Among several references made to Peirce's thought during Jürgen Habermas' philosophical career, two texts are exemplars of the reading Habermas makes of Peirce's thought. Despite the differences found between the two texts, two very important items are conserved: a true admiration for the pragmatic turn promoted Peirce (and followed by Habermas), and serious restrictions with regard to the progressive tendency in Peirce's thought toward abandoning intersubjectivity as the warrant of the objectivity of semiosis and giving preference to a cosmological foundation to all kinds of knowledge. Although this last restriction could be criticized as to its pertinence, both the admiration manifested by Habermas for Peirce's contribution to philosophical thought in his pragmatic proposal, as well as Habermas's restrictions regarding a supposed abandonment of personal relations on the basis of semiosis, undoubtedly manifest the philosophical bias of Habermas' reading of an author he admires but does not intend to follow as an exegete.
Pragmatic turn; Semiosis; Inter-Subjectivity; Cosmology