Neurocognitive models are proposed in order to study the problem of consciousness. The models are attempts to answer the question of how the brain can generate conscious and qualitative states. Models are theoretical representations based on empirical data. Nonetheless, the central question concerns the reliability and the representativeness of the models, i.e., whether they in fact represent what they are supposed to explain, viz., how consciousness can emerge from neuronal processes. Such models are taken to be a guide for the scientific study of consciousness. Presently, there are six models: the multiple draft (Dennett), the global workspace (Baars), the dynamic core (Edelman), the global neuronal workspace (Dehaene et al.), the somatic markers hypothesis (Damásio), and the neurodynamic model (Freeman). This text is a survey and a philosophical analysis of the models of consciousness, and it considers their plausibility and coherence. I will concentrate on two points: (1) whether the neuroscientific models are able to explain ‘consciousness’ and its properties in neural terms, or whether the models only explain the neural correlates of conscious states, and (2) the scope, limitations and applicability of the models in the attempt to solve the problem of consciousness.
consciousness; neuroscientific models; explanation; neurobiology