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Do voters reward politicians for education expenditures?* * We thank Mauricio Bugarin, Raphael Corbi, Thomas Fujiwara, Jason Garred, Ricardo Madeira, Enlinson Mattos, and Marcos Nakaguma for many helpful comments and the seminar participants at the Universities of Ottawa and Princeton. This study was financed by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP, grant #2015/21640-3, 2017/50134-4, and 2019/25033-5), British Academy, and the Newton Fund (Newton Advanced Fellowship, AF140079), and CNPq. This paper is part of Matheus' M.A. thesis at the Department of Economics at USP. Matheus received financial support from the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP, grant # 2014/20307-6 and 2015/16095-6) and Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior-Brasil (CAPES, Finance Code 1). All remaining errors are ours.

Abstract

Since education is publicly provided in most countries, the political system typically determines the level of education expenditures. Thus, it is essential to understand politicians' incentives to allocate resources to education. This paper provides causal evidence that voters reward politicians for educational expenditures by estimating the impact of a change in public education spending on mayors' reelection chances. To do so, we use an exogenous source of variation in education expenditures brought about by a federal reform, FUNDEF, in Brazil. We show that increases in education expenditures caused by FUNDEF led to a significant increase in the mayors' reelection chances. One percent increase in per capita education expenditures due to FUNDEF led to a 1.45 percent increase in mayors' reelection chances.

Keywords
political economy; education; voters

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