The aim of this paper is to discuss the Philonenko's criticism (1981) to the sartrian's concepts of "bad-faith" and "freedom". One of the pillars of this criticism is to defend the notion of "coherence of style", an indispensable element to safeguard the authenticity so relevant for Sartre, according Philonenko. However, when Sartre says "I'm not ever any of my conduct, none of my actions", limits the freedom advocated by himself on the horizon of a malicious deception, that is, the horizon of bad- faith. We found three inaccuracies in this criticism. First, the statement aforementioned of Sartre was misinterpreted. But secondly, if this interpretation is correct, assuming that the style is essential to the authenticity, nevertheless the sartrian's freedom cannot be "for the evil" because it is characterized, in ontological terms, as the very being of human reality "in situation", not in moral terms, as a property of this reality, crystallized by a watchful eye on itself or on the other, and judged as good or bad. Finally, we conclude that, in a possible conduct authentic, the collapse of the bad faith dispenses not only the support of a coherence of style but also presupposes the anxious acknowledgment of his gratuity.
Ontology of the subjectivity; Responsibility; Ethical reflection; Bad-faith; Freedom