Abstract in English:

Abstract In the face of growing restrictions against Huawei in much of ‘the West’ because of the US’ efforts to portray its 5G roll out as a security threat, most of the developing world has resisted such efforts. By drawing on Balzacq’s analytical framework - centred on the degree of congruence between the audience, the securitizing agent’s ability to construct a convincing frame of reference, the role of contextual factors, and securitization counterclaims - it is argued that 5G securitization failed in Brazil and South Africa (2019-2022). Although the contextual factors in both cases were similar (economic interests with China, Huawei’s established role and access to Covid vaccines), in South Africa, narratives of development and cost/benefit considerations overshadowed perceptions of security risk. In Brazil in contrast, some factions within the Bolsonaro government agreed to the US’ securitization frame, whilst others, citing the risk of damaging relations with Beijing and the sheer costs of replacing Huawei infrastructure, disagreed. In both cases, the contextual factors diminished Huawei as a source of risk, especially in the Brazilian case, tipping the scale in support of those seeking to maintain good relations with Beijing.

Abstract in English:

Abstract In 2022 the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) released the National Interest Framework, formally setting out what South Africa’s national interest is. According to DIRCO this aimed at providing an understanding of, and predictability in South Africa’s international relations. As the latest document in guiding foreign policy the framework reflects a continuation in the rhetoric of foreign policy principles; yet for all its effort in identifying the country’s foreign policy priorities, questions remain concerning the interests it reflects. Indeed, although there has been centralisation of decision-making, this has not translated into presenting a singular foreign policy or national interest position. Rather, South Africa’s national interest reflects a negotiated outcome of different positions among the political elites in government and the ruling party (African National Congress). Using Wight’s national interest taxonomy, the article highlights the presence of multiple positions evident in South Africa’s national interest framework before considering what the implications are for the implementation of foreign policy. This draws on a critical review of foreign policy documents, supported by semi-structured interviews with practitioners, academics, think tanks, and NGOs. The article argues that the national interest framework is not a reflection of one, but an amalgamation of what Wight identifies as realist, revolutionist, and rationalist doctrines. This has left the framework a broad document without specific aims in achieving the national interest. It also goes some way towards accounting for the limited application to date of the national interest framework in facilitating an understanding of South Africa’s international relations.

Abstract in English:

Abstract Based on the literature on rising powers, we contend that India has historically perceived itself as a civilizational entity and benefited from the loopholes opened by power transition periods to connect its material capabilities with its normative ambition. Our methodology compares how India behaved after the Cold War (from 1991) with China’s emergence (2008 onwards) through three variables: (i) the acquisition of economic and military power, (ii) the quest for globalized authority, and (iii) the deliberate pursuit of international leadership. We conclude that if the first was already present after the Cold War, the other two only followed more recently, when India employed a deliberate strategy to shape global issues.