This paper seeks to discuss the theory of recognition and to defend, as Taylor and Honneth do, a perspective steered by the notion of self-realization. Dealing with the propositions of Fraser and Markell, it aims at challenging three major criticisms directed to the so-called identity model of recognition: 1) the critique that it essentializes identities; 2) the critique that it lacks mechanisms for distinguishing warranted claims from unjustifiable demands; and 3) the critique that struggles for recognition would only seek a valorization of social groups. These criticisms are based on a distinct notion of recognition, which reduces it to a cultural struggle for the valorization of identities. The paper argues that an attention to the intersubjective grounds of Taylor's and Honneth's propositions helps to undermine these criticisms.
Recognition; Intersubjectivity; Self-realization; Honneth; Social Struggles