SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.42 issue2THE CONFLICTUAL CRAFT author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

Related links

Share


Manuscrito

Print version ISSN 0100-6045On-line version ISSN 2317-630X

Abstract

ONOFRI, ANDREA. Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference. Manuscrito [online]. 2019, vol.42, n.2, pp.1-45.  Epub Aug 12, 2019. ISSN 2317-630X.  https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2019.v42n2.ao.

In ‘The Semantics of Singular Terms’ (1976) Brian Loar proposed a famous case where a hearer seems to misunderstand an utterance even though he has correctly identified its referent. Loar’s case has been used to defend a model of communication where speaker and hearer must think of the referent in similar ways in order for communication to succeed. This ‘Similar Ways of Thinking’ (SW) theory is extremely popular, both in the literature on Loar cases and in other philosophical discussions. My goal is to offer a novel argument against this influential model of communication and propose an alternative picture. First, I show how a certain version of SW fails to solve Loar’s puzzle. Then I point at a more general problem with SW, arguing that no version of this model can account for Loar-style cases without making the conditions for communication too strict. I then propose an alternative account of Loar cases, analyzing them as cases of luck where the hearer does not know that she has identified the referent correctly. I conclude by contrasting my view with other existing accounts of Loar cases.

Keywords : Communication; Reference; Singular terms; Similarity; Knowledge.

        · text in English     · English ( pdf )