Cancelling: debate or censorship? John Stuart Mill’s Liberalism and cancel culture

Abstract:

Despite widespread media coverage, cancel culture (or cancelling), has rarely been the subject of academic analysis. This article aims to contribute to the scholarly debate by discussing two arguments for why cancelling might be considered legitimate: (1) that cancelling regulates social conduct and behaviour and, (2) that it is a form of expression used by minority groups in the public sphere. Looking at John Stuart Mill’s theory, the article rejects the first argument, arguing that the possibility of vilification and the vagueness of the principle of harm make it difficult to justify cancelling for the sake of regulating social behaviour. Nonetheless, the article suggests that cancelling might be more easily justified according to the second argument, although this approach risks promoting conformism and the empowerment of the “social police”. The article closes with a call for more work on the subject, reflecting that despite calls for an end to cancelling based on the values of freedom of expression, the complexity of the phenomenon implies that even Mill could be used to legitimise cancel culture.

Keywords:
cancelling; Liberalism; John Stuart Mill; freedom of expression; debate