The Supreme Federal Court as Queen of Chess: Partisan Fragmentation and Judicial Empowerment in Brazil

Barbosa, Leon Victor de Queiroz; Carvalho, Ernani

doi:10.1590/1678-987320287307en

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Original Articles • Rev. Sociol. Polit. 28 (73) • 2020 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-987320287307en copy

The Supreme Federal Court as Queen of Chess: Partisan Fragmentation and Judicial Empowerment in Brazil

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

ABSTRACT

Introduction:

This article deals with the Supreme Federal Court’s empowerment trajectory, exploring exogenous variables in order to explain what made the Supreme Court so institutionally powerful, and how it happened. After the classic studies on the global expansion of the judicial power, that pointed to a myriad of causes as a result of the phenomenon, several recent researches have indicated the political-party fragmentation as the main cause of judicial empowerment. Seeking to corroborate these analyses, the present work analyzes the institutional empowerment of the Brazilian Judiciary from 1945 to 2015, testing the hypothesis the greater the party fragmentation, more institutional power the STF holds.

Materials and Methods:

As a dependent variable, a synthetic indicator was created to measure the institutional power of the Federal Supreme Court year by year. The independent variables measure the party composition of the Chamber of Deputies annually for the same period. In addition to these variables, other measures were imported from the V-Dem database. For this analysis, simple linear, generalized linear and multinomial models were used.

Results:

We identified significant impact of party fragmentation on institutional empowerment of the Supreme Court. In all tests, party fragmentation increased the chances of institutional empowerment of the Brazilian judiciary.

Discussion:

The exogenous reforms that generated this empowerment took place with the support of the Executive and the leniency of the Legislative, transforming the Brazilian Supreme Court into the Queen of the Chess.

KEYWORDS:
Judiciary Power; Partisan Fragmentation; judicial empowerment; Supreme Federal Court; multinomial; factorial analysis

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation
iSTF	71	39	137	78.70	36.519
LJI	65	0.0798	0.6378	0.4028	0.18106
XCONST	65	0	6	4.06	2.157
XCONST_cat	65	1	3	2.31	0.934
Competição Política	69	1	9	6.12	3.183
NEP	71	1.66	13.45	5.2873	3.20177
NMP	71	1	9	3.06	2.833
F (Rae)	71	0.501	0.956	0.8173	0.18145
Poliarquia	71	0.150	0.892	0.5345	0.28160
Regime	71	0	1	0.68	0.471
N Valid (listwise)	64

	Dependent Variables				Independent Variables
	iSTF	LJI	XCONST	XCONST_cat	NEP	NMP	F	Polyarchy	Regime	Political Competition	Fragmentation Indicator ^I I Variable created from factor analysis, as explained on section III.
iSTF	1	0.590^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.631^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.501^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.873^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.926^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.421^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.894^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.466^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.680^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.862^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
		65	65	65	71	71	71	71	71	69	69
LJI		1	0.899^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.849^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.658^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.490^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.650^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.842^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.781^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.887^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.808^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
			65	65	65	65	65	65	65	64	64
XCONST			1	0.975^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.735^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.542^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.789^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.880^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.932^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.966^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.905^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
				65	65	65	65	65	65	64	64
XCONST_cat				1	0.641^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.436^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.809^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.788^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.939^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.930^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.827^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
					65	65	65	65	65	64	64
NEP					1	0.834^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.671^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.896^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.628^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.772^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.944^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
						71	71	71	71	69	69
NMP						1	0.394^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.775^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.410^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.591^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.811^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
							71	71	71	69	69
F							1	0.661^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.801^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.796^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.802^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
								71	71	69	69
Polyarchy								1	0.758^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.914^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.966^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
										69	69
Regime									1	0.881^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.790^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
										69	69
Political Competition										1	0.919^ The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
											69
Fragmentation
Indicator											1

	Dependent Variables (disaggregated)					Independent Variables
	Judiciary Constraints on Executive Index	Compliance with Judiciary	Compliance with High Court	High Court Independence Index	Lower Court Independence Index	NEP	NMP	F	Polyarchy	Political Competition	Fragmentation Indicator
Judiciary Constraints on Executive Index	1	0.910^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.980^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.889^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.867^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.892^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.819^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.683^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.976^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.909^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.970^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
		71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	69	69
Compliance with Judiciary		1	0.851^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.832^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.860^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.807^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.847^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.481^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.850^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.748^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.847^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
			71	71	71	71	71	71	71	69	69
Compliance with High Court			1	0.823^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.800^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.843^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.748^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.671^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.972^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.912^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.942^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
				71	71	71	71	71	71	69	69
High Court Independence Index				1	0.946^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.890^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.898^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.534^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.842^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.681^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.868^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
					71	71	71	71	71	69	69
Lower Court Independence Index					1	0.856^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.928^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.470^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.803^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.638^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.834^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
						71	71	71	71	69	69
NEP						1	0.834^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.671^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.896^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.772^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.944^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
							71	71	71	69	69
NMP							1	0.394^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.775^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.591^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.811^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
								71	71	69	69
F								1	0.661^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.796^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.802^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
									71	69	69
Polyarchy									1	0.914^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.966^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
										69	69
Political Competition										1	0.919^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
											69
Fragmentation Indicator											1

Tests	Judicial Indicator from V-DEM	Fragmentation Indicator
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)	0.728	0.716
BTS	0.000	0.000

Judicial Indicator from the V-DEM				Fragmentation Indicator
Components		Initial Eigenvalues		Components		Initial Eigenvalues
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %		Total	% of variance	Cumulative %
1	4.504	90.073	90.073	1	3.97	79.405	79.405
2	0.286	5.719	95.792	2	0.667	13.331	92.736
3	0.156	3.123	98.915	3	0.227	4.531	97.267
4	0.048	0.954	99.869	4	0.105	2.091	99.358
5	0.007	0.131	100	5	0.032	0.642	100

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation
Judicial Indicator from the V-DEM	71	-1.17919	1.97663	0	1
Fragmentation Indicator	69	-1.44771	1.65899	0	1

	Indicator Judicial (V-DEM)	NEP	NMP	F	Polyarchy	Political Competition	Fragmentation Indicator
IndicatorJudicial (V-DEM)	1	0.904^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.893^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.599^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.937^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.819^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.940^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
		71	71	71	71	69	69
NEP		1	0.834^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.671^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.896^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.772^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.944^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
			71	71	71	69	69
NMP			1	0.394^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.775^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.591^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.811^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
				71	71	69	69
F				1	0.661^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.796^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.802^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
					71	69	69
Polyarchy					1	0.914^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.	0.966^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
						69	69
Political Competition						1	0.919^ . The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
							69
Fragmentation Indicator							1

Dependent Variables	iSTF			LJI (Latent Judicial Independence Index)			XCONST			Judicial Indicator (V-DEM)
[technique]	[Negative Binomial]			[MQO]			[Negative Binomial]			[MQO]
(model)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
NEP	0.9904			-0.0024^ p-value < 0.05,			0.9644			-0.0028
NMP	1.0504^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	1.1143^* ***** p-value < 0.01.		-0.0081	-0.0025		0.9984	0.9799		0.1547^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	0.1480^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
F	0.6515^ p-value < 0.05,			0.044			4.8309*			0.1135
Polyarchy	7.3364^* ***** p-value < 0.01.			0.5395^* ***** p-value < 0.01.			1.1236			2.0031^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	2.1717^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
Political Competition	0.9365^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	1.0393^* ***** p-value < 0.01.		0.0263^ p-value < 0.05,	0.0508^* ***** p-value < 0.01.		1.1675^ p-value < 0.05,	1.2303^* ***** p-value < 0.01.		0.0134
Fragmentation Indicator			1.4546^* ***** p-value < 0.01.			0.1494^* ***** p-value < 0.01.			1.5321^* ***** p-value < 0.01.			0.9247^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
Log Likelihood	-227.214	-276.888	-291.784				-102.504	-104.314	-122.951
Pseudo R2	0.3291	0.1825	0.1385				0.2735	0.2607	0.1515
Prob. Chi2	1	0	0				0.497	0.499	0.5
R2 Ajustado				0.812	0.781	0.647				0.9486	0.946	0.8552
Prob. (F)				0	0	0				0	0	0
N	69	69	71	64	64	65	64	64	65	61	71	71

Independent Variables	Fragmentation Indicator	Fragmentation Indicator
[técnica]	[Logit Multinomial]	[Probit Multinomial]
XCONST_cat
weak(base category)	-	-
Medium	3.586^ p-value < 0.05,	2.6275^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
Strong	4.7777^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	3.6622^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
Log Likelihood	-25.48	-25.383
Pseudo R2	0.5086
Prob. Chi2	0	0.0001
N	65	65

	Variable Fragmentation Indicator	Dy/dx	Standard Error	P>\|z\|
logit	Weak	-0.3088	0.139	0.027
	Medium	-0.0595	0.078	0.446
	Strong	0.3684	0.147	0.012
probit	Weak	-0.4007	0.145	0.006
	Medium	-0.0464	0.081	0.570
	Strong	0.4471	0.147	0.002

Dependent Variable	Regime	iSTF	Judicial Indicator (V-DEM)
[technique]		[Negative Binomial]	[MQO]
Interactive Term
Fragmentation Indicator	0 (dictatorship)	1.1177^ p-value < 0.05,	0.7130^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
	1 (democracy)	1.6947^* ***** p-value < 0.01.	1.0606^* ***** p-value < 0.01.
Log Likelihood	-286.326
Pseudo R2	0.1775
Prob, Chi2	0
R2 Adjusted	0.8675
Prob, (F)	0
N	71	71

	Legislative	Executive	Total
Democracy	5 (50)	5 (50)	10 (100)
	[50]	[41.6]
Dictatorship	5 (41.6)	7 (58.4)	12 (100)
	[50]	[58.4]
Total	10 (45.5)	12 (54.5)	22 (100)
	[100]	[100]	[100]

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[1] Leon Victor de Queiroz Barbosa (leon.victorqueiroz@ufpe.br) is PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) and Professor at the Political Science Department at UFPE.