Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0100-604520190002&lang=en vol. 42 num. 2 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000200001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In ‘The Semantics of Singular Terms’ (1976) Brian Loar proposed a famous case where a hearer seems to misunderstand an utterance even though he has correctly identified its referent. Loar’s case has been used to defend a model of communication where speaker and hearer must think of the referent in similar ways in order for communication to succeed. This ‘Similar Ways of Thinking’ (SW) theory is extremely popular, both in the literature on Loar cases and in other philosophical discussions. My goal is to offer a novel argument against this influential model of communication and propose an alternative picture. First, I show how a certain version of SW fails to solve Loar’s puzzle. Then I point at a more general problem with SW, arguing that no version of this model can account for Loar-style cases without making the conditions for communication too strict. I then propose an alternative account of Loar cases, analyzing them as cases of luck where the hearer does not know that she has identified the referent correctly. I conclude by contrasting my view with other existing accounts of Loar cases. <![CDATA[THE CONFLICTUAL CRAFT]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000200047&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Are contemporary philosophers to follow Pyrrho of Elis in adopting his skeptic craft or at least core aspects of it as a reaction to the fact that, since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics? Over the last 2500 years or so, most Western philosophers have not done so in being more influenced by Aristotle’s dogmatic craft than by Pyrrho’s skeptic one. Over the last fifty years or so, a few Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonist philosophers, such as Oswald Porchat, Otávio Bueno and Plínio Junqueira Smith, have done the opposite in aiming to spell out the pertinence of Ancient Pyrrhonism to contemporary philosophy. On its part, this essay makes a case for the claim that one is to react to the stated fact by adopting a conflictual craft that promotes a synthesis of Pyrrho’s skeptic craft and the dogmatic craft. This synthesis: brings to light the core features of the skeptic and of the dogmatic craft; problematizes the dogmatic craft by means of the skeptic one and vice-versa so that the shortcomings of these crafts are avoided; and aims to keep certain positive aspects both of the skeptic craft and of the dogmatic one. <![CDATA[The Ontological Import of Adding Proper Classes]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000200085&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In this article, we analyse the ontological import of adding classes to set theories. We assume that this increment is well represented by going from ZF system to NBG. We thus consider the standard techniques of reducing one system to the other. Novak proved that from a model of ZF we can build a model of NBG (and vice versa), while Shoenfield have shown that from a proof in NBG of a set-sentence we can generate a proof in ZF of the same formula. We argue that the first makes use of a too strong metatheory. Although meaningful, this symmetrical reduction does not equate the ontological content of the theories. The strong metatheory levels the two theories. Moreover, we will modernize Shoenfield’s proof, emphasizing its relation to Herbrand’s theorem and that it can only be seen as a partial type of reduction. In contrast with symmetrical reductions, we believe that asymmetrical relations are powerful tools for comparing ontological content. In virtue of this, we prove that there is no interpretation of NBG in ZF, while NBG trivially interprets ZF. This challenges the standard view that the two systems have the same ontological content. <![CDATA[BOOK REVIEW: LINNEBO, Ø., <em>Philosophy of Mathematics</em> (Princeton Universisty Press, 2017, 216, pages)]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000200113&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract We review Linnebo's Philosophy of Mathematics, briefly describing the content of the book. <![CDATA[Book Review: Imaguire, G. <em>Priority Nominalism</em> (Springer Verlag, 2018, 171 pages.)]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000200121&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract The present work is a review of Imaguire's book 'Priority Nominalism'. In the first part I present the fundamental idea of the book along general lines; successively, I report a resume of each chapter and I present in more details the view of the author and the dialectic of his arguments. In the final part, I highlight some strong points of the book and I attempt a formulation of a possible difficulty arising from Imaguire's proposal.