



**Paula Lamoso-González<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Loyola University Andalusia  
Seville, Spain  
(aplamoso@uloyola.es)

 ORCID ID:  
[orcid.org/0000-0001-6852-0932](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6852-0932)

**Stelios Stavridis<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>2</sup>ARAID/University of Zaragoza  
Zaragoza, Spain  
(dr.stelios.stavridis@gmail.com)

 ORCID ID:  
[orcid.org/0000-0003-4113-5262](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4113-5262)

**Copyright:**

- This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are credited.
- Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.



## EuroLat's failure to act as an international moral tribunal over Venezuela: a critical analysis of its Co-Presidents Declarations (2014-2023)

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202400114>

Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 67(1): e014, 2024

### Abstract

Academic literature on interregional institutions, including inter-parliamentary ones, argues that all (should) defend and promote democracy and human rights. Post-plenary co-presidents' declarations represent the cornerstone of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat). It is therefore surprising that the Venezuelan conflict does not appear in several of them. In fact, Venezuela has often acted as an impediment to producing such common positions. Or, if cited, hardly any condemnation of the appalling human rights situation in that country is mentioned. Therefore, our study will argue that this represents an important EuroLat failure in condemning human rights and democratic abuses in that country. To illustrate this, our study consists first of an empirical analysis of what has happened over that issue in the past decade. Then, the second part explains the disagreements between EuroLat's two components, its European and its Latin American ones. The conclusion summarizes our findings and provides possible avenues for future research.

**Keywords:** EuroLat; Venezuela; democracy; human rights; parliamentary diplomacy.

Received: February 04, 2024

Accepted: September 18, 2024

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Set-up in 2006, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) is the parliamentary institution of the EU/European Union-CELAC/Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Bi-Regional Strategic Partnership (Müller et al. 2017; Ruano 2018; Quevedo-Flores 2013; González Sarro 2020; Ayuso 2021).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Translations into English are by the authors. Online references last accessed: June 24, 2024.

<sup>2</sup> European Parliament. Home. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/home>. For more details, see also: European Parliament. Structure. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/about/structure>; European Parliament. Rules of Procedures (as of 20 September 2018): <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/246359/1163861EN.pdf>.

Our theoretical framework draws from recent (inter-)regional agreements scholarship (Telò 2020). Particular attention is given to their role in defending/promoting democracy/human rights in the world, with numerous empirical examples (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015; Mattheis and Wunderlich 2017; Ako and Ikubaje 2022).

Similarly, an ever-expanding academic interest on (inter-)regional *inter-parliamentary* relations – mainly via International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) proliferation (Costa et al. 2013a; Crum and Fossum 2013; Cofelice 2018; Rocabert et al. 2018; García Chourio 2018; Lenz et al. 2019) - concludes that IPIs act as “international norms entrepreneurs”: thus, contributing to “building democratic and responsible global governance” (Šabič 2008, 255). Consequently, to condemn non-democratic regimes, *especially* in member states of those IPIs concerned, is part and parcel of their objectives and activities.

The EU is considered a key promoter of interregional relations and of democracy and human rights (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005; Finizio 2015).<sup>3</sup> It “stands out as the only RIO [regional international organization] that regularly sanctions non-member states” (Palestini 2023, 1090). The European Parliament (EP) plays a privileged role in that respect: its ever-increasing active involvement in the international system (Stavridis and Irrera 2015; Raube et al. 2019) has led to its diplomatic and other external activities being characterized as: “democracy support” (Immenkamp and Bentzen 2019), or “normative power/actor” (Feliu and Serra 2015; Glahn 2019). But it is not the only example: there are also similar parliamentary actors involved in other continents.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, parliamentary bodies “bring a moral dimension to international politics that transcends narrow definitions of the national interest, particularly in their principled support for democracy and human rights” (Beetham 2006, 173; Stavridis and Jańczyć 2017; Ferrero 2019; Péjo 2020). In short, (inter-)parliamentary institutions act as *international moral tribunes*.

EuroLat consists of several organs. Its annual Plenary comprises 150 parliamentarians: 75 EP members (MEPs) for its EU component. And 75 parliamentarians for its CELAC component which consists of parliamentarians from: the Latin American Parliament/Parlatino, the Central American Parliament/Parlacen, the Andean Parliament/Parlandino, the MERCOSUR Parliament/Parlasur, as well as from the Congresses of Chile and Mexico.

One key aspect of EuroLat’s functions is to issue a Co-Presidents Declaration, usually at the end of its yearly Plenary sessions. This “message” to the EU-CELAC heads of state and government summits sums up the main issues discussed and the general agreements reached during the EuroLat’s Plenaries. Thus, this document represents EuroLat’s official public stance. It is particularly important from a declaratory perspective - a key dimension in parliamentary diplomacy.

<sup>3</sup> On EU-Latin America relations, see Gardini and Ayuso (2015); Wouters and Müller (2022).

<sup>4</sup> On Africa, see Nwebo and Fombad (2022); on Latin America, see Quispe-Ricaldo (2012).

One of EuroLat's main objectives is to promote common rules, values, and principles: in particular, in defence of democracy and for human rights promotion (Article 2 of its Constituent Act). Moreover, Point 10 of its December 2007 Resolution declares that EuroLat “[r]eiterates its belief that the internal stability of many of the partner countries will continue to depend on the reform of the state and, concretely, on the modernisation of representative structures, institutions and political parties, on the integration of different sectors of the population such as indigenous peoples into the decision-making processes, and on the reinforcement of democratic governance, with particular stress on reinforcing the role of women; and, in some cases, also on the genuine dissolution of para-state and para-military structures and other illegal armed groups, the impartial judgment of their members under the law, and access to justice for all citizens, both men and women”.<sup>5</sup>

There are several EuroLat examples that criticize attacks on democracy and human rights violations in states whose parliaments participate in it: a 2008 EuroLat Executive Bureau declaration on the political situation in Bolivia, or another one in 2009 on Honduras.<sup>6</sup> Or in 2016, one critical of the EU over its response to the migration crisis.<sup>7</sup>

In this article, we use the Venezuelan “intractable conflict” (Smilde and Ramsey 2020) as a case-study to test if EuroLat's fulfils its role as an international moral tribunal. However, we do not cover it in any detail, as there is ample literature on the subject. In short, Venezuela is “going through an unprecedented political, social and humanitarian disaster, which due to the mass exodus of Venezuelans also have large negative regional consequences” (Marsteintredet 2020, 88; Quevedo-Flores 2013; Legler et al. 2018; Buxton 2018; Romero and Benayas 2018; Krzywicka 2019; Alfaro Pareja 2020; Alarcón and Hidalgo 2023; Ayuso et al. 2023; see also Serbin and Serbin Pont 2017).<sup>8</sup>

As far as our study goes, in spite of having been extensively present in all debates and discussions during the plenary sessions and at all levels, and contrary to expectations from a parliamentary diplomacy literature approach, the Venezuelan conflict does not appear in several Co-President Declarations. Or, when it does appear, Venezuela is only mentioned without any reference to its dire situation and negative impact regionally- and internationally- speaking.

The conflict in Venezuela is also important for EU-CELAC relations: mainly due to discrepancies over that country, there were no such summit meetings between 2015 and 2023 – although several ministerial meetings did take place during that period (Nolte 2023, 2; Díaz Galán and Bertot Triana 2017).<sup>9</sup> The fact remains that (with or without a Joint Declaration), EuroLat plenaries have always taken place as scheduled - unlike EU-CELAC summits. Therefore,

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/251628/701889EN.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Respectively: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/261019/744531EN.pdf>; and, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/265124/794942EN.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> See Point 37: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260692/1105919EN.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> See also a very useful table listing all sanctions taken against the Venezuela regime in Palestini (2023, 1107). For the United Nations Human Rights systematic monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in that country, see: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/venezuela>.

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/eu-latin-america/celac-eu-summits>.

*theoretically* confirming the more flexible nature of parliamentary diplomacy. This is a dimension that this study explores further and as a result adds to the expanding literature on that subject.

Indeed, in what follows, we consider the impact of the ongoing Venezuelan conflict on EuroLat, and in particular on EuroLat's Co-Presidents Declarations *between 2014 and 2023*. The latest EuroLat Plenary took place in Madrid in the summer of 2023.

The EuroLat's EP component (with the exception of its extreme left MEPs) condemns the Venezuelan regime and calls for more action in favour of democracy and human rights (for a detailed analysis of the EP and Venezuela, see Lamoso González and Stavridis 2022). On the contrary, the EuroLat's CELAC component tends not to mention Venezuela in any formal declaration, or, if this occurs, to downplay the importance of human rights and other democratic principles violations in that country. And if necessary, these parliamentarians are ready to prevent EuroLat from adopting joint declarations.

Yet, on EuroLat and Venezuela, there is hardly any academic interest to date: only a very short piece condemning the absence of a Plenary Declaration in 2015 due to disagreements over Venezuela (Malamud 2015); another study points solely to the risks that such situation might create in the longer term, *if it were* to become the norm (Müller 2019); and, finally, another analyst presents this absence of a Joint Declaration as ... *a success for Latin-American cohesion* (Theodoro Luciano 2017). Arguing, that the CELAC component<sup>10</sup> remained united on its refusal to accept EP criticisms (see also below).

Thus, this study adds an original approach to the academic literature, as very little attention has been paid to how EuroLat deals with grave human rights violations in one of its participating states. Especially, when such a conflictual situation yields serious regional and global implications.

However, it is important at this stage to insist that our study in no way invalidates the utility of the EuroLat set-up as a whole. Indeed, in spite of those divergences, EuroLat produces a plethora of resolutions over a huge range of policy-areas: for instance, since 2006, there have been over 60 such resolutions.<sup>11</sup> This very point is consistently repeated by all actors involved, even when there is no Joint Declaration, including by EuroLat's two Co-Presidents themselves. For instance, in the 2015 post-plenary press conference, MEP Ramón Jáuregui (then EP component President) mentioned over 40 topics that had been debated and agreed during the various proceedings. He said there were: "full, intense and candid debates (...) [all was done in] a fraternal way". José Leonel Vásquez Búcaro (then CELAC component President, and from the Salvadorian Parliament for Parlacen) did the same by listing several agreed topics, in order to show how a series of constructive debates had led to numerous positive results (*EP News* 2015).

The remainder of the article will first present an empirical analysis of what has happened in the decade under study here: the facts. Then, it will analyse the disagreements between the

<sup>10</sup> Also referred to thereafter as "LAC parliamentarians".

<sup>11</sup> For an indexed reference list of topics covered by EuroLat resolutions: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/resolutions>.

EP-CELAC components of EuroLat. The Conclusions will then sum up the findings and present some avenues for further research.

## EuroLat and Venezuela: the facts

What follows covers a decade-long period of EuroLat Plenary sessions: 2014-2023.<sup>12</sup> It starts with the first time that EuroLat actually *failed* to issue a Co-Presidents Declaration: its 2014 Athens Plenary. This resulted from disagreements between its two components over whether to mention the Venezuelan conflict in the Declaration.

We take a chronological approach in order to show not only how many times this has occurred, but also to reveal another trend, in our view as worrying as that of non-issuing such declarations: a decision to issue a Joint Declaration that includes a reference to the Venezuelan conflict, but only in a watered-down form; which, *de facto*, removes any real criticism. Either way, EuroLat fails to deliver on one of its main democracy and human rights promotion objectives.

Before looking at the reasons for such a situation, we look at the facts. That is to say, what each Plenary in the period under study has produced in terms of Co-Presidents Declarations, including (or not) Venezuela.

The 7th EuroLat plenary (Athens, 27-29 March 2014)<sup>13</sup> adopted several resolutions and declarations on a number of issues (e.g.: trade, education, femicide). Yet, there was *no* Co-Presidents Declaration.

However, it is important to mention at this stage that it is traditional to refer to a plenary declaration by using the name of the city where it was held. So, how come there is after all what is called ... an “Athens Declaration”? A very small number of left-wing parliamentarians tried to turn that absence of a formal EuroLat declaration to their own political advantage. It comes very close to being “fake news”. Indeed, only left-wing media reported this so-called “Athens Declaration”, which, unsurprisingly, is highly supportive of the Bolivarian government of Nicolás Maduro.<sup>14</sup> As this was issued in Greece, a country heavily hit by the financial/economic crisis of 2008, a number of other radical left views were expressed. Of the 21 parliamentarians involved, only 3 were MEPs (Spain’s Willy Meyer and Germany’s Helmut Scholz from The Left-GUE/NGL, plus European Greens’ Raül Romeva), and the rest came from the CELAC component, including EuroLat Co-President Leonel Vásquez Búcaro.

Thus, Meyer is reported as saying that he “deplore[d] the fact that the EU institutions and the US administration ha[d] applauded, seconded and financed the violent coup d’état in Ukraine in order to impose a preferential relationship between Ukraine and the EU, rather than one with

<sup>12</sup> For details of plenaries prior to 2014: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/previous>.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/2014-7th-session>.

<sup>14</sup> See: <https://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n248135.html>.

the Russian Federation”. He also expressed his and the other signatories’ support for the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa]’ condemnation of the US and EU sanctions against Russia [as a result of Crimea’s annexation]. Before expressing their solidarity with the Greek people “who are suffering the dire impact of austerity measures imposed by the Troika” [International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and the European Commission].

No doubt, this kind of declaration tends to confuse matters, especially for those unfamiliar with EuroLat. There is a difference between a document that formally commits an institution from one that only represents a (tiny) minority’s view, as with the case just-mentioned.

To sum up, this failure to produce a Co-Presidents Declaration resulted from fundamental differences between the two EuroLat components (except for the extreme Left MEPs as just mentioned). As such, it represents a “first” in EuroLat’s history.

The 8th EuroLat plenary (Brussels, 2-5 June 2015)<sup>15</sup> did not produce a Co-Presidents Declaration either. Again, in spite of yet more documents being adopted (including for instance resolutions on climate change and on mining). Venezuela was the object of contention. The EP (except for left-wing MEPs) wanted the Joint Declaration to mention the ongoing crisis in that country as evidence of democratic principles and human rights violations. LAC parliamentarians, plus the MEPs just mentioned, were opposed to even including *any reference* to Venezuela in that Declaration.

Breaking this negative sequence, Point 38 of the 9th EuroLat plenary (Montevideo, 19-22 September 2016)<sup>16</sup> Co-Presidents Declaration states the following: “On the situation in Venezuela [EuroLat members a]re concerned at the political situation in Venezuela and the social and economic crisis faced by its people. Call for the Government and opposition to comply fully with the constitutional order and for the use of the dialogue as a democratic instrument for the resolution of political conflicts. Recommend, to that end, supporting the open nationwide dialogue between representatives of the Government, the National Assembly and the political parties, in strict compliance with the National Constitution and with full respect for civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Support the ongoing mediation efforts of UNASUR [Union of South American Nations], the Organisation of American States, the Holy See, the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini and the group of former Latin American presidents”.

The 10th EuroLat Plenary (San Salvador, 18-21 September 2017)<sup>17</sup> Co-Presidents Declaration was even more forthcoming with Venezuela topping it as its first point: “We regret that events in Venezuela have prompted the decision to postpone the holding of the third EU-CELAC Summit at a time when it is more necessary than ever to strengthen the Bi-regional Strategic Partnership in order to tackle the great geopolitical and economic challenges facing the Member States in the

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/2015-8th-session>.

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260692/1105919EN.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/2017-10th-session>. See also: *EP News* (2017).

Partnership; we reaffirm, in this context, the EuroLat Assembly's role and intention to continue to provide a privileged forum for meetings and debate in which to hold an intense, open and sincere parliamentary and political dialogue, which is particularly called-for in times of tension and crisis.”

Its point 6 returned to that country in no uncertain terms: “Endorsing the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament and various Latin American parliaments and congresses regarding Venezuela, we express our solidarity with the Venezuelan people and we are convinced that only a united and democratic Venezuela will be able to face up to the future. We call on the Venezuelan Government to respect the powers of the legislature and the rule of law and guarantee peace, coexistence and freedom for all, within the framework of absolute compliance with the Constitution. We welcome the calling of elections for local councils and governors on 15 October 2017 and ask both the Government and the opposition to conduct a dialogue and agree an election calendar so that the people can decide on Venezuela's future peacefully and freely, by means of an individual, universal and secret vote”.

The 11th EuroLat plenary (Vienna, 17-20 September 2018)<sup>18</sup> did not produce a Co-Presidents Declaration, in spite of, yet again, a plethora of resolutions being adopted. Once more due to disagreements over Venezuela. Such a situation had been clearly visible during the April 2018 Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights session held in Panama: “At the proposal of the Latin American component, the Deputies of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Oscar Roderos Rangel and Ángel Medina Devis, presented the current serious economic and social situation in Venezuela. The Political Affairs Committee decided to take up as a matter of urgency at its next meeting the question of the humanitarian crisis caused by the massive migration of Venezuelan citizens”.<sup>19</sup> Therefore de facto postponing any discussion of the issue in detail. It is important to note that the two Venezuelan parliamentarians cited here are from the Opposition. But the Committee's decision to postpone the issue clearly reflects a wider lack of agreement, which also eventually prevented a common Co-Presidents declaration.

The 12th EuroLat plenary (Panama City, 12-13 December 2019) did produce a Co-Presidents Declaration, but it was quite subdued on Venezuela. Although it did start with general comments about the need to defend democracy and human rights, it did not mention any particular country. As Point 1 puts it: “Democracy, peace, human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot defend themselves alone and protecting, consolidating and building or developing them requires constant and dedicated work by the public authorities, political parties, civil society organisations and the people. The only way to strengthen our democracies is to accept the democratic rules laid down in the respective constitutional frameworks based on the values of democracy, the separation of powers and public freedoms, the independence of the judiciary and on respect for political pluralism

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/plenary/2018-11th-session>.

<sup>19</sup> [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/265047/Comunicado\\_prensa\\_Panama\\_ES.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/265047/Comunicado_prensa_Panama_ES.pdf).

and human rights. Disinformation and fake news are being used to undermine institutions in countries the world over (...).<sup>20</sup>

One needs however to go to Point 14 on the penultimate page of that document to find the following reference to Venezuela – again starting with a rather general introduction: “We express our deepest concern at the intensification in migration in both regions and the wider world (...). The difficult situation affecting Venezuela, with 4.6 million emigrants according to UNHCR-IOM [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees-International Organization for Migration], and the several million more migrants in Haiti, Mexico and Central America, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the migratory flows from Africa to Europe are representative of the complexity of the problem”.<sup>21</sup>

It is important to note here that such a declaration might be considered as some success bearing in mind that during the extraordinary meetings of the Enlarged Bureau and of the Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights Committee that took place in Santa Cruz (Bolivia) on 27-28 February 2019, it was not possible to issue a common stance, again due to divergences over Venezuela.<sup>22</sup>

The 13th EuroLat plenary (Brussels, 4-5 December 2020) was the first and only one to date Plenary that convened in a hybrid form due to the COVID pandemic. It was dominated by what to do to limit the pandemic’s devastating impact. There is only a very general reference to democracy and human rights in its point 22: “legal measures taken to tackle the [COVID] crisis must be necessary, proportionate and temporary and must always be consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms. Draw attention to the fact that states of emergency cannot be used as a pretext for repressive actions or as a means of silencing citizens, in particular civil society, human rights defenders, journalists or political opposition, or to diminish democratic involvement, or to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms”.<sup>23</sup> There was no Plenary in 2021 due to COVID.

The 14th EuroLat plenary (Buenos Aires, 11-14 April 2022) adopted various resolutions (e.g., on culture, criminal justice), but, as it was to be expected, the war in Ukraine and the still ongoing COVID pandemic dominated the agenda.<sup>24</sup> As Co-President Colombia’s Óscar Darío Pérez mentioned characteristically in the closing session, no less than 35 % of Latin America’s food imports come from Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> In the Co-Presidents Declaration, there is only one point (No. 9) that covers the question of human rights and democracy, but it does so in a very general way: “Highlight the need to work for the strengthening of democracy in both regions, and emphasise the relevance and usefulness of electoral observation mechanisms”.

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/259416/1195159EN.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/259416/1195159EN.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/en/eurolat-meetings/eurolat-meetings.2019>.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/251598/1217533EN.pdf>.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/250295/1253781EN.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdaliTWOH1o&t=30s>.



Finally, the 15th Plenary held in Madrid on 2023 did produce a declaration but due to the fact that it was the first time that the Plenary actually *followed* an EU-CELAC summit, this was done in two steps: first, a joint declaration issued on 3 July 2023 was addressed to the forthcoming EU-CELAC summit (due in Brussels on 17-18 July).<sup>26</sup> And, there was a second one, this time just after that summit had taken place - to which both Co-Presidents had also participated as guests (as did also the EP President, Roberta Metsola).<sup>27</sup> There was no particular reference to the situation in Venezuela in either of them.

**Table 1. EuroLat Co-Presidents Declarations or no Declarations**

<b>EUROLAT PLENARIES</b>	<b>Final Co-Presidents Declaration ISSUED</b>	<b>NO declaration</b>
2014 Athens		No declaration
2015 Brussels		No declaration
2016 Montevideo	YES	
2017 San Salvador	YES	
2018 Vienna		No declaration
2019 Panama	YES	
2020 Brussels/hybrid (due to Covid-19)	YES	
2021 No plenary (due to Covid-19)	NO MEETING	NO MEETING
2022 Buenos Aires	YES	
2023 Madrid	YES	

## EuroLat and Venezuela: the reasons for disagreements

This Section looks at the reasons for divergence over Venezuela between the two EuroLat components during the decade under study here.

The Latin American (LA) component often refuses to include a condemnation of the Venezuelan regime in Co-Presidents Declarations on the basis of a rather traditional Latin American view: the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign and independent state (Jarast 2021).

Thus, in 2015, during the Plenary Closing Session, EuroLat Co-President Vázquez Bucaro (Salvador/Parlacen) put it in no uncertain terms: “Latin America is ours”, he said. He accordingly

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/273418/Mensaje%20Cumbre%2017-18%20Julio%202023\\_ES.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/273418/Mensaje%20Cumbre%2017-18%20Julio%202023_ES.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/eurolat/es/about/communiques>. For the participants list to the EU-CELAC summit, see: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/65858/trombinoscope-celac-1718-07-2023-web.pdf>.

mentioned the names of various traditional LA revolutionaries (past independence wars from Spain and Portugal in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century). As for the EuroLat debates themselves, he said there were “agitated moments”, but that, at the end of the day, all participants looked for agreements because we all share the “same roots”. He stressed that “LA has never seen its [own] resources used for its citizens”, but that this situation was changing now. He insisted: there should be “no interference in our internal affairs”. He also added that currently there are plenty of “exploited” people [in Latin America and that this situation] should become “a thing of the past” (*EP News* 2015a).

Vásquez Búcaro said he was “sorry [there had been] no agreement over Venezuela”, as were “[a] few glitches”. However, he emphasized the fact that all LAC parliamentarians were unanimous in his rejecting any reference to Venezuela in the final declaration. He also made it clear that all Parlantino members had reiterated their support to the Venezuelan government. And that this agreement amidst the CELAC component was clear from the very start of the EuroLat sessions. Finally, he contrasted this clear-cut stance to the fact that there was only a majority view amongst MEPs in favour of mentioning Venezuela. And he ended up insisting that not producing a joint declaration did not mean that the EP’s voice had been silenced: simply that “Europe’s views remain Europe’s views”! (*EP News* 2015a).

As noted, even if there have been some voices disagreeing with that approach (Malamud 2015; Müller 2019), there is at least one academic view supporting the 2015 EuroLat incident as *evidence of growing LA inter-parliamentary coherence* (Theodoro Luciano 2017). Theodoro Luciano even argues that it was the EP’s highly critical stance on Venezuela that had forced the CELAC component’s reaction because it smacked of “interference in internal affairs”. Indeed, he welcomes “the joint defensive position on the Venezuelan political situation adopted by Latin American parliamentarians vis-à-vis the European Parliament’s condemnatory position” (Theodoro Luciano 2017, 319). Even if, as Theodoro Luciano specifically states, there is little doubt that any boost to intra-regional cohesion represents a plus in itself in IPIs like EuroLat, such a view fails to take into consideration the fact that intra- and inter- cohesions are not mutually incompatible: in fact, they are supposed to be mutually reinforcing, simply because both EuroLat components declare they share the same values and principles – a point that Theodoro Luciano (2017, 322) himself fully acknowledges. Which is also a consensus view in the academic literature: for instance, Ruano (2018, 75) reminds us: “One should not lose sight of the fact that the rapprochement between the two regions also had its origins in a democratization wave that began in Spain and Portugal in 1974-1975 and continued in Latin America”. And it goes without saying that this is also what many EuroLat documents, including its 2006 Constitutive Session Declaration,<sup>28</sup> have consistently repeated to date.

Furthermore, it seems strange for Theodoro Luciano (2017) to stress how the European United Left MEPs did not agree with the overall EP declaration proposal by the EuroLat’s

<sup>28</sup> [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260837/20061109\\_brusselsdecl\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260837/20061109_brusselsdecl_EN.pdf).

Co-President, and *at the same time* minimize the fact that Bolivarian Axis/ALBA parliamentarians agreed with their conservative counterparts in the LA component. Indeed, how come that LAC parliamentarians who do not belong to the Bolivarian axis fail to criticize more openly Maduro in EuroLat? As if ideology stopped at the borders of a state, or of a region for that matter. Is it not the whole point of interparliamentary arrangements to reflect the plurality of opinions among political parties, families, or other actors involved?

As noted, the EP stance constantly condemns the Maduro regime (except for extreme left MEPs). Examples abound. For instance, the March 2014 EuroLat Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights Committee meeting minutes are quite clear: “Point 11. Concerning Venezuela, some speakers stressed the need to put an end to the confrontation between government and opposition, for freedoms to be respected, particularly freedom of expression, and for the Caracas government to answer citizen’s demands, ending the repression and human rights abuses. Other speakers stated that the Venezuelan Government was a democratic and legitimately elected one and that the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference should be respected. Speakers also emphatically rejected violence and stressed that dialogue was required in order to solve Venezuela’s crisis. A number of MEPs referred to resolutions on the situation in the two countries recently passed by the European Parliament”.<sup>29</sup> The reference to EP resolutions was not included by chance: as noted, over the years, MEPs have developed a systematic and overwhelming condemnation of the regime in Venezuela, full supporting the Opposition, thus developing a clear anti-Maduro front (Lamoso González and Stavridis 2022).

To return to 2015, during the Press conference’s Questions and Answers section that followed the introductory comments by the two Co-Presidents,<sup>30</sup> Jáuregui insisted that no Joint Declaration was possible because there was no agreement over one single and specific point: Venezuela. A real “disagreement, you can’t pretend otherwise”, he added before pointing out that “[t]here will be a distinct declaration from the European side shortly”. He also stressed that he found it absolutely incredible that the CELAC component did not even agree to his proposal to include two distinct paragraphs in a single text that would have explained both antagonistic views. He insisted that it was not reasonable not to mention Venezuela at all when the situation in that country was so conflictual. He said that if the word “Venezuela” had been included in any form or mention, then Vásquez Bucaro had told him that the CELAC component would have declared the whole document “invalid”. Jáuregui repeated that his suggestion was not accepted by the CELAC’s EuroLat Co-President, although “we talked about Cuba, Ukraine, and these were included [in a first draft]”.

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/265381/1025513EN.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> [https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/8th-ordinary-plenary-session-of-latin-american-parliamentary-assembly-eurolat-closing-session\\_20150604-1230-SPECIAL-UNKN](https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/8th-ordinary-plenary-session-of-latin-american-parliamentary-assembly-eurolat-closing-session_20150604-1230-SPECIAL-UNKN).

All of the above raises the issue of whether separate declarations could be a way out of this conundrum. For instance, after the 2015 Plenary, Jáuregui issued his own message to the forthcoming June 2015 second CELAC-EU Brussels Summit - this time solely in his capacity as President of the EP delegation to EuroLat. Jáuregui wanted to make sure that it was clear who was responsible for the absence of a reference to Venezuela – despite having agreed on more than 40 of the draft's 45 points (*EP News* 2015b).

In short, LAC parliamentarians are opposed to including any critical reference to Venezuela in the final declaration on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. In addition, they consider the Venezuelan government as democratic and representative because it has been elected. On the contrary, the EP component (minus MEPs from the extreme left) argues that the Maduro regime is committing clear human rights and other democratic principles violations.

## Conclusions

This study has looked at the EuroLat's plenaries during the 2014-2023 period (since Maduro has been in power in Venezuela): out of 9 Plenaries in all (the 2021 one was cancelled due to COVID), there have been 6 where Co-Presidents Declarations were issued, and 3 without one.

Moreover, as noted, some of these Declarations mentioning Venezuela only did so in a watered-down version in order to reflect the LAC parliamentarians' views on that issue. In other words, despite an inflection, the fundamental problem remains: such a situation undermines EuroLat's democratization role. Neither the absence of Joint Declaration, nor that of a watered-down version not condemning Venezuela, are acceptable.

It would be better perhaps to follow what Jáuregui suggested in 2015: every time there is a clear disagreement on a given issue, why not issue a joint declaration with two distinct paragraphs? Thus, expressing fully and publicly the views of each EuroLat component. And as a result, stressing the absence of an agreement over a specific issue. Such a development would in fact reflect fully the many controversial debates that Venezuela has been generating during EuroLat meetings, including in its plenary sessions over the past few years. It would put an end to a semblance of normality, and therefore also bring to the open the intensity of these debates over the situation in Venezuela.

In brief, *as far as Venezuela is concerned*, EuroLat's parliamentary diplomacy is failing in its role to try and promote democracy and human rights in an effective way. Such a situation tends to confuse EuroLat's public image over an important conflict, but also more generally on its declared role as an international moral tribune. It represents a "misfunction" of the role that IPIs are expected to play in international relations. In short, IPIs are *not* supposed to support – even if only by default - authoritarian regimes, especially amongst their own members.

By focusing on this neglected aspect, yet important feature, of EuroLat, our article offers an original contribution to the expanding literature on parliamentary diplomacy. For instance,

there is more and more such interest for the EP and Latin America (on Nicaragua, see Lamoso González 2019; on Mexico, see Velasco-Plufeu 2024; Velasco-Plufeu and Stavridis 2024).

Research is also needed about why LAC parliamentarians agree on the whole not to publicly condemn the Maduro regime within EuroLat? And there is no doubt that those discrepancies do exist, even among LAC parliamentarians. There is some related literature on the subject, focusing on Venezuela and Mercosur, including its parliamentary dimension, Parlasur. But it remains rather limited to date, focusing on Paraguay or Brazil for instance (Insaurralde 2014; Araujo and Pasquariello Mariano 2022).

Further research is needed, therefore, not only from the EP's or the EU's perspectives. The Organization of American States has made several attempts at condemning it, including trying to suspend its membership (but failed to do so because of the need for a 2/3<sup>rd</sup> majority: Krzywicka 2019; Ruano 2018). As for MERCOSUR, having initiated its accession process in 2006, Venezuela finally joined it in 2012 - taking advantage of the temporary suspension of Paraguay in its midst: the only member opposed to such a development. That process was fully completed when Paraguay eventually ratified Venezuela's membership in 2014 (Arredondo and Godio 2017, 109-112). In 2016, as a reaction to the authoritarian drift in Caracas, Venezuela was suspended from MERCOSUR - although it is interesting to note that its parliamentary branch refused that decision and continues to allow Venezuelan parliamentarians to participate in its work (Arredondo and Godio 2017, 117) on the grounds that: "Venezuelan representatives in the regional Parliament would be authorised to continue their activities in the bloc, considering them as representatives of the citizens of Venezuela, rather than representatives of the government" (Theodoro Luciano and Ramanzini Júnior 2023, 493; see also Gaudín 2017, 2).

Another question worth investigating further is that of the role of individuals, especially that of the Co-Presidents. For instance, whereas there were no Joint Declarations in both 2014 and 2015, a Joint Declaration, this time issued in December 2015, "congratulate[d] the people of Venezuela on the success of their democratic elections [legislatives held on 6 December 2015 and won by the Opposition]". The message ended with a resounding "Peace for Venezuela".<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting that by then the CELAC component had a new President: Brazilian Senator Roberto Requião had replaced Vásquez Búcaro (according to normal EuroLat procedures: every two years a different CELAC component President). Indeed, the existing parliamentary diplomacy literature has argued that individuals play an important role (Costa et al. 2013b, 237).

It is important to stress once again that even with the Venezuelan conflict's problematic impact on its proceedings, EuroLat still produces plenty of agreements, over a vast array of issues, topics and policies – as witnessed by plethora of declarations on those subjects. A point repeated constantly by all involved, including when no joint declaration had been issued by both EuroLat Co-Presidents. Thus, our analysis is not criticizing EuroLat *per se*: it is critical of

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260955/1080073EN.pdf>.

its handling of the Venezuelan conflict, in particular as expressed (or not!) in its Co-Presidents Declarations. Be it either complicit silence, or total silence over the Venezuelan conflict, this is counterproductive in the long run due to EuroLat's own declared commitment to defend and promote democratic and human rights values and principles everywhere in the world, including among its member states.

## References

- Ako, R. T., and J. G. Ikubaje. "Contemporary developments in human and peoples' rights protection in Africa: insights from the African Union." In *The Palgrave Handbook of democracy, governance and justice in Africa*, edited by A. Adeola, and M. W. Mutua, 221-233. London: Palgrave, 2022.
- Alarcón, B., and M. Hidalgo. "Elecciones, clientelismo competitivo y autocratización en Venezuela." *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 200 (2023): 249-282.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.200.09>
- Alfaro Pareja, F. J. "Archipiélagos políticos bajo la tormenta en Venezuela: coaliciones, actores y autocratización." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109 (2020): 21-40. doi: <https://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs.10568>
- Araujo, A. L., and K. L. Pasquariello Mariano. "Política exterior basada en un corto plazo: la aprobación por el congreso brasileño del protocolo de adhesión de Venezuela al Mercosur." *Estudios Internacionales* 54, no. 201 (2022): 37-67.  
<https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2022.61331>
- Arredondo, R., and L. M. A. Godio. "La suspensión y terminación de los tratados: el caso de Venezuela y el Mercosur." *Revista Electrónica Del Instituto de Investigaciones Ambrosio L. Gioja*, no. 18 (2017): 101-144.
- Ayuso, A. "Keys to reactivating the EU-CELAC partnership and channelling the globalization of the future." *CIDOB Notes Internacionales*, no. 247 (2021).
- Ayuso, A., M. Riddervold, and E. L. Gunnarsdottir. *The EU trapped in the Venezuelan labyrinth: challenges to finding a way out*. Joint Research Papers no. 18. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2023.
- Beetham, D. *Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: a guide to good practice*. Geneva: Interparliamentary Union, 2006.
- Buxton, J. "Defusing Venezuela." *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, no. 19 (2018): 7-25.
- Cofelice, A. *Parliamentary institutions in regional and international governance*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.
- Costa, O., C. Dri, and S. Stavridis (eds.). *Parliamentary dimensions of regionalization and globalization*. New York: Springer, 2013a.

- Costa, O., S. Stavridis, and C. Dri. “Conclusions.” In *Parliamentary dimensions of regionalization and globalization: the role of inter-parliamentary institution*, edited by O. Costa, C. Dri, and S. Stavridis, 231-245. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013b.
- Crum, B., and J. E. Fossum, (eds.). *Practices of interparliamentary coordination in international politics: the European Union and beyond*. Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research, 2013.
- Díaz Galán, E., and H. Bertot Triana. “La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC): un enfoque desde la perspectiva de la integración.” *Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina (Nueva Época)*, no. 126 (2017): 47-66.
- EP News. *8th Ordinary Plenary Session of Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat): Closing Session*. Strasbourg, 2015a. [https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/8th-ordinary-plenary-session-of-latin-american-parliamentary-assembly-eurolat-closing-session\\_20150604-1230-SPECIAL-UNKN](https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/8th-ordinary-plenary-session-of-latin-american-parliamentary-assembly-eurolat-closing-session_20150604-1230-SPECIAL-UNKN)
- EP News. “EuroLat assembly: Jáuregui shows ‘great concern’ at the situation in Venezuela.”, May 6, 2015b. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20150605IPR63368/eurolat-assembly-jauregui-shows-great-concern-at-the-situation-in-venezuela>
- EP News. “Venezuela: EuroLat co-presidents demand respect for the rule of law.” *EP News*, September 22, 2017. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170920IPR84307/venezuela-eurolat-co-presidents-demand-respect-for-the-rule-of-law>
- Feliu, L., and F. Serra. “The European Union as a ‘normative power’ and the normative voice of the European Parliament.” In *The European Parliament and its international relations*, edited by S. Stavridis and D. Irrera, 17–34. London: Routledge, 2015.
- Ferrero, M. “Representación popular y acción exterior: desarrollo y alcances de la diplomacia parlamentaria en el mundo contemporáneo.” *Colombia Internacional*, no. 98 (2019): 139-167. doi: <https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint98.2019.05>
- Finizio, G. “The EU and the promotion of democracy through interregional relations.” In *Interregionalism and the European Union: a post-revisionist approach to europe’s place in a changing world*, edited by M. Teló, L. Fawcett, and F. Ponjaert, 141-157. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315878805-1/introduction-eu-global-actor-role-interregionalism-fredrik-s%C3%B6derbaum-luk-van-langenhove>
- García Chourio J. G. “La cooperación parlamentaria internacional en la era de la gobernanza global.” *Relaciones Internacionales*, no. 130 (2018): 11-51.
- Gardini, G. L., and A. Ayuso. “EU-Latin America and Caribbean inter-regional relations: complexity and change.” *Atlantic Future Scientific Paper 24*, 2015. [https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication\\_series/project\\_papers/atlantic\\_future\\_papers/scientific\\_paper/eu\\_latina\\_america\\_and\\_caribbean\\_inter\\_regional\\_relations\\_complexity\\_and\\_change](https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/atlantic_future_papers/scientific_paper/eu_latina_america_and_caribbean_inter_regional_relations_complexity_and_change).

- Gaudín, A. *Mercosur trade bloc severs ties with Venezuela*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2017.
- Glahn, C. “The European Parliament as a ‘normative actor’ in inter-parliamentary cooperation?” In *Parliamentary cooperation and diplomacy in eu external relations: an essential companion*, edited by K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters, 269-288. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019.
- González Sarro, I. “Veinte años de relaciones estratégicas de la Unión Europea con América Latina y el Caribe (1999-2019): análisis de la evolución de sus ‘tres pilares’ fundamentales.” *Foro Internacional* 60, no. 3 (2020): 1121-1167. <https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v60i3.2646>.
- Immenkamp, B., and N. Bentzen. “Parliamentary diplomacy: democracy support at the European Parliament: dynamics and transformations.” In *The European Parliament in times of EU crisis*, edited by O. Costa, 413-437. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Insaurralde, G. “Oposición parlamentaria y política exterior el rechazo del Partido Colorado al ingreso de Venezuela al Mercosur durante el gobierno de Fernando Lugo (2008-2012).” *Estudios Internacionais* 2, no. 2 (2014): 149-187.
- Jarast, F. “Is democracy in peril in the Americas? The demise of Tobar and the resurrection of Estrada.” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 45, no. 2 (2021): 17-40.
- Krzywicka, K. “La Organización de Estados Americanos frente a la crisis del estado en Venezuela.” *Revista Del CESLA*, no. 23 (2019): 383-398.
- Lamoso González, P. “Nicaragua, obxecto de diplomacia parlamentaria ad hoc.” *Tempo Exterior*, no. 39 (2019): 65-78.
- Lamoso González, P., and S. Stavridis. “El Parlamento Europeo como tribuna moral internacional: el caso de Venezuela.” *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, no. 131 (2022): 185–210. doi: <https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2022.131.2.185>
- Legler T., A. Serbin Pont, and O. Garelli-Ríos, (eds.). “Venezuela: la multidimensionalidad de una crisis hemisférica,” *Pensamiento Propio* 47, no. spe (2018).
- Lenz, T., A. Burilkov, and L. A. Viola. “Legitimacy and the cognitive sources of international institutional change: the case of regional parliamentarization.” *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2019): 1094-1107. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz051>
- Malamud, C. “Venezuela y la asamblea parlamentaria eurolatinoamericana.” *Real Instituto Elcano*, June 7, 2015. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/archive/opinion/venezuela-y-la-asamblea-parlamentaria-eurolatinoamericana/>.
- Marsteintredet, L. “With the cards stacked against you: challenges to a negotiated transition to democracy in Venezuela.” *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109 (2020): 87. doi: <https://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs.10553>
- Mattheis, F., and U. Wunderlich. “Regional actorness and interregional relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur.” *Journal of European Integration* 39, no. 6 (2017): 723-738. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2017.1333503>



- Müller, G. G. “The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat): constructing a common bi-regional agenda.” In *Parliamentary cooperation and diplomacy in eu external relations: an essential companion*, edited by K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters, 324-340. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019.
- Müller, G., J. Wouters, J. C. Defraigne, S. Santander, and K. Raube. *The EU-Latin American strategic partnership: state of play and ways forward*. Brussels: European Parliament, 2017.
- Nolte, D. *The European Union and Latin America: Renewing the Partnership after Drifting Apart*. GIGA Focus/Latin America 2. Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2023.
- Nwebo, O. E., and C. M. Fombad. “Reflections on the role of the Pan-African Parliament in advancing democratic governance in Africa.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of democracy, governance and justice in Africa*, edited by A. Adeola and M. W. Mutua, 85–107. London: Palgrave, 2022.
- Palestini, S. “The politics of legitimation in combined sanction regimes: the case of Venezuela.” *International Affairs* 99, no. 3 (2023): 1087-1107. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad052>
- Péjo, P. *La Diplomatie parlementaire*. Paris: LGDJ, 2020.
- Quevedo-Flores, J. A. “La relación universidad-empresa en las relaciones Unión Europea-América Latina Y El Caribe: una variable necesaria para el desarrollo económico y social birregional.” *InterNaciones* 9, no. 3 (2013): 37-50. <https://doi.org/10.32870/in.v0i3.7045>.
- Quispe-Ricalde, C. “La cooperación interparlamentaria en América Latina.” *Revista Andina de Estudios Políticos* 2, no. 2 (2012): 63-75. doi: <https://doi.org/10.35004/raep.v2i2.20>.
- Raube, K., M. Müftüler-Baç, J. Wouters, and K. Irwin Otteburn, (eds.). *Parliamentary cooperation and diplomacy in EU external relations: an essential companion*. Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2019.
- Ribeiro Hoffmann, A. “At last: protection and promotion of human rights by Mercosur.” In *Governance transfer by regional organizations patching together a global script*, edited by T. A. Börzel and V. Hüllen, 192-208. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Rocabert, J., F. Schimmelfennig, L. Crasnic, and T. Winzen. “The rise of international parliamentary institutions: purpose and legitimation.” *The Review of International Organizations* 14 (2018). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9326-3>
- Romero, C. A., and G. Benayas. “Venezuela: el ocaso de una democracia.” *Revista mexicana de ciencias políticas y sociales* 233, no. 63 (2018): 285-306. doi: <https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2018.233.62343>
- Ruano, L. “La Unión Europea Y América Latina Y El Caribe: breve historia de la relación birregional.” *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, no. 112 (2018): 69-88.
- Šabič, Z. “Building democratic and responsible global governance: the role of international parliamentary institutions.” *Parliamentary Affairs* 61, no. 2 (2008): 255-271. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsm062>

- Serbin, A., and A. Serbin Pont. “The foreign policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: the role and legacy of Hugo Chávez.” *Latin American Policy* 8, no. 2 (2017): 232-248. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12122>.
- Smilde, D., and G. Ramsey. “International peace-making in Venezuela’s intractable conflict.” *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109 (2020): 157-179.
- Söderbaum, F., and L. Van Langenhove. “Introduction: the EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism.” *Journal of European Integration*, no. 27, no. 3 (2005): 249-262. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330500190073>
- Stavridis, S., and D. Irrera, (eds.). *The European Parliament and its international relations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
- Stavridis, S., and D. Jańczyć (eds.). *Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance*. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Telò, M. “Perspectives.” *Belgeo*, no. 4 (2020): 1-18. doi: <https://doi.org/10.4000/belgeo.43943>
- Theodoro Luciano, B. T. “Inter-parliamentary European Union–Latin American Caribbean (EU-LAC) relations and the increasing political convergence among Latin American regional parliaments (2006–15).” *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 37, no. 3 (2017): 318-334. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2017.1336326>
- Theodoro Luciano, B., and H. Ramanzini Júnior. “Regional parliaments and democratic crises: the performance of Ecowas and Mercosur parliaments in the democracy protection agenda.” *Parliamentary Affairs* 76, no. 2 (2023): 485-506. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab059>
- Velasco-Pufleau, M. “The Ayotzinapa case (Mexico) and the role of the European Parliament as a moral tribune to promote human rights worldwide.” *The International Journal of Human Rights* 5, no. 28 (2024): 713-737. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2023.2297314>
- Velasco-Pufleau, M., and S. Stavridis. “Diplomacia parlamentaria, política exterior populista y derechos humanos: la reacción del presidente López Obrador a la resolución del Parlamento Europeo de 2022.” *Revista Española de Derecho Internacional* 76, no. 1 (2024): 225-255. doi: <https://doi.org/10.36151/REDI.76.1.8>
- Wouters, J., and G. Müller. “The European Union’s promotion of human rights abroad: the case of Latin America and the Caribbean; la promoción de los derechos humanos en el extranjero por la unión europea: el caso de América Latina y el Caribe.” In *Multilateralism and regionalism in challenging times: relations between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean*, edited by E. Jeger, D. Durán Cruz, and B. T. Luciano. Hamburg: EU-LAC Foundation, 2022. <https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/eu-lac-Multilateralismo-regionalismo-EN-2.pdf>