational and intergenerational equity; reconciliation between sustainable use and conservation; prioritization of traditional knowledge and cultural aspects; state intervention; democratic and participatory processes in government decision-making; support for public policies guided by deontological ethics; appreciation of various types of environmental policy instruments; caution regarding the role of the private sector in solving environmental problems; concern for regional and local specificities and interests; recognition of the consultative and deliberative role of collegial bodies with civil society participation; defense of the rights of traditional populations; regulation of human presence in Conservation Units (CUs); and advocacy for the allocation of public forests to traditional populations or local communities (Araújo, 2013).

During the Dilma Rousseff administration (Phase 1), the Socio-environmentalist coalition was more prominent in political debates, with a large number of organizations defending the beliefs of this coalition (Box 6). Representatives from the federal executive and legislative branches, state and municipal governments, civil society, and academia were part of this coalition. Within the analyzed period, Phase 1 represents the moment of greatest strength and influence of the Socio-environmentalist coalition in the political agenda, even after the defeat regarding the content of the 2012 Forest Code (Law No. 12,651/2012). An analysis of the attributes and behaviors of the stakeholders that comprise this coalition reveals that key representatives of the executive branch (MMA, SFB, ICMBio) and the legislative branch (members of parliament, except those linked to the agribusiness sector) were part of the Socio-environmentalists, giving prominence within the subsystem to the coalition's goals.

BOX 6   STAKEHOLDERS OF THE SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTALIST COALITION BY PHASE

Phase	Stakeholders	Stakeholder classification
Phase 1 – Dilma (2012 – May 2016)	APIB	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	Other federal public entities	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	State governments	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Government of Mato Grosso	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
	Municipal governments	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	ICMBio	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	ISA	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	MMA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	OAB	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	NGOs (except environmentalists)	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	Environmental NGOs	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	Environmentalist parliamentarians	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	Parliamentarians (others)	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	SFB	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	SOS Mata Atlântica	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	UNB	Discretionary; Collaborator.
Phase 2 – Temer (May 2016 – 2018)	Embrapa*	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
Phase 3 – Bolsonaro (2019 – 2021)	Private companies	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Public Prosecutor's Office	Definitive; Controller.
	Environmentalist parliamentarians	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	Parliamentarians (others)	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	SOS Mata Atlântica	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
	USP*	Discretionary; Collaborator.

*Stakeholders classified in more than one coalition during the same period

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

An analysis based solely on the final classification of organizations within their respective coalitions might suggest that the Socio-environmentalist coalition was the dominant one in Phase 1. However, the interview data revealed that subsystem dominance during this period appears to have been shared between the Socio-environmentalists and the Modern Developmentalists, with both sides experiencing gains and losses. Interviewee 8, a representative of the Ministry of the Environment

(MMA) during Phase 1, highlighted the government's alignment with agribusiness representatives—classified as Modern Developmentalists: "we became much closer to a part of the agribusiness sector, and that sector is quite complicated, but they came." In Phases 2 and 3, the representation of the Socio-environmentalist coalition in National Congress hearings declined significantly (Box 6).

In Phase 2, under the Michel Temer administration, only Embrapa was classified as Socio-environmentalist. However, the organization also defended beliefs aligned with the Traditional Developmentalist and Enlightened Technocrat coalitions, indicating that its representatives' positioning during this period was not clearly defined. This marks the period of greatest weakening for the Socio-environmentalist coalition in congressional hearings.

In the third phase, during the Jair Bolsonaro administration, the coalition once again appeared in the analyzed documents, though with less influence than in Phase 1. Members of the Socio-environmentalist coalition included representatives from private companies, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, legal professionals, parliamentarians (excluding those aligned with agribusiness), the SOS Mata Atlântica Foundation, and the University of São Paulo (USP). USP was also classified as part of the Enlightened Technocrat coalition in Phase 3. The coalition included Definitive stakeholders such as public prosecutors and certain environmentalist parliamentarians, but it lacked any representation within the federal executive branch, which weakened its influence during this period.

The Public Prosecutor's Office, environmentalist parliamentarians, the Socio-environmental Institute (Instituto Socioambiental - ISA), and USP were classified as Socio-environmentalist in Araújo's (2013) study. These organizations have maintained alignment over time regarding their beliefs and positions within the National Congress. According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), such long-term alignment contributes to the credibility of organizations within the policy process.

4.2.3. Modern Developmentalist

The main beliefs of the Modern Developmentalists, as defended by key stakeholders in the subsystem, include: moderate anthropocentrism; concern for intragenerational equity; sustainable use of natural resources; prioritization of technical-scientific knowledge; preference for market mechanisms over state intervention; support for joint governmental decision-making with selected civil society groups; a pragmatic perspective on the value of public policies; cautious decentralization of government decisions; strong emphasis on economic instruments; broad participation of the private sector in solving environmental problems; deforestation control through the promotion of environmentally sustainable activities; prioritization of Sustainable Use Conservation Units; an ambiguous stance on the rights of traditional populations; limited consideration of the role of collegial bodies; and support for forest concessions to private entities (Araújo, 2013).

In Phase 1, the Modern Developmentalists were composed of representatives from the agribusiness sector (producer and livestock associations, agricultural and livestock federations, the Institute for Agricultural Thought, among others), Ipam, MCTI, agribusiness-aligned parliamentarians, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and technical experts who declared no organizational affiliation (Box 7). The parliamentarians linked to the agribusiness sector were the only Definitive stakeholders in the Modern Developmentalists during Phase 1. However, they held considerable political power within the National Congress and acted as Agenda Setters, Regulators, and Controllers in the subsystem, as illustrated in the following excerpt: "[...] after 2012, there was a greater coordination of attacks, a

very organized and forceful pushback against environmental legislation, coming from Congress and the agribusiness caucus. The Forest Code was really a turning point for all of this" (Interviewee 12).

In Phase 1, the dominance of the subsystem, as previously mentioned, appears to have been shared between the Socio-environmentalists and the Modern Developmentalists. In Phase 2, under the Michel Temer administration, the Modern Developmentalists dominated the debate in the National Congress. Mapa, SFB, CNA, and representatives from the agribusiness sector were Definitive and Dependent stakeholders who held significant influence within the subsystem and were part of the group during this period. In Phase 3, the Modern Developmentalists became even stronger with the addition of other Definitive stakeholders, such as MMA, ICMBio, and agribusiness-aligned parliamentarians. The Bolsonaro administration marked the period of greatest dominance by the Modern Developmentalists in the subsystem.

However, as discussed in the next section, the organizations that make up the Modern Developmentalists expressed a discourse consistent with this coalition's beliefs, but their actions were more aligned with the beliefs of the Traditional Developmentalists. Thus, the group that effectively dominated the subsystem in the third phase appears to be the Traditional Developmentalists with a Modern Developmentalist narrative.

BOX 7   STAKEHOLDERS OF THE MODERN DEVELOPMENTALIST COALITION BY PHASE

Phase	Stakeholders	Stakeholder classification
Phase 1 – Dilma (2012 – May 2016)	Agribusiness sector	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	IPAM	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	MCTI	Dominant; Collaborator.
	Agribusiness sector parliamentarians	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	Technicians and experts	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	The Nature Conservancy – TNC	Discretionary; Collaborator and Legitimizer.
Phase 2 – Temer (May 2016 – 2018)	Agribusiness sector	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	CNA*	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	MAPA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	OAB*	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	SFB	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	UFMG	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	UNB	Discretionary; Collaborator.

(Continue)

Phase	Stakeholders	Stakeholder classification
Phase 3 – Bolsonaro (2019 – 2021)	Academics and research organizations	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Agribusiness sector	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	CNA	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	Embrapa	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
	Other federal public entities	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	ICMBIO	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	MAPA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	MMA	Definitive; Agenda Setter and Regulator.
	Agribusiness sector parliamentarians	Definitive; Agenda Setter, Regulator, and Controller.
	UNB	Discretionary; Collaborator.

*Stakeholders classified in more than one coalition during the same period

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

4.2.4. Traditional Developmentalists

The main beliefs of the Traditional Developmentalists include: a purely anthropocentric worldview; low concern for equity; a utilitarian view of natural resources; disregard for knowledge; prioritization of government decisions made by a ruling elite; support for decentralization in environmental policy; support for a strong state presence in promoting private initiatives aimed at economic growth; opposition to environmental policy instruments; emphasis on private sector participation; the view that controlling deforestation and environmental degradation should not hinder economic activities; limited consideration of the role of collegial bodies; disregard for the rights of traditional populations; and advocacy for the allocation of public forests to private producers (Araújo, 2013).

In Phase 1, the Traditional Developmentalists included CNA, Embrapa, and some private companies that participated in National Congress hearings. None of these stakeholders were Definitive—that is, they did not hold the power attribute. However, CNA and Embrapa acted as Agenda Setters due to their strong influence over decision-makers. In Phase 2, members of this group included representatives from municipal governments, the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), and Embrapa. The latter two organizations were classified in more than one group during the same period, indicating ambiguity in the beliefs they defended in the analyzed hearings.

BOX 8   STAKEHOLDERS OF THE TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENTALIST COALITION BY PHASE

Phase	Stakeholders	Stakeholder classification
Phase 1 – Dilma (2012 – May 2016)	CNA	Dependent; Agenda Setter, Collaborator, and Legitimizer.
	Private companies	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Embrapa*	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
Phase 2 – Temer (May 2016 – 2018)	Municipal governments	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	OAB*	Discretionary; Collaborator.
	Embrapa*	Dependent; Collaborator and Agenda Setter.
Phase 3 – Bolsonaro (2019 – 2021)		

*Stakeholders classified in more than one coalition during the same period

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Although the beliefs expressed during the National Congress hearings in the third phase of the research indicate that there were no organizations explicitly aligned with the Traditional Developmentalists, the statements made by representatives of other coalitions suggest that federal government actors acted according to the beliefs of this group. "[...] we currently have an *anti-environmental government in the country*. We have a legislative measure that tries to provide some level of protection to the forests — not all, and not enough — and we have a government playing on the opposing side" (Astrini, representing Greenpeace, at the public hearing on May 21, 2019, at CMADS of the Chamber of Deputies, emphasis added). "I notice that we have entered a new scenario, one that is even darker. [...] Today, we see that it is no longer possible to identify either developmentalism or agribusiness interests, but *rather a hatred of the environment*" (Figueiredo, representing the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, at the public hearing on July 4, 2019, at CMADS of the Chamber of Deputies, emphasis added).

When analyzing stakeholder beliefs in public documents, the authors of the ACF themselves raise the following question: "How does the researcher know if the speakers are expressing their 'true' opinions?" (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 243). According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), actors tend to maintain consistency in their beliefs to avoid losing credibility within the policy subsystem. This assertion, however, would apply only to representatives and organizations that seek credibility in the political subsystem. The stakeholders belonging to the Traditional Developmentalists appear not to be concerned with this factor. Capelari et al. (2020) point to the declining legitimacy of this group within the green agenda subsystem and in the eyes of other coalitions. Thus, it is not that the Traditional Developmentalists no longer exist — quite the contrary. The speeches, appeals, and denunciations made during the hearings prove that they are stronger than ever in the political process, albeit with rhetoric that reflects milder beliefs, which end up aligning with the Modern Developmentalists. Their actions (see Box 9), however, reveal a stance clearly aligned with the

Traditional Developmentalists, as already identified by other researchers (Capelari et al., 2020) and pointed out by representatives of other coalitions.

BOX 9   COMPARISON BETWEEN ACTIONS AND BELIEFS OF THE TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENTALIST COALITION

Beliefs of the Traditional Developmentalist Coalition	Actions taken
Prioritization of government decisions by a ruling elite Little consideration for the role of collegiate bodies	- Reduction of the number of counselors in the National Environmental Council (Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente – CONAMA) from 96 to 23, harming the representation of NGOs and states.
Disregard for knowledge	- Distrust and discredit of environmental research institutions' programs, such as INPE's forest monitoring systems, by the president. Dismissal of INPE's director in 2019 after a clash with Bolsonaro over deforestation data.
Belief that deforestation and environmental degradation control should not hinder economic activities	- Termination of the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (Plano de Controle do Desmatamento da Amazônia - PPCDAm), in place since 2004; - Dissolution of the Amazon Fund's Steering and Technical Committees, worsening the diplomatic crisis with donors. The lack of governance structures put the fund at risk and triggered several consequences for environmental policies.
Advocacy of a strong State role in promoting private initiatives aimed at economic growth	- Bill by Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PSL/RJ) and Senator Marcio Bittar (MDB/AC) to revoke the legal reserve areas in the Forest Code, enabling economic exploitation of these areas; - Open letter from the National Association of Environmental Career Civil Servants (Associação Nacional de Servidores da Carreira de Meio Ambiente - Ascema Nacional) to society, denouncing repeated negative remarks by Minister Ricardo Salles about ICMBio staff.
Opposition to environmental policy instruments	- Issuance of Provisional Measure No. 867/2018. The original aim was to postpone the deadline for regularization of rural properties not compliant with the 2012 Brazilian Forest Code, but the measure received 35 amendments that could have blocked the recovery of deforested areas and granted amnesty to noncompliant landowners.
Utilitarian view of natural resources	- Transfer of SFB from MMA to MAPA.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

This scenario, of a government opposed to environmental protection (in the third phase of the study), led organizations from coalitions that have historically acted on opposing sides of the political process to cooperate in an effort to prevent governmental setbacks. A clear example of this mobilization was the response to Provisional Measure 867/2018, which amended Law No. 12.651/2012 (the Forest Code). During the hearings specifically focused on this topic—or held close to the voting period of the measure in Congress—representatives from the CNA positioned themselves against the measure alongside environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, after the changes the provisional measure underwent during the legislative process. The following excerpt illustrates this stance: "At the end of this hearing, *I'll be sitting next to Greenpeace* – I hope no one sends pictures to my boss, but I think today we're having a very convergent conversation" (Brito, representing CNA, at the public hearing on May 21, 2019, at CMADS of the Chamber of Deputies, emphasis added).

The approval of the 2012 Forest Code, which increased the productive use of protected areas and granted amnesty to producers who deforested until July 2008, is credited to the economic and political power of agribusiness in Brazil and to the timid and uncoordinated actions of environmental NGOs during the legislative process. Thus, the 2012 Forest Code is considered a major victory for the Traditional Developmentalists, despite opposition from the Socio-environmentalists and the Enlightened Technocrats (Araújo, 2013; Capelari et al., 2020). However, in 2019, the same coalitions that had fought against the Code were now defending it in light of the government's current proposals to weaken it, as reflected in the following testimony: "We already lost a lot with the 2012 Code. I even joked here with my colleague Gabriel that *I never thought I'd be defending the 2012 Code.* And here I am defending the 2012 Code" (Graça, representing the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, at the public hearing on May 22, 2019, at CMADS of the Chamber of Deputies, emphasis added).

The joint action of the Socio-environmentalists, Enlightened Technocrats, and even members of the Modern Developmentalists against Provisional Measure 867/2018 and in defense of maintaining the current Forest Code produced results. The measure was approved in the Chamber of Deputies but expired in the Federal Senate — in other words, it was not voted on within the established timeframe and therefore lost its legal effect (Provisional Measure No. 867, 2018, 2018).

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The objective of this study was to identify the types of stakeholders that acted within advocacy coalitions in the national green agenda subsystem from 2012 to 2021. To achieve this goal, stakeholders operating in the subsystem during the period were first identified and classified. A total of 300 individual stakeholders were identified, representing 143 organizations (collective or organizational stakeholders). Most of the stakeholders identified are discretionary, possessing only the attribute of legitimacy and acting as collaborators and legitimizers. The most influential stakeholders in the subsystem are the definitive ones, who act as agenda setters, regulators, and/or controllers. These stakeholders were highly contested by the coalitions, as they hold formal and legal authority over political decision-making.

Next, the advocacy coalitions that operated in the green agenda and their respective belief systems were characterized. The four coalitions identified by Araújo (2013) remain active in the subsystem; however, their members and levels of influence varied according to changes in the federal executive power (study phases). The Enlightened Technocrats had more influence in Phase 1 (Dilma

Rousseff's administration), as they were supported by definitive stakeholders. Nevertheless, they never became the dominant coalition in the subsystem. The Socio-environmentalists were more present in the political debates and included more significant stakeholders during Phase 1. In that phase, the subsystem's dominance appears to have been shared between the Socio-environmentalists and the Modern Developmentalists. In Phase 2, the Socio-environmentalists were practically absent from the congressional hearings.

The Modern Developmentalists maintained relevant stakeholders throughout all three phases of the study, many linked to the productive sector, such as agribusiness representatives, members of the ruralist congressional caucus, MAPA, EMBRAPA, and CNA. In Phase 1, this coalition shared subsystem dominance with the Socio-environmentalists. In Phase 2, under Michel Temer's administration, Modern Developmentalist stakeholders dominated the debate in Congress. Phase 3 marked the height of their dominance in the subsystem.

Stakeholders from the Traditional Developmentalist coalition defended their belief system, but their discourse aligned with the beliefs of the Modern Developmentalists. The beliefs held by the Traditional Developmentalists are the most contrary to environmental protection. In congressional debates, few actors explicitly expressed support for those beliefs; even Minister Ricardo Salles was classified as a Modern Developmentalist based on his discourse. Therefore, it was necessary to go beyond speech analysis and examine their actions. It was through this lens that the Traditional Developmentalist coalition was found to dominate the subsystem in Phase 3, despite expressing a Modern Developmentalist discourse in Congress. There was a mobilization effort in Phase 3 in which historically opposed coalitions joined forces to act against the dominant coalition—the Traditional Developmentalists.

The study's results contribute to the understanding of power and influence dynamics in Brazil's green agenda subsystem. Advocacy coalitions competed and collaborated with different stakeholders, and the capacity to mobilize these actors directly influenced each coalition's dominance in the subsystem. When a coalition becomes dominant, it is more likely that its belief system will be reflected in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Thus, the reorganization of stakeholders over different governments shifted the balance of power among coalitions and impacted the subsystem.

Moreover, stakeholder classification and mapping allowed for empirical verification of the distinct roles these actors play within coalitions. This offers a new perspective on environmental governance, demonstrating that coalition dynamics are strongly influenced by the stakeholders that comprise them.

The main limitations of this study were: the lack of some transcripts for analysis, especially from Phase 3; the difficulty in interviewing members from all subsystem coalitions—only two members of the Traditional Developmentalist coalition were interviewed, as the others declined or did not respond to the invitation; and the inconsistency between the speeches delivered during hearings and the actual actions of certain subsystem stakeholders.

For future research, it is suggested that scholars investigate how stakeholders' narratives in Congress serve as strategies to influence the political process. The methodology used in this study could be applied to other policy subsystems, including those related to the environment, such as the brown and blue agendas. Further study into the political resources mobilized by coalitions and their stakeholders is a research field that still needs exploration. Additionally, other subtopics within the green agenda could be analyzed using a new coding framework that includes additional beliefs.

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Diego Mota Vieira: Project administration (Supporting); Supervision (Lead); Validation (Lead); Visualization (Supporting); Writing – review & editing (Equal).

DATA AVAILABILITY

The full dataset supporting the results of this study has been made available in the Institutional Repository of the University of Brasília (UnB) and can be accessed at: https://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/46240

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