Neurorights as fundamental rights^*

Abstract

This article aims to examine the hypothesis that neuro-rights are implicitly recognized as fundamental rights in the Brazilian Constitution and to emphasize the importance of their future explicit constitutional enshrinement. Initially, the article outlines the context of the information society and data capitalism, in which information and communication technologies (ICTs) constitute a networked and surveillance-oriented community identifiable with neurocapitalism. Subsequently, the discussion addresses the right to privacy and the recognition of the fundamental nature of data protection rights as a comparable hermeneutic paradigm. Although the topic remains controversial, the text adopts the fivefold classification of neurorights: (1) mental privacy, concerning the transfer of neural data; (2) personal identity, involving the need to establish limits on technological interventions in individuality, including brain enhancements and the insertion of nanorobots; (3) free will in decision-making; (4) fair access to mental enhancement; and (5) protection against algorithmic bias and discrimination. The study employs deductive methods and bibliographic research techniques. Its object is the examination of whether neurorights may be recognized as fundamental rights within the Brazilian legal system. The conclusion affirms the hypothesis that recognizing neuro-rights as implicit fundamental rights is relevant, as well as the necessity of their legal regulation, without negating the importance of their future explicit constitutional positivization.

Keywords:
fundamental rights; neurorights; information society; information and communication technologies (ICTs); neurocapitalism