International development cooperation as a global governance policy

Orliange, Philippe; Zaratiegui, Thomas

doi:10.1590/0034-7329202200215

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Article • Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 65 (2) • 2022 • https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202200215 linkcopy

International development cooperation as a global governance policy

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

The three major international texts adopted in 2015 -Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Paris Climate Agreement- place national public policies and actors at the heart of international development cooperation (IDC). By bringing IDC closer to national institutions, particularly development banks, and taking it further away from traditional foreign policy, this shift has challenged long-held IDC narratives and structures, both among developed and developing countries. It has also laid the foundations for a degree of structured and universal accountability within the international development cooperation system, setting the stage for a wider shift within global governance.

International development cooperation; development banks; governance; foreign policy

	NDB	AIIB
Membership	BRICS	93 members. Breakaway from traditional international finance institutions’ (IFIs) practice, as neither Japan nor the USA are members (unlike various EU countries).
Initial capital (bn USD)	100, with an initial subscription of 50, of which 10 are paid-in.	100, of which 10 paid upfront.
Capital distribution and voting rights	Equally shared among member States. NDB is a rare example among IFIs of a “one country, one vote” approach.	Split unequally among shareholders, with China being the largest shareholder (27% capital) and holding a right of veto. Voting rights are proportionate to shares.
Presidency	Rotates among shareholders (currently Brazilian).	Chinese President.
2020 disbursed volume (bn USD)	5,38 (out of 10,27 approved)	6,23 (out of 9,98 approved)
Sectoral focus	Infrastructure - transport and energy represent 50% of lending.	Infrastructure - transport and energy represent 68% of lending.
Clients	90% sovereign (i.e. States, or with State’s guarantee) – increasingly balanced among the five beneficiaries.	76,5% sovereign with limited non-sovereign (e.g. public companies borrowing without State guarantee) and private sector lending.
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Currency	Mostly US dollar (market raised) with bonds emitted in Chinese RMB, Russian ruble and South African ZAR.	Mostly US dollar (market raised).
Co-financing & Coordination	Less co-financing than AIIB but greater use of development banks of its shareholders (e.g. BNDES) and regional banks (e.g. CAF). Uses national rules and procedures for tendering, social and environmental safeguards (common practice in international public finance).	Operates largely through co-financing with the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank, demonstrating a degree of compatibility between their rules and procedures. Decreasing share of co-financing (74% in 2016, 33% in 2019), due to the AIIB’s increasing capacity to generate its own operations.
2015 compact	Its 2019 annual report states that it “is paying due regard to the alignment of its operations with the SDGs as well as the goals of the Paris Agreement […] in line with its general strategy 2017-2021”.	The “Agenda 2030” strategy adopted in 2020 makes numerous references to the Paris Agreement.

	2016	2018	2020
AIIB disbursements	0,01	0,62	6,23
AsDB disbursements	12,48	14,18	23,58

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Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília Centro de Estudos Globais, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Universidade de Brasília, Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro, Brasília - DF - 70910-900 - Brazil, Tel.: + 55 61 31073651 - Brasília - DF - Brazil
E-mail: rbpi@unb.br

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[TFN1] Source: authors’ elaboration based on both institutions’ reports