Ownership concentration
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FF |
% of shares in circulation |
- |
Ding et al. (2016Ding, X. (Sara), Ni, Y., & Zhong, L. (2016). Free float and market liquidity around the world. Journal of Empirical Finance, 38(A), 236-257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.0...
) |
BIGGOR |
% held by the largest ultimate shareholder |
+ |
Stulz (1988Stulz, R. M. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)900...
) |
SHARE3 |
% held by the three largest shareholders |
+ |
Stulz (1988Stulz, R. M. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)900...
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Shareholder characteristics
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FOR |
Dummy = 1 if there is a foreigner among the three largest shareholders |
- |
Inácio-Soares & Marcon (2019Inácio-Soares, J. M., & Marcon, R. (2019). Mecanismos internos de governança e a participação acionária de estrangeiros: uma análise das companhias abertas brasileiras. Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais, 14(3), 251-264.) |
INST |
Dummy = 1 if there is an institutional investor among the three largest shareholders |
± |
Gillan e Starks (2000Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 275-305.) |
GOV |
Dummy = 1 if the government is among the three largest shareholders |
+ |
La Porta et al. (1999La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115 https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115...
) |
PRIV |
Dummy = 1 if there is a private individual among the three largest shareholders |
+ |
La Porta et al. (1999La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115 https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115...
) |
Shareholder agreement
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D_SA |
Dummy = 1 if there is a shareholder agreement in the company |
+ |
Gelman et al. (2015Gelman, M., Castro, L. R. K. D., & Seidler, V. (2015). Efeitos da vinculação de conselheiros ao acordo de acionistas no valor da firma. Revista de Administração de Empresas, 55(3), 345-358. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-759020150309 https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-7590201503...
), Silva (2012Silva, A. L. C. (2012). Do shareholder agreements affect market valuation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 919-933. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.04.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012....
) |
QT_SH |
Total number of shareholders present in the agreement |
+ |
Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.) |
SHARE_SA |
% of combined share of the shareholders present in the agreement |
+ |
Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.) |
SA_CONTROL |
Dummy = 1 if the combined share of the shareholders in the agreement is greater than 50% |
± |
Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.), Silva (2012Silva, A. L. C. (2012). Do shareholder agreements affect market valuation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 919-933. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.04.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012....
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Indirect ownership structures
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D_IND |
Dummy = 1 if there is an indirect ownership structure |
± |
Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.), Silva & Leal (2005Silva, A. L. C., & Leal, R. P. C. (2005). Índice de governança corporativa, desempenho e valor da firma no Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 3(1), 1-18.) |
D_CONTROL |
Dummy = 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder has acquired more than 50% of the company’s shares with voting rights |
± |
Aldrighi et al. (2018Aldrighi, D. M., Postali, F. A. S., & Diaz, M. D. M. (2018). Corporate governance and pyramidal ownership: The role of Novo Mercado. Brazilian Review of Finance, 16(1), 5. https://doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v16n1.2018.72020 https://doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v16n1.201...
), Andrade et al. (2015Andrade, L. P., Bressan, A. A., & Iquiapaza, R. A. (2015). Estrutura piramidal de controle, emissão de duas classes de ações e desempenho financeiro das empresas brasileiras. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 12(4), 555-595.), Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.) |
D_PR |
Dummy = 1 if there are preference shares in companies that compose the indirect structure |
± |
Gorga (2009Gorga, E. (2009). Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed ownership? Evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 29(2), 106.), Silva & Leal (2005Silva, A. L. C., & Leal, R. P. C. (2005). Índice de governança corporativa, desempenho e valor da firma no Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 3(1), 1-18.) |
DEV_SH1 (SH2; SH3) |
Difference between the voting rights and cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder, of the second largest, and the third largest |
+ |
Bortolon (2013Bortolon, P. M. (2013). Por que as empresas brasileiras adotam estruturas piramidais de controle. Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos, 10(1), 2-18. https://doi.org/10.4013/base.2013.101.01 https://doi.org/10.4013/base.2013.101.01...
), Silva & Leal (2005Silva, A. L. C., & Leal, R. P. C. (2005). Índice de governança corporativa, desempenho e valor da firma no Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 3(1), 1-18.) |
LEVEL |
Number of levels in the indirect structure |
+ |
Andrade et al. (2015Andrade, L. P., Bressan, A. A., & Iquiapaza, R. A. (2015). Estrutura piramidal de controle, emissão de duas classes de ações e desempenho financeiro das empresas brasileiras. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 12(4), 555-595.), Bortolon (2013Bortolon, P. M. (2013). Por que as empresas brasileiras adotam estruturas piramidais de controle. Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos, 10(1), 2-18. https://doi.org/10.4013/base.2013.101.01 https://doi.org/10.4013/base.2013.101.01...
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