The coalitional presidentialism cycles and its political-economic determinants

Abstract

What would be the political and economic determinants of coalitional instability? According Abranches (2014) this instability would be determined by the presidential attraction force, which is motivated by political and macroeconomic factors. Therefore, the objective of this paper is empirically verify in Brazil the relationship between factors of the presidential attraction force and the parliamentary support of coalition. Analyzes were performed with panel data from 1995 to 2014, using linear methods (fixed effects and random effects) and GMM regressions. It was observed that the decrease of GDP causes decrease of the parliamentary support, as well as a greater presidential approval rating cause greater discipline of the coalition. The relation between parliamentary support and inflation has not been confirmed. In addition, we highlight the tendency of oscillations of the variables and their coincidence with the political crises occurrence. The results point to the influence of economic and political factors on the parliamentary support of the coalition, corroborating some Abranches' propositions.

Keywords:
coalitional presidentialism; cycles; instability; panel data