Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0100-604520200001&lang=en vol. 43 num. 1 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[S5-denying Approach to Relativized Metaphysical Modality]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality (which I call ‘S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality’) and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory for relativized (metaphysical) modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality. <![CDATA[A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SOSA’S “TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT” IN KNOWING FULL WELL]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100041&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable (i.e., it would be epistemically self-defeating to think otherwise). However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species. <![CDATA[CONCEPTS, INTENTIONS AND MATERIAL OBJECTS. SOME COMMENTS ON EVNINE’S PROPOSAL IN MAKING OBJECTS AND EVENTS]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100073&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In this paper I present and critically discuss Simon Evnine’s account of hylomorphically complex objects (as presented in his 2016 book Making Objects and Events). On the one hand, I object to the account he gives of how artifacts (which are for him the paradigmatic cases of hylomorphically complex objects) allegedly acquire their existence and identity conditions. I elaborate on two problems I see for this account: first, that it seems unable to explain our knowledge of the kinds to which artifacts belong; second, that it cannot offer a plausible solution to the grounding problem for coincident objects. I also object to the way in which he tries to adapt the sort of account he gave for artifacts to the case of organisms (in my view this fails because both cases are dissimilar at crucial points), and finally I also object to his attempt to extend that account, in a fictional way, to the case of natural non-organic objects (as I try to show, both his arguments to the effect that there are no such objects, and his positive fictionalist proposal to account for our talk about them, are flawed). <![CDATA[FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100115&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay. <![CDATA[BOOK REVIEW: DI PAOLO, Ezequiel, DE JAEGHER, Hanne & CUFFARI, Elena. <em>Linguistic Bodies: The continuity between Life and Language.</em> (MIT Press, 2018, 414 pages)]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100151&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panoramic view of the theory of linguistic bodies. Following the book's structure, I first describe the authors’ notion of body, then refer to their notion of dialectics, after that, I expose the steps of the model and, finally, get to their conception of languaging.