Sports policies and the New Projectment Economy: a case study of China’s path to Olympic success

Políticas esportivas e a Nova Economia do Projetamento: um estudo de caso sobre o caminho da China para o sucesso olímpico

Políticas deportivas y la Nueva Economía del Proyectamiento: un estudio de caso del camino de China hacia el éxito olímpico

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the relationship between China's Olympic success and the New Projectment Economy (NPE). It seeks to demonstrate that China's path to becoming an Olympic superpower is the result of sports policies, through which it is possible to perceive a parallel with the planning that provided the country's economic and technological growth. Based on a literature review on China's Olympic development, this work analyzes the main policies under the theoretical framework of the NPE, in which state planning anticipates the needs of society, resolves contradictions and achieves results in various sectors. China's Olympic success serves as a case study of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the NEP, promoting success not only in the economy, but also in sports.

Keywords:
China; New Projectment Economy; Sports policies; Olympic Games

RESUMO

Este artigo foca na relação entre o sucesso olímpico da China e a Nova Economia do Projetamento (NEP). Busca demonstrar que o caminho chinês para se tornar superpotência olímpica é resultado de políticas esportivas, por meio das quais é possível perceber o paralelo com o planejamento que proporcionou seu crescimento econômico e tecnológico. Com base em revisão de literatura sobre o desenvolvimento olímpico, este artigo analisa as principais políticas sob o arcabouço teórico da NEP, em que o planejamento estatal antecipa as necessidades da sociedade, resolve contradições e alcança resultados em vários setores. O sucesso olímpico da China serve como estudo de caso do socialismo com características chinesas e da NPE, promovendo sucesso não apenas na economia, mas também no esporte.

Palavras-chave:
China; Nova Economia do Projetamento; Políticas esportivas; Jogos Olímpicos

RESUMEN

Este artículo se centra en la relación entre el éxito olímpico de China y la Nueva Economía del Proyectamiento (NEP). Busca demostrar que el camino chino para convertirse en superpotencia olímpica es resultado de políticas deportivas, a través de las cuales es posible ver el paralelo con la planificación que proporcionó su crecimiento económico. A partir de revisión de la literatura sobre el desarrollo olímpico, este artículo analiza las principales políticas bajo el marco teórico de la NEP, en las que la planificación estatal anticipa las necesidades de la sociedad, resuelve contradicciones y logra resultados. El éxito olímpico de China sirve como caso de estudio del socialismo chino y la NPE, que promueve el éxito no sólo en la economía sino también en el deporte.

Palabras-clave:
China; Nueva Economia del Proyectamiento; Políticas deportivas; Juegos Olímpicos

INTRODUCTION

Elite sport and international competitions, particularly mega sport events (MSE) such as the Olympic Games, transcend sport itself. It is no surprise, then, that the economic, political and social roles of sport have long been the focus of great attention in the realm of politics and policy-making (Korneeva and Ogurtsov, 2016). That is why elite sport has long been used as an ideological tool and as a means of showcasing countries to the world (Gupta, 2009). As Bairner argues, sport is linked to the construction and reproduction of many people’s national identities (Bairner, 2001), and by involving a competition that is based on the nation-state, sport became the vehicle for national sentiment, thus, the values ​​of national identities are mixed with the central values ​​of modern sport (Amara, 2012, p. 10).

Orwell described the Olympic Games as a ‘war minus the shooting’ (Orwell, 1945). It is no surprise that this ‘conflict’ intensified during the Cold War, when each Olympic Game became one of the political-ideological battle fronts, and sporting triumph was promoted as a demonstration of superiority. Since the 1960s there has been a growing governmental interest in pursuing Olympic success (Green and Houlihan, 2005). Even after the end of the Cold War, the struggle between nations to win medals at major international competitions has intensified. This led national governments to spend ever-increasing sums of money on elite sport. Several nations have indeed shown that accelerated funding can lead to an increase in medals at the Olympics (De Bosscher et al., 2008).

In China, sports have not taken a back seat in Chinese political and social structures (Hwang and Chang, 2008). More than 30 years before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong wrote an essay in which highlighted the importance of physical education, emphasizing physical education as essential to combating the population’s poor physical and health conditions (Mao, 1917). Following the Marxist tradition of combining training of the mind with training of the body (Riordan, 1976), when the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Ruijing in November 1931, the government launched a policy of sports and sports leadership (Jarvie et al., 2008). Physical education was systematically promoted in the military, educational institutions, counties and rural areas (Wei et al., 2010). Likewise, the PRC identified sport not only as a way to keep bodies and minds healthy, but also as an element of the modernization process of New China¹ (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 77).

So, the success of elite sports is also a fundamental concern of Chinese government. It is no surprise that the Chinese state has been committed to the development of Olympic sports over the past few decades. After all, the return to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) occurred in parallel with other events that were profoundly decisive in recent Chinese history, such as the reform and opening up, aimed to accelerate the development of productive forces to expand the process of capital accumulation and, thus, underpin the national socialist transformation. Olympic sports were identified as a crucial element for China to demonstrate that it could catch up with Western countries. Since China’s return to the IOC in the late 1970s and its participation at the Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles 1984, its Olympic trajectory has been a unique case of success. Between its first gold medal in LA 1984 and Paris 2024, China won 325 golds, making it the 3rd most winning country in history. China has not only managed to catch up with the sporting powers but has also established itself as an Olympic superpower (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 89).

Since rejoining the IOC, China has implemented several projects aimed at Olympic success, but also to develop a sector of the economy - the sports industry - to serve the necessary accumulation process, as evidenced in the New Projectment Economy (NPE). This development aligns with what characterizes the current stage of the evolution of the Chinese socialist experience, the NPE (Jabbour et al., 2020), where national Olympic strategies and policies support the necessary process of capital accumulation. Such as the Olympic Strategy (1985) (Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012d), the Strategic Plans for Olympic Glory covering periods from 1994-2000 (1995), 2001-2010 (2002), and 2011-2020 (2011) (Zheng et al., 2018), Project 119 (Zheng and Chen, 2016), the ‘Invite in and go out’ strategy, and multiple five-year plans developed by the China Sports Commission (which became the General Administration of Sports in 1998) and the PRC’s State Council all illustrate this approach (Zheng et al., 2018).

METHOD

This paper aims to explore the rise of China in Olympic sports to understand socialism with Chinese characteristics, the centrality of the State and its ability to generate a chain of productive sectors. We intend to demonstrate how China's Olympic success helps us understand how the State's planning works. China's trajectory to becoming an Olympic powerhouse follows China's rise on the global stage. China's Olympic rise allows us to visualize, in the sports field, the concretization of the NPE as the driving force behind the Chinese catching up process, reflecting the most flagrant example of a country that consciously and persistently seeks a long-term development strategy in order to overcome its own peripheral condition (Paula and Jabbour, 2020). In essence, China’s Olympic success illustrates how ‘the concept manifests itself in real movement’ (Jabbour and Capovilla, 2024).

China's Olympic history and success have been source of academic interest for some time now. Several studies on the subject have been published over the past few years (Chen and Zheng, 2019; Green and Houlihan, 2005; Hong, 2008; Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012b; Tan, 2015; Tan and Houlihan, 2012; Wei et al., 2010; Zheng, 2019; Zheng and Chen, 2016). However, none have sought to observe this phenomenon from the perspective as a concrete case of the NPE. Thus, the relevance of this article lies in its innovative character, in using the NPE as a theoretical framework and in reflecting on how this concept helps us understand Chinese development, including in the sports field. In this regard, it is important, therefore, to emphasize that this study does not consider the NPE as the only interpretative key to this topic. As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, the trajectory of Chinese Olympic sports policies has already been analysed in different ways and theoretical foundations, but the main objective of this work is precisely to provoke a theoretical-conceptual debate on the relevance of the NPE as an additional instrument for interpreting the phenomenon of China's Olympic success.

This paper adopts a theoretical-conceptual approach, based on a literature review and analysis of Chinese sports policy documents. The data analysis method adopted in this study is qualitative content analysis, guided by a theoretical-conceptual framework rooted in the political economy of development and Chinese socialism. In terms of the selection of literature used, Peer-reviewed articles and books by renowned experts in Chinese foreign policy and international political economy were given preference when choosing sources. It is acknowledged, from the outset, that the use of secondary resources is a limitation of this paper, which leaves open the possibility for future research that could incorporate primary data, such as conducting interviews with stakeholders of sports public policies in China, such as experts on the subject, policymakers and authorities of the country's sports bodies.

The NPE concept

China's development has caused a disruptive dynamic since its rise on the global geopolitical scene and has shaken the Western hegemonic status quo. The shock caused by China's continuous growth in recent decades, has sparked a dispute of narratives in the search for a definition of the Chinese economic model, with arguments such as that China embraced the free market economy to a type of 'state capitalism' (Jabbour and Capovilla, 2024), and also 'post-socialism' (Yu et al., 2017). We don’t align with these interpretations. We follow Heilmann (2018), who says that China's development require analytical perspectives that go beyond preconceived typologies. (Gabriele and Schettino (2012) identified the emergence of a Modern Mode of Production. Jabbour went further and suggested that a new economic-social formation is emerging (Jabbour, 2019, p. 113), an idea Gabriele agreed with, when writing on this topic with Jabbour (Gabriele and Jabbour, 2022, p. 325).

Therefore, we adopt the view that socialism with Chinese characteristics represents a multifaceted social formation (Jabbour et al., 2021a). This framework restructured development planning in terms of content, processes, and methods, integrating market coordination while maintaining overarching state control (Heilmann, 2018, p. 132). Thus, the Chinese catching-up process built its own economic-social formation, based on its concrete reality, through the dialectical process called market socialism, which allowed the country, by adopting elements of the market economy, to undertake its process of development and capital accumulation. So, we align with Jabbour et al., who classify the PRC as a society led by a political force determined to advancing towards socialism (Jabbour et al., 2021a), where planning is a deliberate human action to ensure stability that makes sense in the form of an essential economic logic of market socialism (Jabbour, 2019, p. 112). We are witnessing an advanced phase of Chinese socialism: the NPE (Gabriele and Jabbour, 2022, p. 325; Jabbour and Dantas, 2021; Jabbour et al., 2021b).

In the NPE, different modes of production coexist. This is a typical condition for a long process of transformation of the dominant mode of production, as happened, for example, during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, when occurred what Li Xing called the phenomenon of the 'disembedded transformation' (Li, 2016). In fact, the coexistence of different modes of production in a transitional period is something found in Marxist literature. In instance, we first have in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels establishing the basis for the conception of the transition from capitalism to communism. ‘The proletariat will use its political supremacy to gradually wrest all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, that is, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible’ (Marx and Engels, 1976a). In 1875, writing The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx refers to the transition to communism, in which he describes that communist society will inevitably be marked with the birthmarks of the old society (Marx and Engels, 1976b). The critical factor is identifying which mode of production is dominant and which class and/or political force has control over strategic factors (Jabbour et al., 2021b).

In China, the State holds the centrality of political and economic power (Jabbour and Capovilla, 2024). It is the constructive path of socialism that allows the emergence and development of concepts such as the NPE, which creates the basis for transforming the fundamental development needs of society into technologies that conceive, design and implement strategic projects for the collective good, instead of serving capital or the market (Jabbour and Capovilla, 2024).

The Chinese experience shows us the use of rationality to produce common goods that differentiates socialism with Chinese characteristics, which advances in the form of NPE, from a typically capitalist experience. As Li argues, a free-market economy is ‘an economic system directed, controlled, and regulated by the market mechanism alone, in which all values ​​are economically based, and nothing exists outside the free market framework’ (Li, 2016, p. 20). In the same sense, Amin argues that ‘the law of value not only dictates economic life under capitalism but all aspects of social life (this is what is meant by market alienation)’ (Amin, 1996, p. 219). In China the market does not control, direct, or regulate. The market is at the service of national development. This is the reason why Li (2016) argues that China's unique ‘embedded’ process is realized and maintained through a dynamic state-market-society relationship. Accordingly, the search for the development of productive forces aiming at the transformation of concrete reality, through planning and projectment, is what characterizes the NPE (Jabbour and Capovilla, 2024, p. 5).

Drawing on these theoretical contributions, we position our analysis within a tradition that conceives Chinese socialism as a historically determined, dialectically evolving social formation. We interpret the New Projectment Economy not simply as a development phase, but as a concrete expression of the Chinese state's strategic capacity to restructure its socioeconomic formation in line with its material conditions and long-term political objectives.

Sports in the PRC

So why analyse the development of Olympic sport in China considering the NPE? Because we believe that history does not happen by chance and is not an isolated act. Therefore, contrary to the dominant logic in capitalism, just as the producer cannot be separated from the total production process, nor should the division of the labor process into parts be dissociated at the expense of the individual humanity of the worker (Lukács, 1972), it seems inconceivable to analyze Chinese Olympic success isolated from the broader context. As Santos taught, ‘the whole can only be known through knowledge of the parts and the parts can only be known through knowledge of the whole’, however, as the Brazilian geographer warned, ‘to reach the total truth, it is necessary to recognize the joint movement of the whole and the parts, through the process of totalization’ (Santos, 2006, p. 77). Thus, we can’t look at the projects of Olympic sports in China individually, but as part of the totality, that is, into its social, political, economic and geopolitical context.

With the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949, sports were identified as a fundamental instrument for the New China. So, as the socialist modernization plan initiated by the Chinese communists followed the Soviet model (Heilmann, 2018; Hu, 2013; Shabad, 1955), in the first decade there was the ‘Sovietization of Chinese sports’ (Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012b; Zheng et al., 2018): the adoption of a centralized sports management system, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries, and also influencing the PRC to approach the IOC (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 78-81).

The political dispute for the recognition and legitimacy of the PRC as the only China led the country to be absent from the 1956 Melbourne Games and to break with the IOC, and 10 other international sports federations, in 1958 (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 82). The Sino-Soviet split led China to seek to reposition itself on the international geopolitical board, approaching the Non-Aligned Movement (Qingmin, 2013). This eventually culminated in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 85). Rising tensions between the PRC and the USSR in the late 1960s led the PRC leadership to seek establishing relations with the US. And it was through the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ that a US delegation visited the PRC for the first time in 1971, paving the way for Mao Zedong to receive the then US president, Richard Nixon, in Beijing, in 1972. At the end of Nixon's visit, the Shanghai Communiqué, expressed that the US formally recognized that ‘there is only one China’ (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 86-88).

The Chinese seized the opportunity to reopen to the world. In 1973, returned to the Asian Games Federation (AGF). The 1973 AGF executive committee meeting concluded that China should be represented by the PRC and Taiwan should be expelled (Qingmin, 2013). China sought to reconnect with the IOC and unsuccessfully appealed to participate in the 1976 Montreal Games. In 1979, the IOC determined that the Taiwan Olympic Committee should be renamed as the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and the PRC returned to the IOC as China’s sole representative.

Back to the IOC and the Olympic project

China's return to the IOC coincided with the rise of Deng Xiaoping to the leadership of the country, marking the beginning of a period of economic reforms opening up. At this point, the PRC intensified the goal of achieving national modernization and catching up with Western capitalist countries. Sports played a fundamental role in the modernization process. In 1978, the Sports Commission organized a national conference at which the State Council declared that the development of sports was an important mission because it not only promoted ‘the drive to catch up with and even surpass other sports superpower countries’ but would therefore contribute ‘to establishing a modern socialist superpower’ (Tan and Green, 2008). In 1980, a strategy was established for the development of sports. According to the Minister of Sports, Wang Meng, elite sports would be an effective way to boost the country’s image on the international stage. The government sought to use sports to enhance national self-esteem, self-confidence, and dignity (Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012c). Wang also recognized the economic constraints, so the nation's limited resources were to medal-winning sports (Hong, 2008; Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012c; Wei et al., 2010).

In 1980, a short-term plan set the goal of finishing in the top 10 at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. China, however, was one of the 65 delegations that boycotted the 1980 Moscow Games. In Los Angeles 1984, taking advantage of the boycott led by the USSR, China achieved a creditable 4th place with 15 gold medals. The successful results in LA increased China’s Olympic ambitions. Deng highlighted the impact and influence of sport: ‘The success of sport reflects the strength of a country’s economy and civilization. Sports attract and inspire many people. We need to further improve our sports’ (Xu, 2008, p. 216). In response, measures were immediately taken to meet the goals of winning as many gold medals as possible.

In 1985, the ‘Olympic Strategy’ was issued, establishing elite sports as a priority in both the short and long term, considering winning Olympic gold medals a source of national honor and pride. In 1986, the Sports Commission implemented the ‘Decisions on the Reform of the Sports System’, emphasizing the guidelines of the Olympic Strategy, among which: establishing a scientific training system; improving the sports competition system; promoting scientific research in sports; reforming the sports and physical education systems; emphasizing the political significance of sports; improving competition awards; and developing flexible policies for sports competitions. The Olympic Strategy was the model project for Chinese sports in the 1980s and 1990s (Hong, 2008), facilitating the consolidation and in-depth development of strategic projects for sports over the following three decades (Zheng, 2019).

Juguo Tizhi and the plans for Olympic glory

At the 1988 Seoul Games, the Chinese performance declined. With the return of Olympic powers such as the USSR, the GDR and Eastern European countries, the China saw their number of gold medals drop from 15 to 5 and plummet from 4th to 11th place. This led to changes in the sports structure, starting with the position of Director General of the Sports Commission, taken over by Wu Shaozhu. The Sports Commission also reformed the education system for young talents and, in partnership with the Ministry of Education, decreed new regulations for physical education. At the time, the country also recognized and gave greater importance to the role of science (Zheng et al., 2018).

Another major incentive was the expansion of the support system for elite sports was Juguo Tizhi, which further directed all available resources to the Olympic Games. Juguo tizhi means that the whole country should make every effort to support elite sport: the central and local governments should use their power to channel adequate financial and human resources throughout the country to support elite sport, to win Olympic glory for the nation. Juguo Tizhi is distinguished by its recognition of China’s political ideology; the centralization of its sports system; and its focus on raising the level of sporting success through a specialized and selective training system.

The budget for Olympic sports increased considerably: the Olympic cycle for the Seoul Games had a budget of 4 billion yuan (1 billion per year), a figure that tripled for the Barcelona 1992 cycle: 12 billion in total (3 billion per year) (Xu, 2008). The results in Barcelona 1992 were encouraging. China returned to the top 4: 16 gold medals.

As mentioned, it is impossible to understand the success of Chinese Olympic sports without looking at the entire process of socialist transformation. The Olympic cycle leading up to Atlanta 1996 reflects this. After the 14th Congress of the CPC in October 1992 officially adopted the socialist market economy system and established Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as its guiding theory, sports also underwent profound reforms in the 1990s. In 1993, Wu Shaozhu advocated that Chinese sports’ market should open up to the world and that sports should become professional and commercialized. To lay the foundation for the growth of sports in an increasingly marketized economy, in 1995 the State Council of China approved the implementation of three objectives: the Strategic Plan for Olympic Glory, the Development Strategy of the Sports Industry and Commerce, and the National Program for Physical Fitness for All.

The Strategic Plan for Olympic Glory 1994-2000 reinforced the fundamental role of juguo tizhi and the importance of sporting success. China aimed to re-establish its national image and status and inspire national confidence. The Olympic Strategy was a national priority, and the focus of the Plan for Olympic Glory was on individual sports/disciplines. With the development of Chinese socialism, the state budget for sports increased substantially. In Atlanta 1996, China kept its 4th place, ​​winning 16 gold medals. In Sydney 2000, China reached the podium with 28 gold medals, behind only the US and Russia. At the time, President Jiang Zemin stated, ‘The success of American sports depends on its economic power; the success of Russian sports depends on its rich resources and experience in training elite athletes; the success of Chinese sports depends on juguo tizhi’ (Wei et al., 2010).

Between Atlanta and Sydney, the sports’ administrative structure underwent a major restructuring. The Soviet model, from the 1950s, a pyramidal, centralized-hierarchical model, gave place to a multi-level, simplified, seeking greater efficiency through multi-channel cooperation between agencies. This followed the reform of the Central Government that restructured the ministries. In 1998, the Sports Commission was renamed as General Administration of Sports (GAS): the agency also had its structure changed, from 20 to 9 departments.

Beijing 2008 and the Olympic glory

This transformation in the country's sports organizational model and infrastructure was driven by another historical fact. In 2001, Beijing was selected to host the 2008 Olympic Games. This influenced the entire state project for the following decade as hosting the Summer Olympic Games has always been an important objective for China's Olympic Strategy. Not only from a sporting perspective, but also from the message of political and economic strength, showing the world that the country was capable of organizing a MSE like the Olympics (Hong and Zhouxiang, 2012a). Projects were implemented aiming to prepare for Beijing Games and, above all, for China to triumph. Beijing 2008 was the fundamental priority for the entire country. Based on the previous strategic plan, the GAS launched the Strategic Plan for Olympic Glory 2001-2010. However, this one was more audacious: the goal to beat the US and Russia. Reaching the top of the Olympics would be a way to show the world its economic development, prosperity and modernization.

To bolster the Strategic Plan for Olympic Glory 2001-2010, other projects were implemented such as the Olympic Glory Action Plan 2008, Project 119 and the ‘Invite In and Go Out’ Strategy. Project 119 is so named because when the Chinese identified certain sports and disciplines as targets to be reached to maximize the number of medals, the total number of gold medals at the Sydney 2000 Games was 119. These sports were: Track and Field, Swimming, Rowing and Canoeing/Kayaking and Sailing.

The ‘Invite In and Go Out’ Strategy was one of the most important ways to achieve Project 119’s objectives. It basically consisted of seeking exchanges between China and more advanced countries. ‘Going out’ meant sending athletes abroad to learn from the best coaches and the best learning techniques, but also to go to places where the training centers and training methodologies were more advanced and obtain that knowledge so that they could implement at home. The ‘invitation’ involved attracting the best professionals to China to work in Chinese high-performance centers. As we can see, nothing very different from what China did during its process of industrial and technological modernization, in which it sought to attract foreign know-how to its territory, at the same time as it sought to learn abroad to be able to develop technical and theoretical knowledge that would allow the country to adapt to its reality and needs.

In the lead-up to Beijing 2008, China also achieved great success in Athens 2004, winning 32 gold medals, surpassing Russia and rising to the 2nd place in the medal table. In addition, Chinese athletes broke six world records and 21 Olympic records, further affirming the country’s growing Olympic prowess.

The Beijing 2008 Games were a great success. Amidst the crisis of capitalism, with economic recession in the US and Europe, China conveyed to the world the image of a rejuvenated, modern nation, economically and socially developed. Hu Jintao used his speech to reinforce the message of peaceful ascension. Appealing to the Olympic spirit of solidarity, friendship and peace, Hu emphasized that, in the face of the serious international crisis, the moment demonstrated more than ever ‘the need to understand, accommodate and cooperate with each other’ and concluded ‘we must promote the construction of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity’.

China won 51 gold medals (15 more than the US) and for the first time was at the top spot in the medals table. The resounding sporting success at the Olympic Games reiterated the sense of demonstration of China's capacity and strength and, furthermore, highlighted its new positioning in the world.

Post-Beijing 2008: beyond gold

In 2011, the Strategic Plan for Olympic Glory 2011-2020 signaled a new direction: to ‘increase the quality and value of Olympic gold medals’ by shifting from a ‘factor-driven’ to an “innovation-driven’ model in elite sports (Zheng and Chen, 2016). China consolidated its position as an Olympic powerhouse at the 2012 London Games. With 38 gold medals, China surpassed the home team Great Britain by 9 golds and came in 2nd place.

Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the focus of investments has shifted to developing the sports industry, with the aim of consolidating the country as a global sports powerhouse, which goes beyond achievements in international competitions. The goal is for the Chinese sports industry to be the largest in the world by 2035. At the same time, efforts have been made to encourage sports practice as a way of promoting health and well-being. The focus on physical fitness and promoting sports as a recreational practice and not just aimed at training high-performance athletes is evident in documents such as the National Physical Fitness Program (2016-2020) and the 13th 5-Year Plan for the Development of Sports.

However, the decline in performance at Rio 2016 set off alarm bells. China fell to 3rd place, behind the US and GB, winning 26 gold medals. The State Council and the GAS quickly intervened. Structural reforms were implemented, with increased investment focused on improving the quality of gold medals and reinforcement of sports that yield many medals, such as track and field and water sports. The need to invest in sports dominated by Western powers, such as track and field, swimming, canoeing, rowing and sailing was identified (Zheng et al., 2018).

The Science and Technology Action Project for Olympic Glory was also strengthened, aiming to improve athletic performance. Science and technology research also has an interministerial structure, based on the Olympic Technology Action Project, involving the Ministry of Science and Technology, GAS, Ministry of Education, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and even the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The concern with science and the improvement of knowledge to the development of sports is reflected in the numbers of the infrastructure: in 2022 there were 3069 Sports Administrative Agencies, 8 Sports Universities and Colleges, 16 Sports Technical Institutes, 220 Physical Education and Sports Schools, 19 Competitive Sports Schools, 1201 Leisure Sports Schools, 33 Physical Education Secondary Schools, 60 Training Bases, 46 Sports Scientific Research Institutes (NBS, 2023).

In preparation for Tokyo 2020, for example, missile technology was used. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the main service provider for the Chinese space program, provided swimming athletes with aerospace measurement products, a high-tech system that allowed them to gain greater agility. Additionally, the China Control Technology and Application Center (CCTAC) developed a compact missile guidance system to collect data on the athletes' posture. This data-driven approach allowed athletes to refine their training with scientific support. The impact was evident as Chinese swimming team won 6 medals in Tokyo, the same number as in Rio 2016, but while in 2016 only one was gold, in 2021 there were three. In Paris 2024, there were two gold medals, but the Chinese won 12 in total. Pan Zhanle won gold in the 100m freestyle, breaking the Olympic and world records.

The results in Tokyo and Paris demonstrate the effectiveness of the adjustments made after Rio. In Japan, China was one gold medal away from tying with the US: 38x39. In France, the competition was tighter, with the Chinese winning as many golds as the US (40), finishing 2nd in the overall medal tally.

China's Olympic success, however, goes beyond gold medals. As already mentioned, one of the goals of the Olympic Strategy has always been the development of the Chinese sports industry. This goal has been intensified under Xi’s leadership. The 2014 State Council document, Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Sports Industry and Promoting Sports Consumption, underscores this vision for advancing the sector (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024, p. 112). This process allowed several Chinese companies to gain prominence in both the Tokyo 2020 and Paris 2024: Anta, Li-Ning, Peak (sponsor of the Brazilian Olympic Committee). Chinese companies were also responsible for supplying various sports equipment, as well as many of the technological innovations, especially the use of Artificial Intelligence, seen in Paris were provided by Chinese companies, such as Alibaba Cloud, SenseTime and Baidu Inc.

DISCUSSION

The NPE seems to us to be a pertinent concept that reflects the complex dialectical process that is the period of socialist transition. We understand that this stage of Chinese socialism is what characterizes China's rise as a global power, the second largest economy in the world and emerging as the most advanced country in the areas of science and technology. While China promoted its process of reforms and opening up, the country also identified sports as an instrument to promote its image abroad and as an element of cohesion in nation-building, creating a sense of belonging, national pride and honor. China’s rise as a global Olympic power reflects China’s own process of catching up with Western powers. Just as the country’s economic, technological and social development is the result of the State’s project and role as an inducer of creative destruction, the success of the Olympic Strategy and the achievement of Olympic glory are the results of State-led projects, always aligned with national objectives. Since China’s return to the IOC in the 1980s, sports policies have been parallel to the country’s economic and technological ambitions, reflecting the core of China’s governance model.

The NPE goes far beyond conventional economic planning and, as it does not respond to market interests, it seeks, at the same time, to promote the accelerated development of productive forces in order to guarantee the necessary accumulation of capital to achieve the fulfillment of society's needs, providing services and consumer goods that improve people's well-being and quality of life in various fields, including sports.

While capitalism is characterized, as Amin taught, by being ‘a system whose specificity lies precisely in the dominance of economic authority’, in which ‘the law of value not only dictates economic life under capitalism but all aspects of social life (this is what is meant by market alienation)’ (Amin, 1996, p. 219), the Chinese experience shows that it is possible to carry out human action driven by rationality in the service of the realization of common goods, in which the market is a mere instrument for the development of productive forces. In this sense, we understand that just as China, through the NPE, undertook strategic investments in infrastructure, talent development and applied science and technology for its economic and social development, with the eradication of extreme poverty and the improvement of the quality of life of its population, it also applied measures of the same nature to build a solid foundation for the strengthening and improvement of sports, culminating in its Olympic success. China's Olympic trajectory, with 325 gold medals in 40 years, placing the country in third place in the gold medal table in history, demonstrates the efficiency of the Chinese model, while reflecting, in our understanding, the broader economic rise of the nation, with the state actively directing its resources towards national development.

However, not everything is perfect and successful in this historical process that China is going through. There are no perfect formulas and the practice of real socialism as a human experience is still very recent, with just over 100 years of existence, counting from the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Chinese dialectical process of socialist transition is still in its first stage, having completed 75 years of existence in 2024. The NPE as a process of development of a new economic and social formation is an even more recent phenomenon. The NPE is, in fact, a concept that is manifesting itself in the real movement, which points to trends towards the realization of a higher stage of Chinese socialism, but it is still in its infancy. The same can be said of the project of Chinese Olympic sports. It is a four-decade trajectory that sought to catch up with Western nations that already had almost a century of experience, such as the USA, the United Kingdom and Germany. For this reason, despite China's astonishing Olympic success, with all the achievements discussed in this paper, there are still gaps to be filled in the country's sports structure, which are evident in some failures. Chinese team sports are still far from being competitive at an international level, especially in the men's category. This failure reflects the difficulty of promoting sports activity as a form of socialization and collective cooperation in favour of a common team goal, which is reflected in team sports. This cultural aspect is also evident in the obstacles that the country has encountered in making its football stronger, particularly men's football. Even with a project as large as the “China's medium and long-term football development plan (2016-2050)”- (中国足球中长期发展规划 2016—2050年), this sport still limps and there is debate in the country about how to promote the flourishing of football culture (Leite and Rodrigues, 2024). In short, like every historical process, the evolution of sports in China is susceptible to mistakes and failures. Something that the dialectic of sports policies in China, in fact, makes clear, since the country's sports authorities are always seeking to improve their projects, trying to identify errors so that they are more successful in the future, reinforcing the crucial role of projectment.

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion, we consider China's Olympic success to be a good case study for understanding how socialism manifests itself in the real movement, in its current stage, the NPE, a sui generis economic-social formation, capable of uniting immediate social needs with long-term strategic objectives. In the specific case of Olympic sports, the objectives of catching up with Western powers, of becoming a sports powerhouse, while also aiming to develop its sports industry and to provide the population with infrastructure to practice sports with the well-being and health in mind, show how this model of governance promotes national progress. At the same time, we also identify that the limitations in Chinese sports policies are part of this long transition process that the country is going through and even with all the Olympic success achieved in the last 40 years, there are still competitive gaps in team sports, for example. The full development of sports and the social practice of sports activities is still a goal to be fully achieved, as part of the quest for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and thus contributing to the realization of the Double Centenary goals.

We acknowledge, however, that the concept of the NPE is still incipient within the field of sports studies. Precisely for this reason, this work proposed to advance this debate by situating sports policies within the broader dynamics of China's contemporary economic-social formation. To show how the NPE's strategic planning logic applies to the sports industry as a tool of national growth and international projection, this study is based on a totalising theoretical approach and modern political economy literature. That said, this paper initiates that discussion by connecting sports policy to the structural changes of Chinese socialism in its current era, even though we acknowledge the need for more refinement of the topic within sports scholarship. Another limitation of this work, as already mentioned, is its methodology of literature review and analysis of Chinese public policy documents, leaving room for future research to enrich the debate, seeking primary sources, such as Chinese sports authorities and policymakers.

But in short, we believe that this paper main relevance is the contribution both to the discussion on Chinese sports policies and to the debate Chinese socialism, and the concept of the NPE. So, this work innovates not only by analyzing the Olympic trajectory under the NPE, but also by being a pioneer in adopting this concept to the field of sports in general and, more specifically, to the case study of Chinese Olympic sports.

• 1
  The expression “New China” symbolizes the purpose of the Chinese Communists, stated even before they came to power, to modernize China, freeing the country from the Century of Humiliation, starting the path of a new China, “politically free and economically prosperous” (Mao, 1940).
• FUNDING
  There was no funding.

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  30 June 2025
• Date of issue
  2025

History

• Received
  16 Oct 2024
• Accepted
  26 Apr 2025