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Revista de Economia Contemporânea

versão impressa ISSN 1415-9848versão On-line ISSN 1980-5527

Resumo

KATSOULACOS, Yannis; MOTCHENKOVA, Evgenia  e  ULPH, David. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR CARTELS: SHOULD THERE BE A COMMON APPROACH TO SANCTIONING BASED ON THE OVERCHARGE RATE?. Rev. econ. contemp. [online]. 2019, vol.23, n.2, e192321.  Epub 29-Jul-2019. ISSN 1980-5527.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/198055272321.

We review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate.

Palavras-chave : antitrust penalties; antitrust enforcement; antitrust law; cartels.

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