Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Contexto Internacional]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0102-852920170002&lang=en vol. 39 num. 2 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[Maritime Regions and the South Atlantic]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200229&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en <![CDATA[The Enabling Power of the Oceans]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200237&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract The importance of the oceans to humankind has been studied throughout the centuries, including in the fields of co-operation and conflict. This think piece synthesises discussions in international politics of some of the characteristics of oceans, especially discussions in the strategic-military domain, It contests those who consider oceans as a “barrier”, and alternatively defends that oceans are a critical enabler that allows the generation of wealth, projection of military forces, and the influence of the international politics in war or peace. <![CDATA[Why Not Eminently Maritime UN Peacekeeping Operations?]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200245&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Although the UN Charter does not explicitly provide for Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), they have become one of the UN’s most important means of preserving peace and international security. Some of the greatest threats to international peace and security do not occur on ‘UN Member States territory’, but at sea. The internationally significant and long-standing phenomenon of maritime piracy initially led to international action off the coast of Somalia, but other regions affected by criminal acts at sea (including the Straits of Malacca, the Gulf of Guinea and the Mediterranean Sea) are reinforcing the need for international action. In most of these situations, the UN has not acted directly, but called on multilateral or regional bodies to do so. Earlier experiences in PKOs at sea, in Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, and most recently in Lebanon, undertaken by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), begin to provide a basis for building a naval PKO doctrine. This article argues that it is legitimate for the UN to undertake direct action when facing threats to maritime security, making use of an empirical example and suggests that new instances of criminal acts at sea, such as those in the Gulf of Guinea, may best be dealt with under a direct UN mandate. <![CDATA[Brazilian Policy and the Creation of a Regional Security Complex in the South Atlantic: Pax Brasiliana?]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200263&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Over the past five years, the South Atlantic region has become a central element of Brazilian security policy, with Brazil actively supporting the notion of a trans-oceanic security consciousness involving African littoral states. It has invested in diplomatic initiatives such as the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA, or ZOPACAS), and extensive military co-operation with West African states such as São Tomé e Príncipe, Namibia and Cape Verde. Its internal security and defence policy documents have repeatedly been updated to reflect this dimension, and now provide the foundation for advancing these initiatives. This policy thrust is directed at securing Brazil’s offshore oil assets, and limiting the influence of what it has termed ‘extra-regional powers’ such as the P-5. This article highlights these initiatives and reviews the prospects for this policy by examining the plausibility of the South Atlantic region as a regional security complex in the sense coined by Buzan and Wæver. The analysis is based on the role of geographical and linguistic proximity in international relations, and the impact of multilateral bodies on building support for a regional approach to security governance. <![CDATA[Maritime Co-operation among South Atlantic Countries and Repercussions for the Regional Community of Security Practice]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200281&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract This paper aims to examine the importance of co-operation for maritime security in the South Atlantic, focusing on the relationship between the national and sub-regional institutions that have leveraged this process, especially those from Brazil. For this purpose, the diagnosis addresses the debates around the contemporary roles of the navy and the importance of international co-operation for its mission accomplishment, highlighting the tasks judged as subsidiary, among them being that of maritime traffic control. The alignment of these co-operative activities with foreign policy and national defence projects can be seen through the navy’s participation in multilateral co-operation projects involving South America, particularly the Co-ordination for the South Atlantic Maritime Area (CAMAS). The research detects the existence of a particular model of a community of security practice in which national and sub-regional institutions have been generating an important maritime co-operative system, which is more stable than in other areas of co-operation in the same region. <![CDATA[Stretching the Limits? Strengths and Pitfalls of South Atlantic Security Regionalism]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200305&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In the broader context of regional studies, the South Atlantic comes across as a singular, yet still understudied case study for the formation, evolution, and regression of security regionalism dynamics. More so when South Atlantic countries have come to engage in increased regionally focused interactions through wider defence co-operation ties. However, they have also steadfastly eschewed any kind of permanent structures and shared sovereignty over sensitive security issues. This article strives to ascertain the limits and prospects of these regional security dynamics in the South Atlantic. With the focal points set on both South American and African shores, I pinpoint key overtures in this area and question their contribution to advancing an overall regionalisation process. Despite shared threat perceptions and an absence of major intra-regional conflicts, I argue that South Atlantic security regionalism lacks a stable and permanent structure inasmuch as it lacks real autonomy from the dictums of external regional powers, thus leaving the transatlantic space still in flux. <![CDATA[A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200329&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In this article, we analyse one aspect of Brazilian nuclear policy during the tenure of the Workers Party (2003–2016): the development of a nuclear-propelled submarine. We propose that the project of building a nuclear-propelled submarine has become possible partly because of the mobilisation of a set of arguments for the construction of the South Atlantic as a strategic area, framed in terms of security and development. On the other hand, we contend that the need for a nuclear-propelled submarine is framed through the mobilisation of a specific notion of deterrence. In other words, we claim that the notions of ‘strategic area’, ‘general deterrence’, ‘conventional deterrence’, and ‘deterrence by denial’ can help us analyse the fundamental aspects involved in the framing of the South Atlantic as a security concern, justifying the nuclear-propelled submarine project. <![CDATA[A Blue BRICS, Maritime Security, and the South Atlantic]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200351&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Analysts frequently label the BRICS grouping of states (Brazil, India, Russia, China, and South Africa) as primarily an economic club emphasising economic performances as primary objectives. Co-operation of international groupings are rarely, if ever, set within the context of their access to maritime interests, security, and benefits. A second void stems from the lack of emphasis upon the economic benefits of secured maritime domains. In this vein, a common, but neglected aspect of the BRICS grouping’s power and future influence resides in their maritime domains, the value of which ultimately depends upon the responsible governance and use of ocean territories. The maritime interests of BRICS countries only become meaningful if reinforced by maritime security governance and co-operation in the respective oceans. Presently China and India seem to dominate the maritime stage of BRICS, but the South Atlantic is an often overlooked space. For BRICS the value of the South Atlantic stems from how it secures and unlocks the potential of this maritime space through co-operative ventures between Brazil, South Africa as a late BRICS partner, and West African littoral states in particular. Unfortunately, BRICS holds its own maritime tensions, as member countries also pursue competing interests at sea. <![CDATA[The TIPNIS Conflict in Bolivia]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200373&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract Soon after the formation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009, the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) became the epicentre of a conflict over the construction of a road, initiated by Evo Morales’s administration, that would run through the park. Initially undertaken by the Brazilian company OAS, and funded by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the project was justified on the grounds that it would link the departments of Beni and Cochabamba, and bring development to an isolated locality. However, indigenous peoples from the lowlands opposed the scheme, and, together with their counterparts in the Andean region, organised a march that was violently dispersed by the Bolivian armed forces. In this article, I analyse the political processes in this Andean country, notably the reconfiguration of power from 2011 onwards, in parallel with economic measures adopted by the government. I conclude with observations about the relation between the national and regional spheres, arguing that indigenous repression forms part of a new developmentalist agenda. <![CDATA[Land Market and Land Grabbing in Brazil during the Commodity Boom of the 2000s]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200393&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract This article analyses the determining factors affecting the land market in Brazil in an international context where the availability of natural resources, essential to satisfy the population worldwide, is again heading the agenda. This scenario provoked a rapid expansion of agribusiness and enhanced international participation based on the relative abundance of natural resources. The first part of this article presents the spatial dynamics surrounding the production of commodities and gives evidence of the sharp increase in land price in Brazil. The second part attempts to understand the factors that affect price dynamics and subsequent effects over capital allocation in the sector, addressing the impact of the recent boom of commodities and rising interest by foreign actors in Brazilian land. The conclusion elaborates on the possible land pricing developments and political unfolding. <![CDATA[Brazil’s Discourse on the Environment in the International Arena, 1972-1992]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200421&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract In this article, I analyse key statements by the Brazilian government about environmental issues during two important decades, from 1972 to 1992. I identify the specific subjects addressed by Brazilian spokespersons, and the rhetorical strategies they adopted for doing so. I conclude that these spokespersons largely adopted a defensive posture in response to mounting international pressures on a range of environmental issues, while using various rhetorical devices to highlight the positive dimension of the government’s environmental policies and initiatives. <![CDATA[Climate Change and International Civil Aviation Negotiations]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200443&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has discussed ways of regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by civil aircraft for almost 20 years. Over the past four years, a consensus has developed about a market-based mechanism in the form of a carbon offset system. This article describes the route to the agreement reached by ICAO’s 39th Assembly, in order to contextualise the results and point out some of its limitations. It points to two main factors that contributed to the consensus: the role of the European Union, which sought to lead the negotiations, and the choice of a flexible and ultimately weak mechanism that received support from the international airlines. <![CDATA[CINT Referees 2015-2016]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200459&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Abstract The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has discussed ways of regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by civil aircraft for almost 20 years. Over the past four years, a consensus has developed about a market-based mechanism in the form of a carbon offset system. This article describes the route to the agreement reached by ICAO’s 39th Assembly, in order to contextualise the results and point out some of its limitations. It points to two main factors that contributed to the consensus: the role of the European Union, which sought to lead the negotiations, and the choice of a flexible and ultimately weak mechanism that received support from the international airlines.