Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the idea of person on Law, based on a dialogue between the critical view of Evguiéni Pachukanis, for whom legal subject is merely a way of enabling capital domination, and the critical contributions of Franz Neumann, Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. Neumann centralizes the person as a fundamental principle of rule of law because the possibility of accountability over domination. Legal subject is then understood as the centre of imputation of rights and duties and author of norms that regulates his life. Foucault analyzes power as a dynamic and circular form in social relations. Judith Butler contributes with her concept of resistance and analyzes the practice of criticism as a social relation of the subject to the norms. Within Law, we can understand it as a claim to norms with the aim of transforming them, in order enable the expression of different life forms. We suggest to analyze, in short, the possibility of a social regulation grammar as well the idea of person as propellant of an autonomous and constant process of normative criteria construction, based on the formulation of equality of subjects before Law.
Keywords:
Person; Law critique; Autonomy; Subjectivation