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Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia

versión impresa ISSN 0100-512Xversión On-line ISSN 1981-5336


FAGGION, Andrea. LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION. Kriterion [online]. 2020, vol.61, n.145, pp.55-72.  Epub 18-Mayo-2020. ISSN 1981-5336.

Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law- applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions - that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims.

Palabras clave : law; justification; authority; justice.

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