Divergent trends in Latin American social security: the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban cases in comparative perspective

Abstract:

This article contributes to explaining divergent trends in the recent evolution of Latin American social security: contraction and expansion. Based on an historical institutionalist analysis of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban cases, it argues that these trends are interrelated: they are sequences of reinforcement of the contraction established by systemic reforms and of reaction to the increase in exclusion caused by them. In the Argentine and Brazilian cases, the findings align with the hypothesis, evidencing an association between the level of contraction caused by the reforms, the existence of reactive measures and the mobilization of learning from previous policies in their modeling. However, the specificities of the Cuban case do not allow us to infer that reforms that caused a low level of contraction do not trigger reactive changes.

Keywords:
Latin America; social security systems; institutional change; reactive sequences; systemic reform

Resumo:

O artigo contribui para a explicação das tendências divergentes na evolução recente da seguridade social latino-americana: retração e ampliação. A partir da análise institucionalista histórica dos casos argentino, brasileiro e cubano, argumenta-se que essas tendências estão inter-relacionadas: são sequências de reforço da retração estabelecida pelas reformas sistêmicas e de reação ao aumento da exclusão por elas provocado. Nos casos argentino e brasileiro, os achados alinham-se com a hipótese, evidenciando associação entre o nível da retração promovida pelas reformas, a existência de medidas reativas e mobilização do aprendizado de políticas prévias em sua modelagem, mas especificidades do caso cubano não permitem inferir que reformas que provocaram retração baixa não desencadeiam mudanças reativas.

Palavras-chave:
América Latina; sistemas de seguridade social; mudança institucional sequências reativas; reforma sistêmica

Introduction

Social security is characterized, in the terms of Beveridge (1942), as a system of mutually complementary provisions intended to protect against the risks of old age, disability, death, illness, unemployment, occupational accidents and diseases, and family burdens, to which, in the last three decades, according to Robles (2023), the risks arising from poverty, inequity, and informality, among others, have also been added. Its provisions are guaranteed mainly via health, pensions, and social assistance policies in the form of contributory, quasi-contributory, and non-contributory benefits and services².

In Latin America, the first social security schemes emerged during the 1920s and 1930s in the more economically developed countries at the time, forming what Mesa-Lago (2004) would later call “pioneer systems”, specifically in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Costa Rica and Uruguay, in contrast to those that emerged in the following decades, which are called “intermediate” and “latecomers”. The differentiation and organizational fragmentation of the first decades were relatively overcome by standardizing provisions and unifying the management of part of the schemes in state bodies, constituting the “general regimes” which, together with the schemes maintained separately, under the heading of “special regimes”, made up the national social security systems.

From 1980 onwards, however, with the installation in the region of a situation of “permanent austerity”, as defined by Pierson (1994), which derived from the economic and fiscal crises, systemic reforms of the general social security regimes were carried out, promoting the retraction of the contributory dimension of social security. In analyzing its evolution since then, the literature points to two divergent, if not conflicting, development trends: one of reinforcing or maintaining the retraction instituted by the aforementioned systemic reforms (e.g., Mesa-Lago, 2004, 2020; Ortiz et al, 2018; Uthoff, 2019), and the other of expansion of the provisions available, either by making the conditions for accessing contributory benefits more flexible (Ansiliero, 2013; Calligaro; Cetrángolo, 2023) or by creating non-contributory provisions (Abramo; Cecchini; Morales, 2019; Barrientos, 2004; Cantu, 2015; Cecchini et al., 2015; Molina, 2006; Niedzwiecki; Pribble, 2023).

From an historical institutionalist perspective and based on the literature and legislation related to the subject, this article argues that these trends of retraction and expansion are interrelated:³ they comprise, according to Mahoney (2000), sequences of self-reinforcing the institutional design established by systemic social security reforms, as usually occurs in the development of institutions, and of reaction to the increased exclusion of informal workers, considered here as those whose social security contributions are intermittent, rare or absent (Matijascic, 2015). Two hypotheses guide the analysis: (1) reactive measures to the increase in exclusion are related to the level of retraction caused by the systemic reform, being (a) absent if there is a low level of retraction, that is, only a tightening of access criteria and a reduction in the value of benefits, and (b) present if, in addition to the above, there is an abolition of benefits intended for informal workers; (2) in the case of high retraction and, therefore, presence of inclusion measures, the mechanisms mobilized in them were learned in the period before systemic reforms. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the causal relationship established in the first hypothesis.

Figure 1.
Causal links of hypothesis 1

The methodology employed is that of comparing case studies. Based on the process tracing (George; Bennett, 2005), the following are analyzed: the constitution and evolution of the general social security regimes that make up three pioneering social security systems - Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban - in the stage before systemic reforms; the institutional design established in the critical junctures of these reforms; and the causal links between this design and possible reactive incremental changes. In line with the guidelines of the comparative method (Lijphart, 1971; Mahoney, 2007), the three cases are similar in structural dimensions: they are pioneering systems, their pensions systems adopt the financing regime known as pay-as-you-go (PAYGO),⁴ and they have carried out restrictive systemic reforms.

The analysis is organized into three sections, in addition to this introduction and the conclusion. The first discusses the concepts of critical juncture and path dependence that structure the historical institutionalist analysis of reinforcing and reactive sequences and their application in the field of public policies. The second describes the configuration and evolution of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban systems that preceded the critical juncture of interest, focusing on the general regimes that comprise them. The third begins by analyzing the institutional design adopted in the three systemic reforms, classifying the objectives and strategies for change mobilized and, based on the differences between this design and that of the preceding system, the level of retraction promoted by them. It then goes on to map the possible incremental changes in reaction to the increase in exclusion caused by the retraction, highlighting the mechanisms that structure those changes, and to assess the connection between the possible measures, the level of retraction caused by the reforms and the learning processes that took place in the stage that preceded them.

Institutional change and reinforcing and reactive sequences in public policies

According to Mahoney (2000), path dependence is “historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (p. 507). Contingency is given by the deviation of these patterns from the theory that would explain them, and the sequences that can be triggered are, as anticipated, self-reinforcing or reactive. The former is characterized by resilience or reinforcement of the established pattern, and the latter “are chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events” in which each of them “is in part a reaction to temporally antecedent events” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 509). Thus, according to the author, path dependence analyses must go beyond the basic notion that past decisions affect future processes.

In reactive sequences, “early events trigger subsequent development not by reproducing a given pattern, but by setting in motion a chain of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 526-7). Their explanation must demonstrate: (i) the necessity and sufficiency of each event, which requires attention to the past, asking what events might have prevented the current state of affairs, and to the future, asking about possible subsequent events; (ii) inherent sequentially between initial conditions and outcomes, which requires demonstration of causal mechanisms.

Concerning the self-reinforcing sequences, Mahoney (2000) points out two types of causes: the institution’s genesis, and the second, oriented towards its reproduction. The genesis occurs in critical junctures, where the usual restrictions on action are suspended or attenuated, allowing the adoption of alternatives that were not theoretically foreseen (Capoccia; Kelemen, 2007; Collier; Collier, 1991). The mechanisms that guide reproduction vary with the type of institutional analysis (sociological, historical or rational choice) and the theoretical perspective adopted (utilitarian, distribution of power, functionalist and legitimation).

In the functionalist and legitimation perspectives, the reproduction or resilience of institutions is a stronger assumption: in the former, they are maintained by their beneficial consequences for the system; in the latter, resilience is based on the subjective orientations and beliefs of actors about what is appropriate. In the institutionalist analysis, there are variations: in the utilitarian approach, reproduction or change involves the calculation of benefits derived from past investments, learning effects, and coordination or adaptive expectations in the face of the costs of implementing alternatives, to which the power distribution approach adds that, once created, the institution enables certain groups to use their additional power to expand the established pattern further until it reaches a critical threshold, when subordinate groups can effectively challenge the prevailing agreement (Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney; Thelen, 2010).

Focusing on analyzing changes or reproduction of public policies, the power distribution approach, typical of historical institutionalism, contributes to analyzing actors, objectives, results and strategies. Pierson (1993) argues that institutionally empowered groups can include social actors, government elites and mass audiences, which, depending on the context, can mobilize incentives and resources to “lock in a particular path of policy development” (p. 606). According to Pierson (1994), the results can be expansion or contraction, aiming at cost containment in contexts of permanent austerity. Regarding the objectives, Pierson (2008) distinguishes between re-commodification, with cuts in benefits or restrictions on their eligibility, and recalibration of systems through the rationalization/updating of programs or creation of benefits.

Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also contribute to the explanation of changes. When considering institutions as instruments loaded with implications of power, they argue that their maintenance or reinforcement is not automatic: those who benefit from prevailing agreements prefer continuity and, to this end, mobilize support and resolve ambiguities in their favor. Thus, change arises from variations in: (i) the balance of power or (ii) the level of compliance of institutional actors, which varies according to the politically contested nature of the rules and the degree of openness to their interpretation. Based on these assumptions, the authors propose a model to explain changes: depending on the types of political context (weak or substantial possibility of veto) and institution (high or low level of discretion in the interpretation of rules), different strategies of change may emerge (by displacement, layering, deviation or conversion). Change by displacement means the removal of old rules and the introduction of new ones in contexts with low veto possibilities and high levels of discretion, which characterize critical junctures, and change by deviation means the neglect of old rules or their impact in modified environments, where there is a high veto possibility and a high level of discretion. Change by conversion occurs when rules have different implications than expected due to environmental changes establishing a high level of discretion and a low veto possibility. Finally, change by layering is the introduction of new rules together with or above the current rules, producing specific changes, revisions or additions that can change the institutional dynamics and effects in contexts where the veto possibility is high and the level of discretion of the rules is low.

As will be shown, the strategy of change mobilized in the three systemic social security reforms - a redistributive policy (Lowi, 1972), therefore inherently conflictual - and in the incremental changes that reinforced the design they instituted was that of displacement, and its objectives, re-commodification; the strategy mobilized in the reactive incremental changes, on the other hand, has been layering, and its objective, the recalibration of the systems. In the next section, to clarify the starting point of the systemic reforms of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban general regimes, the original configuration of these regimes and their evolution in the stage that preceded the respective reforms are described.

Constitution and expansion of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban social security systems

Standardizing part of the social security schemes and unifying their management in public bodies, constituting the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban general regimes, were completed in 1968, 1966 and 1963, respectively, and together with the regimes maintained separately, then transformed into special regimes, the general regimes comprised national social security systems with slight variation in their scope. In the Brazilian and Cuban cases, this system covered provisions for all risks, except, in the Cuban case, unemployment, given the assumption of full employment under the socialist regime; in the Argentine case, provisions for illness, occupational risks and unemployment were maintained under the management of private institutions.

The main actions to establish the general Argentine regime took place during the military dictatorship of 1966-1973. The process began in 1967, with the removal of unions from the management of retirement and pensions provided by 12 funds, transferring them to three national funds that became responsible for implementing the Régimen Nacional de Previsión Social. In the following year, the dictatorship extinguished the Régimen. It instituted the Sistema Nacional de Previsión Social, aimed at workers under a dependency regime, and the Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones para los Trabajadores Autonomos, comprising the general regime, under the management of the Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social. The following were excluded from the process: (i) the special regimes for military personnel and security forces and (ii) judges and judicial officials. To the Executive was delegated the prerogatives of defining contribution rates and establishing differentiated schemes that would cover, among others, arduous, dangerous and unhealthy tasks⁵ (Apella, 2022; Bertranou et al., 2011; Rofman, 2021).

The provisions of the general regime covered contributory pensions and retirements, with reduced waiting periods for teachers, quasi-contributory retirements due to old age and disability, and non-contributory pensions, created in 1947 and 1948, for older people (70 years old) and low-income disabled people without access to social security benefits, therefore, people with a history of informal employment.⁶ The contribution rates were set at 10% of remuneration and 5% of earnings for workers in a dependent and self-employed regime, respectively, and 16% of the payroll for employers (Bertranou et al., 2011).

In the following years, three incremental changes were made that, according to Pierson (1994), recalibrated the general Argentine regime, two of which were creating and updating programs. The programs created were: (i) in 1974, during the government of Maria Estela Péron (1974-1976), the Régimen Especial de Jubilación por Edad Avanzada para los Trabajadores del Sector Rural, which made access to retirement more flexible for rural workers aged 80 or over, requiring them only to provide some sort of proof of length of service; (ii) in 1989, during the Menem government (1989-1999), of the Justicialist Party, a non-contributory pension for mothers of seven or more children. The update refers to increasing the age of access to the non-contributory pension to 80 years, thus aligning it with the criteria adopted in the aforementioned special regime.⁷

In Brazil, the establishment of the general system advanced with the approval of the Organic Law of Social Security (LOPS) in 1960, which created the General Social Security (PGS), standardizing the provisions offered by the Retirement and Pension Institutes (IAP).⁸ Until then, that was under the management of unions, except for the Institute of Social Security and Assistance for State Employees (IPASE) and the retirement and pension schemes for military personnel. However, the implementation of the LOPS was postponed, occurring only during the military dictatorship (1964-1985). The first initiatives date back to 1966,⁹ covering changes to the LOPS benefit plan and the creation of the General Urban Pension Regime (RGPU), whose management was the responsibility of the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) (Fagnani, 1997; IPEA, 2009; Rangel, et al., 2009).

The RGPU comprised the contributory provisions intended for formal workers, configuring what Santos (1979) called “regulated citizenship”,¹⁰ notably retirement benefits for old age, disability and length of service, survivor’s pensions, benefits for illness and accidents (common and occupational), family benefits and health services. For teachers, the retirement eligibility period was reduced by five years, and for workers in arduous, unhealthy and dangerous activities, a special retirement was created.¹¹

The configuration of the RGPU was recalibrated during the military dictatorship and by the 1988 Constitution. The dictatorship incorporated, on a quasi-contributory basis: (i) in 1971, rural workers and, (ii) in 1974, elderly and disabled people. On a contributory basis it incorporated, (i) in 1973, domestic, casual and self-employed workers were incorporated and; (ii) in the 1980s, municipal and state employees who did not have their own pension plans were also incorporated.¹²

The provision guaranteed to rural workers through the Rural Worker Assistance Program (PRORURAL) consisted of health services and retirement or pension, equivalent to 50% and 30% of the minimum wage, respectively, financed with resources raised from the marketing of rural production. Retirement for elderly and disabled people, called Lifelong Minimum Revenue (RMV), was accessible to those over 70 years of age and disabled people who had made at least 12 contributions, or had worked for pay for five years, or had joined the INPS after the age of 60. The benefit could not exceed 60% of the minimum wage, and the INPS and PRORURAL covered its cost.

The 1988 Constitution established four commands, the implementation of which, in the first half of the 1990s, expanded the RGPU while its systemic reform was being carried out in 1991. The first refers to the definition of the minimum wage as the minimum value of social security benefits (art. 201), and the second to the extension of urban social security to “rural workers of both sexes and to those who carry out their activities under a family economy regime, including rural producers, miners and artisanal fishermen” (art. 202, translated by author), with the retirement eligibility reduced by five years, as occurred in PRORURAL. The third command is the “guarantee of a minimum monthly benefit wage to the disabled person and the elderly who prove that they do not have the means to provide for their maintenance or to have it provided by their family” (art. 203, translated by author). Finally, the fourth concerns the universalization of the healthcare service, which was, until then, restricted to RGPU and PRORURAL policyholders and, from the 1974 Rapid Action Plan, to the general population in emergencies.

Unlike the first command, whose implementation was independent of law, the others were regulated by Laws 8,212 and 8,213 from 1991, which comprise the standardization of the systemic reform; Law 8,080, from 1990, entitled the Organic Health Law, which established the bases of the Unified Health System (SUS); and Law 8,742, from 1993, also known as the Organic Law of Social Assistance (LOAS), which laid the bases of the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS).

In the regulation of income for older people and people with disabilities, called Continuous Benefit Payment (BPC) by the LOAS, people aged 70 or over and people with disabilities were included, both groups with per capita family income lower than a quarter of the minimum wage. The LOAS stipulated the reduction of this age to 67 years in 24 months and 65 in 48 months, counting from implementing the benefit, which began in 1996. The regulation of the social security of rural workers, in turn, was made by the standardization of the reform, which maintained it on a quasi-contributory basis. For those who were active in the period before the reform, only some sort of proof of length of service was required, which significantly expanded the coverage of this segment from 4.4% in 1990 to more than 10% of the Economically Active Population (PEA) in 1992 (IPEA, 2009).

The Cuban social security system, established in 1963, also evolved expansively until the systemic reform of 2008. Still, it differs from the Argentine and Brazilian cases in two aspects: it underwent an expansive systemic reform in 1979 and the restrictive reform of 2008, and its regime changed from socialist to capitalist, in the terms of Esping-Andersen (1990).

The first initiative to establish the Cuban system occurred in 1959, the year of the socialist revolution, with the transfer of the management of 20 social security funds to the Banco de Seguros Sociales de Cuba (BANSESCU), which became responsible for guaranteeing universal benefits. However, this institution was abolished in 1963 with the creation of the Seguridad Social, which was entirely financed by the State. The provisions covered retirement due to old age and disability, pensions, benefits for illness and accidents (common and occupational), maternity, and healthcare services. In old-age retirement, two categories were defined according to working conditions (I - normal; II - harmful and dangerous). In the 1979 reform, which instituted the Sistema de Seguridad Social, another type of retirement was created, the extraordinary one, and social assistance was expanded¹³ (Donate-Armada, 1994; Mesa-Lago, 2012). As anticipated, the absence of unemployment insurance stands out in this configuration, in line with the assumption of full employment under the socialist regime.

Thus, the general regimes of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban social security systems, established in 1968, 1966 and 1963, evolved expansively. The strategy for change was layering, according to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and its objective was recalibration through creating programs aimed at social segments excluded from the original design. In the modeling of inclusion measures, it is worth highlighting the variety of mechanisms mobilized in the Argentine system: non-contributory (retirement created in 1947-8), quasi-contributory (retirement for old age), reduction of rates (provisions for the self-employed) and flexibility in proving length of service for rural workers. In the Brazilian and Cuban systems, this experience was more restricted: in the first case, quasi-contributory (PRORURAL and RMV) and, in the latter, reduction in length of service (extraordinary retirement).

Regardless of the level of diversification of these experiences, the expanded configuration of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban systems was seen as unsustainable, giving rise to the restrictive systemic reforms of 1993, 1991 and 2008, respectively.

Restrictive systemic reforms and subsequent incremental changes

From 1980 onwards, a new period began in Latin America, which was marked by, according to Pierson (2008), permanent austerity, stimulating structural reforms and public policies, as had already occurred in developed countries. In the social security sector, this period was seen as a critical juncture in which the foreseeable development alternatives, in terms of historical institutionalism, the inertia or self-reinforcement of the established systems, were seen as unviable. The justifications for the social security reforms, led by governments with different ideological positions, showed slight variation, covering, among other things, the search for financial sustainability, adaptation of the systems to demographic changes, changes in the structure of families and the labor market (Cepal, 2006; Mesa-Lago, 2004). In the cases analyzed here, different strategies were mobilized in an attempt to guarantee financial sustainability: cessation of benefits, changes in the financing structure and remodeling of benefits, as will be seen in the analysis of systemic reforms developed in the first part of this section. In the second, the possible changes made as a reaction to the increase in the exclusion of informal workers are analyzed. Their connection with the retraction level caused by the systemic reform and the lessons learned from the inclusion experiences of the previous stage is assessed.

Restrictive social security reforms and the resilience or self-reinforcement of their design

Argentina, the reformist effort advanced under the Menem government of the Justicialist Party, situated on the left of the ideological spectrum of Argentine politics, which, with the support of unionists and pressure from private insurers, led the replacement, in 1993, of the Sistema Nacional de Previsión Social by the Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (SIJP).¹⁴ The latter was structured as a mixed regime: a public pillar, maintaining the distribution regime for the provision of death and disability benefits, the management of which was assigned to the Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES), and a private one, which was organized as a capitalization scheme for the provision of retirement by age, whose operation was delegated to the Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFJP). The contribution rates of the previous system were maintained, with workers’ contributions going to individual accounts and employers’ contributions to the solidarity pillar (Apella, 2022; Bertranou et al. 2011; Ferro, 2002; Silva, 2006). Among the provisions, this reform eliminated quasi-contributory retirement due to old age, which, although requiring an age of five years higher than the one previously established, made the contribution period more flexible, thus favoring workers with a previous history of informality.

However, the 1993 reform only exacerbated the problem of financial sustainability. When it was implemented, the high cost of transitioning from a mature pay-as-you-go system to a capitalization system became apparent, a difficulty enhanced by the deepening economic crisis. The issue remained on the agenda of the governments of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2011 and 2011-2015), both also from the Justicialist Party, who decided in 2007 to allow a return to the pay-as-you-go system and, in 2008, to put an end to the capitalization system by transferring the resources accumulated in individual accounts to a new pay-as-you-go system, the Sistema Integrado Previsional Argentino (SIPA), whose provisions are the same as those of the now-terminated SIJP¹⁵ (Bertranou; Casalí; Cetrángolo, 2018).

In Brazil, systemic reform was also driven by the understanding that the RGPU, as designed in the regulations consolidated at the end of the military dictatorship,¹⁶ was financially unsustainable. The initiative was led by the Collor de Mello government (1990-1992) of the National Reconstruction Party (PRN), a small right-wing party favored, in this attempt, by the urgency of regulating the commands of the 1988 Constitution.

The reform replaced the RGPU with the General Social Security Regime (RGPS), whose management was assigned to the National Institute of Social Security (INSS). Taking as a reference the expanded configuration of the RGPU, created by the dictatorship and the 1988 Constitution, this reform restricted the contributory provision, transferring to municipal governments, within the scope of social assistance, the birth and funeral benefits, and the quasi-contributory provision, extinguishing the RMV which, like the old-age retirement pension of the Argentine system, covered workers with a history of informality.

In terms of financing, the changes introduced by the Brazilian systemic reform were negligible from the worker’s perspective: it maintained the scale of contributions by income brackets (8%, 9% and 11%), with a 1% increase in the rate allocated to those with higher incomes, but a 0.5% reduction in the range assigned to those with lower incomes, and the 0.75% contribution for family allowance and maternity benefits were discontinued. For employers, the change was more significant: a residual increase in the rate allocated to occupational risk benefits (0.5%) and a substantial increase in the rate assigned to others (from 10% to 20% of the payroll), partially offset by the end of the 5.05% contribution allocated to family expenses.

Finally, the Cuban social security reform was carried out within the framework of significant economic and political changes led by the government of Raul Castro, with the replacement of the Sistema de Seguridad Social by another with the same name but organized as a pay-as-you-go system and managed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social (INASS). The definition of contribution rates was transferred to the scope of the tax reform, which set them at 2.5% or 5% of earnings for workers, depending on income, and, for employers, at 12.5% and 14.5% of payroll for the state and private sectors, respectively (ISSA, 2024).

In terms of provisions, the previous configuration of the Cuban system was recalibrated with the creation of the Prestación Social Opcional, intended for mothers who prefer to take care of their children rather than return to work after maternity leave. In this regard, two points are worth highlighting: first, even with the change in the nature of social security, from non-contributory (socialist) to contributory (social-democratic), the reform was guided by the premise of full employment, evidenced by the absence of unemployment insurance; and, second, this full employment continued to be assured with the mobilization of jobs within the state structure, despite the economic restructuring efforts undertaken since 2010 (Mesa-Lago, 2012).

Finally, with regard to the modeling of benefits, the three systemic reforms are similar: they tightened the criteria for accessing benefits and reduced their monetary value.

The effect of the changes in the access criteria is easy to understand: the higher the age and the qualifying period, measured in terms of length of service or number of contributions, the more restrictive the access. Understanding the reduction in the monetary value requires further clarification. In the Brazilian system, this value is calculated based on the concepts of contribution and benefit salaries. The first refers to the remunerations/earnings on which the contribution rates are levied; the second is the average contribution salary in a given period, which is the basis for calculating the percentage to which the monetary value of the benefit will correspond. In the Argentine and Cuban systems, the logic is the same: the monetary value of the benefit corresponds to the percentage of the average earnings/remunerations for a given period. Logically speaking, the longer this period, the lower the average will be, given that, in general, earnings at the beginning of working life are lower, and the monetary value may be reduced or increased by changing the percentage of the average to which it will correspond.

For the sake of parsimony, this analysis compares the modeling of retirements by age and length of service (or contribution), given that the changes are replicated, with the necessary adjustments, to other benefits. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of these criteria between the system configured at the end of the previous stage and those instituted by systemic reforms.

Table 1.
Criteria for defining access to and value of pensions in the original and reformed Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban systems

Legislation	Name	Access criteria	Average calculation basis	Percentage of average
Argentina
Law 18.037/1968	Ordinary	60/55 years for men/women, 30 years of service and 10 years of contribution	36 most favorable salaries in the last 10 years	70%, plus 1% for each year exceeding 82% of the average
	Advanced age	65 years old and 10 years of contributions, 5 in the last 8 years		50%, plus 1% for each additional year
Law 24,241/ 1993 (reform)	Ordinary	65/60 years for men/women, 30 years of service with contributions	Remuneration received in the last 10 years (in formal employment)	From 70% to 82%
Brazil
Decree 89.312/1984	Old age	65/60 years for men/women and 60 contributions	1/36 of the sum of the contribution salaries of the immediately preceding months, up to a maximum of 36, calculated within 48 months	70%, plus 1% for every 12 contributions exceeding 100%
	Service time	30 years of service and 60 contributions		Man: 80%, plus 3% per year exceeding 95%; Woman: 95%
	RMV	70 years old or disability, 12 contributions or paid activity for 5 years or membership of INPS after 60	--	60% of the minimum wage
Law 8,213/1991 (reform)	Age	65/60 years for men/women and 180 contributions	Idem	70%, plus 1% for each group of 12 contributions exceeding 100%
	Service time	30/25 years of service for men/women and 180 contributions		70%, plus 6% per year exceeding 100%
Law 9.876/1999 (incremental change)	Age	Idem	Highest contribution salaries corresponding to 80% of the contribution period, multiplied by the FP	Idem
	Service time	Idem		Idem
Law 13.135/2015 (incremental change)	Age	Idem	Highest contribution salaries corresponding to 80% of the contribution period, multiplied by the Social Security Factor or sum of points	Idem
	Service time	Idem		Idem
EC* 103/2019 (incremental change)	Age	65/62 years for men/women and 240/180 contributions	Remuneration for the entire contribution period	60%, plus 2% for each year of contribution after 240/180 Continued
Legislation	Name	Access criteria	Average (benefit-salary)	Percentage of average
Cuba
Law 24/1979	Ordinary	Category I: 60/55 years for men/women and 25 years of service Category II: 55/50 years for men/women and 25 years of service, 12 in strenuous activities	Highest salaries over 5 years, selected from the last 10	Category I: 50% of the average, plus 1% for each excess year Category II: 50% of the average, plus 1.5% for each excess year
	Extraordinary	65/60 years for men/women and 15 years of service		40% of the average, plus 1% for each excess year
Law 105/2008 (reform)	Ordinary	Category I: 65/60 years for men/women and 30 years of service Category II: 60/55 years for men/women and 30 years of service, 15 in strenuous activities	Highest salaries over 5 years, selected from the last 15	60% of the average, plus 2% for each additional year after 30 for categories I and II
	Extraordinary	65/60 years for men/women, 20 years of service		40% of the average, plus 2% for each excess year

• Source: Legislation mentioned, compiled by the author.
• Note: *Constitutional Amendment.

In the Argentine reform, the criteria for access to benefits were tightened by increasing the retirement age by five years and replacing 30 years of service and 10 years of contributions with 30 years of service with contributions. The ordinary retirement’s monetary value was reduced by increasing the earnings range used to calculate the average. In the Brazilian reform, the retirement age of the previous system was maintained. Still, the number of contributions required was tripled, from 60 to 180, and increased to 240 for men under the Bolsonaro government (2019-2022). The benefit salary was also maintained during the systemic reform but was reduced by subsequent incremental changes. This effort began during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998, 1999-2002), with the de-constitutionalizing of the parameters for calculating the value of benefits in 1998,¹⁷ and continued in the following year with the approval of an increase in the time interval for calculating the average and the inclusion of the Social Security Factor (FP) in the calculation of the benefit salary.¹⁸ A new change, not necessarily restrictive, came in 2015, during Dilma’s second government (2015-2017), when the option for not applying the FP was allowed if the total resulting from the sum of age and contribution time is equal to or greater than 85 and 95 points, for women and men, respectively (IPEA, 2000, 2012). The 2019 reform finally extended the interval for calculating the average to the entire contribution period, reduced the percentage of the average to which the monetary value corresponds from 70% to 60%, and eliminated retirement solely based on length of service. Finally, the Cuban reform also tightened the criteria for access to the two types of ordinary retirement, increasing both age and length of service by five years, and, in the extraordinary type, the duration of service was also increased by five years.¹⁹ The changes in the parameters for defining the value are ambiguous: although the percentages of the average increased, the length of service defined for its calculation tripled. According to Mesa-Lago (2012), these changes resulted in a 22% increase in the monetary value of the minimum pension and a 10% to 20% increase in the remaining types.

Thus, concerning the range of provisions, displacement was the strategy mobilized in the reforms. The objectives varied: (i) re-commodification in the Argentine and Brazilian systems, with the elimination of the quasi-contributory benefit that allowed people of advanced age who were unable to meet the contribution time criterion at the regulatory age to retire; and (ii) recalibration in the Cuban case, with the creation of a new benefit. Regarding financing, from the worker’s perspective, the impact was zero in the Argentine system, residual in the Brazilian system, and significant in the Cuban system, which changed from non-contributory to contributory. In modeling benefits, re-commodification (or commodification in the Cuban case) was sought by tightening the access criteria and, in the Argentine and Brazilian cases, also by reducing their monetary value. Subsequently, re-commodification was ratified in the Argentine system in 2008 and deepened in the Brazilian system through incremental changes by displacement. It should be noted that the design established by the three reforms maintained the flexibility of access for workers who perform activities that are harmful to health. For workers with a history of informality, the Argentine reform maintained the tax rate reduction for self-employed workers and non-contributory retirement; the Brazilian reform maintained the quasi-contributory provisions for rural workers; and the Cuban reform maintained the extraordinary retirement, with reduced service time.

In classifying these reforms according to the level of retraction they caused, taking as a reference the categories announced in the introduction, we can see: (i) a high retraction in the Argentine and Brazilian reforms, which, in addition to tightening the criteria for access to benefits and reducing their value, eliminated the quasi-contributory benefits intended for older workers with a previous history of informality (RMV and retirement due to old age, respectively), maintaining only the quasi-contributory provisions (for self-employed workers and rural workers, respectively); and (ii) a low retraction in the Cuban reform, which, although became contributory and tightened the access criteria, maintained the configuration achieved at the end of the first stage, with emphasis, for what is of interest here, on extraordinary retirement.

Before investigating the possible incremental changes in reaction to the effect of reforms on the increase in exclusion, it is worth highlighting that this phenomenon - exclusion - has been treated in the literature as a chronic problem of Latin American welfare regimes (e.g., Abramo, 2021; Barrientos, 2004; Cantu, 2015; Cecchini et al. 2015; Draibe, 1997; Filgueira, 2005; Fiori, 1997; Fleury; Mesa-Lago, 2004; Franzoni, 2005; Molina, 2002). In the context of social security policy, exclusion was addressed before systemic reforms took place through different strategies, as seen in the previous section. Still, these were insufficient to universalize coverage. The exclusion of informal workers worsened, as occurred in other Latin American countries, as a result of the emergence of new occupational categories and structural reforms, notably (i) the deregulation of the labor market and its consequences (outsourcing, subcontracting, etc.) and (ii) social security reforms, regardless if they adopted the capitalization regime or maintained the PAYGO regime (e.g.: Abramo, 2021; Barrientos, 2004; Fiori, 1997; Fleury; Molina, 2002; Izquierdo, 2015; Krein; Colombi, 2019; Mesa-Lago, 2020; Picolotto, 2024; Picolotto; Lazzaretti; Hübner, 2020).

It is also worth highlighting that the social security exclusion of informal workers is strongly related, in logical terms, not only to the rules that define access to the policy (contribution rate, qualifying period, age) but also to the dynamics of the economy which, as highlighted in the literature, affects the level of formal employment, which is the primary determinant of this inclusion (Casalí et al. 2018; Calligaro; Cetrángolo, 2023). However, despite the theoretical clarity of these connections, the empirical measurement of the effects of each of these factors on social security coverage is complex, firstly, by the fact that they can, during the same time, act in opposite directions, with one compensating for the negative or positive effect of the other, or adding up in the same direction, and, secondly, by the unavailability of information, as is the case in Cuba.

Information is available in the Argentine and Brazilian cases. For the former, the data indicate a decline in social security coverage and, therefore, an increase in exclusion of both economically active (PEA) (16-64 years) and inactive populations (65 years and over) in the years following the reform, during which there were several economic crises: in the PEA, the decline was from 49.7% in 1991 to 38.7% in 2003; among the inactive, the decline was from 78.1%, also in 1992, to 68.1% in 2004.²⁰ For the Brazilian system, the data also indicate a drop in PEA coverage in the years following the reform, which encompasses the economic crisis and its overcoming, from 66.4% in 1992 to 61.7% in 2002, but an increase in coverage for older people (60 years and over): from 74.1% in 1992 to 82% in 2003, thus highlighting the importance of making access to rural retirement more flexible, as implemented by the systemic reform itself for workers in activity in the previous period, and the implementation of the BPC, starting in 1996 (Brazil, 2016).

The following section investigates the possible reaction to the increase in this multi-caused phenomenon - social security exclusion - in the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban systems and whether this reaction is connected to the level of retraction caused by systemic reforms and the learning acquired in the inclusion initiatives implemented in the previous stage.

Reactive changes to the increasing exclusion of informal workers

In the Argentine and Brazilian systems, where the level of contraction caused by the systemic reform was high, reactive measures aimed at informal workers of working age and inactive workers have emerged, led by governments with different ideological positions. For those of working age, the measures are divided into two groups: (i) creation of mechanisms to induce the implementation of contributions, taking into account the different links in the labor market (salaried, self-employed, domestic, etc.), and (ii) creation of jobs, for which, their advocates argue, it would be necessary to reduce employer contributions. For inactive workers, new non-contributory programs have been created, or the coverage of existing ones has been expanded. In addressing exclusion in these two countries, policies known as social promotion (labor intermediation, professional qualification, etc.) (Cecchini et al., 2015; Cepal, 2023) also stand out, but these do not affect the social security’s institutionality, which was established in the systemic reforms, thus falling outside the scope of the discussion developed here. Finally, it is worth highlighting that the assessment of measures that reduce employer contributions to job creation generally indicates their low or non-existent effectiveness in Argentina, Brazil and other countries, except for those that affect micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Measures focused on workers, on the other hand, are evaluated positively, but, like those that reduce employer costs, their effect is also confounded by economic dynamics (Casalí et al. 2018; Calligaro; Cetrángolo, 2023; Delgado et al., 2007; Paiva; Ansiliero, 2009). Finally, in the Cuban system, where the level of contraction was low, there was no reaction in the form of layering of the design instituted by the systemic reform.

Table 2 lists the measures designed to promote social security inclusion in the Argentine and Brazilian systems, discriminating by regulation between the groups covered (active and inactive workers, employers) and the inclusion mechanisms that structure them.

Table 2.
Measures to stimulate inclusion in Argentine and Brazilian social security systems, created between systemic reforms and 2000

Measures	Groups covered	Mechanism
Argentina
Inactive workers
Update on non-contributory pensions (Decree 432/1997)	Elderly and disabled	Reduction in age
Pension for beneficiaries of non-contributory pensions (Decree 1,450/2005)	Dependents of beneficiaries	Coverage extension
Pensión Universal para Adultos Mayores (PUAM) (Law 27.260/2016)	Seniors 65 years or older	Non-contributivity
Working-age worker
Housewives (Law 24,347/1994)	Housewives	Tax rate reduction
Inclusion Previsional (Decree 164/2004 and Laws 24,476/1995, 26,970/2014 and 27,562/2019)	Workers of retirement age	Installment of social security debts
Régimen Simplificado para Pequenos Contribuyentes (Laws 24,977/1998, 26,063/2005, 26,565/2009, 26,970/2014)	Self-employed	Reduction of tax rates
Rural workers with temporary or cyclical tasks (Anses Resolution 2/1999)	Workers of retirement age	Flexibility in proving period of service
Early retirement (Law 25.994/2004, Decree 1.451/2006)	Workers close to retirement age	Reduction in age
Employers
Disminución de las contribuciones a cargo de los empleadores (Decree 2.609/1993)	Employers	Tax waiver
Measures	Groups covered	Mechanism
Brazil
Inactive workers
Reduction of the age for access to BPC (Laws 9,720/1998 and 10,741/2003)	Elderly and disabled people aged 65 and over	Coverage extension
Working-age workers
Contribution from individuals who provide services to companies (Law 10.666/2003)	Cooperative member and self-employed worker who provides services to companies	Reduction of tax rates
Simplified Pension Inclusion Plan (Complementary Law 123/2006)	Self-employed worker who provides services to individuals	Tax rate reduction
Simplified Social Security Plan (Decree 6,042/2006)	Individual/optional contributor and entrepreneur with gross revenue of up to R$36 thousand per year	Tax rate reduction
Short-term rural worker contract (Law 11,718/2008)	A rural worker hired by an individual	Tax rate reduction
Contribution to labor assignment contracts (Laws 9,212/1991 and 11,933/2009)	An employee of service providers through labor outsourcing	Collection of contributions at source
Low-income optional contributor (Law 12,470/2011)	Low-income worker dedicated to domestic work in his own home	Tax rate reduction
Individual Microentrepreneur (MEI) (LC* 128/2008 and Law 2,470/2011)	Entrepreneur with annual revenue of up to R$36 thousand	Tax rate reduction
Full Inclusion of Domestic Workers (EC** 72/2013, LC 150/2015)	Domestic worker	Tax rate reduction
Employers
SIMPLES and SUPERSIMPLES (Laws 9,317/1996, 9,732/1998 and 9,841/1999)	Micro and small businesses	Tax waiver
Domestic Employer’s Quota (Laws 11,250/1995, 11,324/2006 and 12,469/2011)	Domestic employer	Tax waiver
Employer quota on rural exports (EC 33/2001, art. 149)	Agroindustry and rural producer legal entity	Tax waiver
Payroll Tax Relief (Laws 12,546/2011, 12,715/2012, 12,794/2013, 12,844/2013, 12,995/2014, 13,043/2014, 13,161/2015 and 14.784/2023)	Companies from selected sectors and small municipalities	Tax waiver

• Sources: Legislation mentioned, compiled by the author.
• Notes: * Complementary Law, ** Constitutional Amendment.

In Argentina’s social security system, in line with the lessons learned from previous experiences of inclusion, various inclusion mechanisms have been mobilized. There have been three measures for inactive workers. The first, in 1997, by the Menem government, updated the criteria for access to non-contributory old-age and disability pensions created in 1947-8, reducing the age from 80 to 70 years. The second and third measures, by the governments of Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri, the latter from the right-wing party Compromiso para el Cambio, refer to the creation, in 2005, of a pension for survivors of beneficiaries of the aforementioned non-contributory pensions, and, in 2016, of the Pensión Universal para Adultos Mayores for people aged 65 or over, also non-contributory. For workers of working age, five measures were adopted by the governments of Menem, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, four of which were aimed at those close to retirement age: (i) Inclusión Previsional program, the “moratória previsional”, created in 1995 and made permanent in 2004. It is aimed at self-employed workers of retirement age with insufficient contribution history, allowing them to pay the debt accumulated up to 1993 in installments. In 2014, a new moratorium was created for self-employed workers and single-tax payers with retirement age to be reached within two years, allowing them to pay in installments debts contracted up to 2003, extended in 2019; (ii) the Régimen Simplificado para Pequeños Contribuyentes, the “monotributo” from 1998, whose objective is to encourage the inclusion of self-employed workers (salespeople, service providers) and, in its reissues of 2005, 2009 and 2014, also of other occupations; (iii) flexibility in the proof of length of service for temporary or cyclical workers, from 1999; and, finally, (iv) anticipation of retirement by five years, in the case of the unemployed, from 2006 (Apella, 2022; Bertranou et al., 2011; Cetrángolo; Grushka, 2020; Cetrángolo et al., 2018). Regarding measures covering employers, there was only one, in 1999, the Disminución de las contribuciones a cargo de los empleadores, which had no positive effects on employment and was short-lived (Cruces; Galiani; Kidyba, 2010).

In Brazil, the inclusion measures show negligible diversification in the mechanisms used, consistent with the lack of previous experience. For working-age workers, eight measures were instituted, seven of which were structured around reducing the tax rate. Special mention should be made to the government of Luís Inácio da Silva Lula, from the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), who led the approval of Constitutional Amendment 47/2005, which created the “special social security inclusion system” to be structured with lower rates and eligibility requirements for microentrepreneurs, employees without formal employment contracts, the unemployed, etc. Of the measures resulting from this amendment, the most comprehensive are the two Simplified Plans from 2006 and the one for Individual Microentrepreneurs (MEI) from 2011. Like these measures, those created during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), the Simples and the Super Simples, have been evaluated positively, given that they reduce the tax burden on small and micro-enterprises. This evaluation has not been extended, as anticipated, to the measure aimed at employers, created during Dilma Rousseff’s administration, also a member of the Workers Party (PT), which has not received such a positive evaluation (Ansiliero et al., 2008; Paiva; Ansiliero, 2009). Created in 2011 and valid until 2012, this initiative covered five sectors and was renewed in December 2012, with changes in the rates, incorporation of other industries and extension of its validity until 2014. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, new sectors were included, the rates were changed, and the validity’s end was left indefinite. In 2023, the gradual elimination of this exemption for companies was planned until 2027, but the exemption was extended indefinitely to small municipalities.²¹ Finally, for the inactive population, the Brazilian social security initiative is limited to reducing the age of access to BPC to 67 years in 1998 and 65 in 2003.²²

It is worth noting that these recalibrations, accomplished via layering of the design established in the Argentine and Brazilian reforms, alongside the improvement in the economic scenario, produced growth in social security coverage in the 2000s and 2010s. In the Argentine system, among inactive individuals, this coverage increased from 68.1% in 2004 to 93.1% in 2020, and in the PEA, from 38.7% in 2003 to 51.8% in 2020.²³ In the Brazilian system, among inactive individuals, this coverage increased from 82% in 2003 to 84.8% in 2019, and in the PEA, from 61.7% in 2002 to 70.2% in 2019 (Brazil, 2016, 2019, 2021).

In the Cuban social security system, there were no reactive changes in the institutional framework of the general system, similar to those observed in the Argentine and Brazilian systems, which can be attributed to the low level of retraction promoted by the systemic reform, which, unlike the Argentine and Brazilian systems, maintained the retirement system intended for workers with insufficient work experience to access ordinary retirement. However, it should be noted that two specificities of the Cuban system prevent this lack of reaction from being related solely to the maintenance of this benefit, disregarding possible effects of the tightening of access criteria on the exclusion of workers of working age, namely: (i) the maintenance of the government practice of trying to ensure full employment through the occupation (or creation) of jobs within the state structure, as reported by Mesa-Lago (2012); (ii) the innovation of the system to deal with the effects of the country’s economic restructuring, after 2010, on the workforce.

This innovation refers to the creation of the so-called Régimenes Especiales de Seguridad Social,²⁴ aimed at emerging segments of workers in Cuba. Currently, there are six new special regimes, all of which are mandatory, including agricultural cooperatives, land usufructuaries, workers and artists in the cultural sector, members of basic cooperative production units, workers in the maritime sector,²⁵ self-employed workers, members of non-agricultural cooperatives and partners in micro, small and medium-sized businesses.²⁶ The provisions of these regimes are similar to those of the general regime. Still, the contribution rates are much higher, reaching 25% of income for seafarers and 20% for members of cooperatives, except for agricultural cooperatives, where the contribution is divided between the entity and members (5% and 7%, respectively). The contribution is also higher for the cultural sector, in which it is also divided between companies and professionals (12% and 8%, respectively).²⁷ Finally, it is worth noting that, unlike the general regime, in these special regimes, the eligibility period for access to benefits is defined in terms of contribution time, with service time being set only for members of agricultural cooperatives and, in the case of ordinary retirement, for self-employed workers and company partners.

In short, the systemic reform of the Cuban general system did not trigger reactive measures to social security inclusion through the layering of the design it instituted. This absence of reactive measures can be understood as logically connected to the low level of retraction it established. Still, specificities of the system weaken this association, specifically the government’s efforts to promote full employment and the creation of special social security systems. On the other hand, the Argentine and Brazilian reforms, which encouraged high retraction, adding to the toughening of the criteria for access to benefits and reduction of their value, the elimination of benefits intended for workers with a history of informality, triggered different incremental changes reactive to the increase in the exclusion of workers of working age and inactive workers, most of them structured by mechanisms learned in the previous stage, before the systemic reforms.

Conclusion

This article sought to contribute to the explanation of the divergent trends - contraction and expansion - in the evolution of Latin American social security over the last three decades. Based on Mahoney (2020), the argument that guided the analysis was that these trends constitute self-reinforcing sequences of the contraction promoted by systemic reforms of general social security regimes, which, among other things, tightened the criteria for accessing benefits and reduced their value, and reactive sequences to the increase in social security exclusion caused by them.

The analysis of the Argentine, Brazilian and Cuban cases was guided by the hypothesis that the existence of reactive measures to the increase in exclusion is related to the level of retraction established by the systemic reform, which may be low if there is only a tightening of access criteria and a reduction in the value of benefits, or high if, in addition to the above, there is a termination of benefits. The comparison of the design of the general regimes that preceded the systemic reforms with the design instituted by them showed a high retraction in the Argentine and Brazilian cases and a low retraction in the Cuban case. In the first two cases, a reaction was observed to the increase in exclusion

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• ²
  This work was carried out with the support of the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior - Brazil (CAPES) - Financing Code 001. I am very grateful for this support, the contributions of Oscar Cetrángolo (CONICET/UBA), Carlos Grushka (UBA) and Ignacio Apella (World Bank) and the valuable criticisms and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers of the Brazilian Journal of Political Science.
• ³
  In the evolution of special pension schemes, there is greater complexity: although many have undergone restrictive incremental changes, some have been kept untouched or expanded, and others have been extinguished, which indicates a relatively independent development of the trends highlighted here.
• ⁴
  The other pioneering systems incorporated the capitalization regime into their systemic reforms, exclusively, together with or parallel to the PAYGO regime.
• ⁵
  According to Laws 17,575/1967, 18,037 (arts. 2, 91, 92 and 64) and 18,038, of 1968.
• ⁶
  Established by Laws 13,025/1947, 13,478/1948.
• ⁷
  According to Decree 1021/1974 and Law 23.746/1989.
• ⁸
  Specifically, the Law 3.807/1960.
• ⁹
  Established by Decrees 66 e 72, de 1966.
• ¹⁰
  In the author’s words, “[c]itizenship whose roots lie not in a code of political values, but in a system of occupational stratification, and which, furthermore, such a system of occupational stratification is defined by legal norms” (Santos, 1979, p. 75, translated by author).
• ¹¹
  According to the Social Security Law Consolidation Decree (CLPS) 89,312/1984.
• ¹²
  Changes made by Complementary Laws (LC) 11/1971, 16/1971, and Laws 5,890/1973, 5,889/1973, 6,179/1974, 6,887/1980, 7,004/1982, 7,070/1982, 7,986/1989.
• ¹³
  According to Laws 1,100/1963 and 24/1979.
• ¹⁴
  eform made by Law 24,241/1993.
• ¹⁵
  According to Laws 26,222/2007 and 26,425/2008.
• ¹⁶
  Consolidation made by Decree 89,312/1984.
• ¹⁷
  Change made by Constitutional Amendment 20/1998.
• ¹⁸
  Index consisting of the insured’s age and contribution period and life expectancy.
• ¹⁹
  In Law 105/2008, this benefit is included in the social security provisions, but in the ISSA portal and in Mesa-Lago (2012), it is included as social assistance (non-contributory). This discrepancy, however, is not important for the discussion developed here.
• ²⁰
  Data provided by Ignacio Apella, based on the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH)/INDEC and Muestra Longitudinal del Registered Employment / MTEySS.
• ²¹
  Law 14,784/2023 was vetoed by the Executive, but the veto was overturned. After defeat in new proposals, the Executive questioned the constitutionality of this law (ADI 7,633), which led to the approval of Law 14,973, which establishes the gradual resumption of taxation on the payroll of companies and small municipalities until 2027.
• ²²
  According to Laws 9,720/1998 and 10,741/2003 (Elderly Statute).
• ²³
  Data provided by Ignacio Apella, based on the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH)/INDEC and Muestra Longitudinal del Registered Employment / MTEySS.
• ²⁴
  Established by Decree-laws 297/2012, 298/2012, 312/2013, 351/2017, 382/2019 and 48/2021.
• ²⁵
  Only individuals who provide services to the Selecmar enterprise.
• ²⁶
  The two segments are favored according to terms of the Decree-law 48/2021, which repealed Decrees 278/2010 and 284/2011, both focusing on self-employed individuals, and Decree-law 306/2012, regulating non-agricultural cooperatives.
• ²⁷
  The basis for calculating these rates can be selected from values ranging from 350 to 2,000 pesos, except in the self-employed workers regime, in which the values are between 2,000 and 9,500 pesos.

Edited by

• Debora Rezende de Almeida

• Rebecca Neaera Abers

Data availability

Data citations

ISSA - INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION. Social Security around the world: Country profiles. [base de dados]. Disponível em: Disponível em: https://www.issa.int/databases/country-profiles Acesso em: 15 jan. 2024.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  24 Feb 2025
• Date of issue
  2025

History

• Received
  14 Feb 2024
• Accepted
  25 Sept 2024