ABSTRACT
This essay develops a deconstructive interpretation of some aspects of the economics of science formulated by Michael Polanyi. In particular, the essay analyzes the extent to which Polanyi’s libertarian positions can be seen as consistent from a logical-deconstructive point of view. Although the essay highlights the existence of inconsistencies in Polanyi’s discourse, his contribution to the debate about the specificities inherent to the knowledge process is equally emphasized. In other words, even though Polanyi has exaggerated his Panglossian belief in the efficiency of the spontaneous coordination of scientific activities promoted by the market, it is necessary to recognize that his positions regarding the characteristics of knowledge must be seen as an important antidote against naive proposals for centralization of scientific activities under a single authority.
KEYWORDS:
Economic methodology; scientific methodology; philosophy of science; history of economic thought; Michael Polanyi