SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.15 issue1Literary Readers’ Education: Possible Dialogues between Conceptions of the Bakhtin Circle and Textbook ActivitiesThomas Fink entrevista Lakshmi Bandlamudi: Difference, Dialogue and Development: a Bakhtinian World author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

Related links

Share


Bakhtiniana: Revista de Estudos do Discurso

On-line version ISSN 2176-4573

Bakhtiniana, Rev. Estud. Discurso vol.15 no.1 São Paulo Jan./Mar. 2020  Epub Nov 28, 2019

https://doi.org/10.1590/2176-457343943 

ARTICLES

Refractions of Reported Speech as a Discursive Episteme in Verbal Creativity

* Universidade de São Paulo - USP, Escola de Comunicações e Artes - ECA, Departamento de Comunicações e Artes, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil; CNPq; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1662-258X; irenear@usp.br


ABSTRACT

This essay reviews the critical analysis of V.N. Voloshinov with respect to the process of discursive transmission, questioning consecrated studies of stylistic and impressionistic categories. Voloshinov, on discovering ways in which reported speech creates tension in the citation, causing a quasi-direct discourse to emerge, which can be attributed to both the narrator as well as the character, understands he has found another history of discourse that is much more favorable to the manifestation of bivocality as active reaction to the discourse of the other, and as a full manifestation of the ideologeme. We infer, thus, that the problem examined by the theorist establishes a new discursive episteme in dialogic studies.

KEYWORDS: Reported speech; Quasi-direct discourse; Active reaction; Intonation; Ideologeme

RESUMO

O ensaio revê a análise crítica de V. N. Volóchinov a respeito dos processos de transmissão discursiva, questionando estudos consagrados das categorias estilísticas e impressionistas. Ao descobrir formas em que o discurso citado tensiona a citação fazendo emergir um discurso quase direto, que tanto pode ser do narrador como da personagem, Volóchinov entende ter encontrado uma outra história do discurso, muito mais favorável à manifestação da bivocalidade como reação ativa ao discurso de outrem e como plena manifestação do ideologema. Inferimos, por conseguinte, que o problema examinado pelo teórico se coloca como uma nova episteme discursiva nos estudos dialógicos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Discurso citado; Discurso quase direto; Reação ativa; Entonação; Ideologema

Introduction: Bivocality as a New Discursive Episteme

Within the panorama of the critical reception of V.N. Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929-1930), the intense and controversial debate around the authorship of the text did little to contribute to recognizing the radicality of his critical thought in his conceptual and theoretical review of the dialogical production of language. This lack of recognition was aggravated by his being relegated to the status of a mere co-author, pseudonym, or even ghostwriter of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. The near complete erasure of the theorist becomes a serious threat in light of his disappearance, together with other intellectuals, in the Stalinist expunctions of the 1930s, which left the merit of his contributions suspect. However, recent studies of his biography, his investigations, and his publications, have given rise to another analytical understanding of his work, and contributes to the construction of the image of a scholar who is neither a spokesperson, nor a myth, and much less a ghost (GRILLO; AMÉRICO, 2017, pp.255-281).

Without precedence in philosophical, historical and dialogical theory of language studies, many of Voloshinov’s radical approaches to the process of the construction of the ideological sign guarantee the unity and coherence of competent and well-founded theoretical thought that does not shy away from challenges in the name of the object of its critical reflection: the discursive interactions in concrete utterances1 in forming awareness, without which it is impossible to sustain critical thought, and to establish scientific rigor. On carrying out his analysis of verbal works strongly linked to a view of the signifying construction of interactive processes, Voloshinov outlines a critical epistemological space informed by methodologies focused on utterance/E - one of the privileged places of his reflection, and of the unfolding of signifying refraction.

The destiny of the conceptual formulations in Marxism and the Philosophy of language (1929-1930) was also submitted to controversial scrutiny in its critical reception. Conceptual formulations from the first part, and the historical review of the two theoretical lines of philosophy of language from the second part, are commonly cited and incorporated in various works of commentary. The conceptual confrontations that construct the theory of utterance/E that focuses on consecrated concepts about utterance/E, from the third part of the book, demand a keener interpretative investment, slower processing, and, above all, access to the sources that are not readily available.

According to our understanding, the magnitude of the concept of the ideological sign acquires materiality as a form of utterance/E that is historically constructed from concrete utterances2 in interactive processes of language because it is constituted as orientation for the other. Voloshinov dedicates the third and final part of his book to the understanding of a modality of this orientation: the review of the processes of transmission of the discourse of the other considering impasses between reported speech and the citation of concrete utterances in narrative discourse. On examining trends by which discursive transformations occurring in their transmission are understood, he discovers a revealing history of forms of discourse, which addresses his concerns. In this history there are studies regarding enunciative creation in which reported speech and reporting, in our view, enter into conflict with the context of transmission, and are presented as concrete utterances by the narrator, and by the characters. Two problems are considered: the first relates to the history that is reassembled to the representation, in the discourse in the narrative prose text, of the forms of transmission and representation of the discourse of one, and the discourse of the other. The second concerns the process of bivocalization when the direct emission confuses the limits of the discourse of one with the other. Voloshinov returned to this bivocal modality seeing that, instead of the discourse establishing itself in one or another sphere, it poses as a direct discourse that can emanate both in the voice of the characters as well as the narrator. Thus, we are dealing with an impure or improper formation, irreverent to submission, not conforming even to the limits of the consecrated category of free indirect discourse. According to the synthesis of the argument developed in our investigation, before Charles Bally’s formulation, in 1912, consecrated as discours indirect libre [free indirect discourse], there were other attempts to conceptualize the difficult relationship of uttering the discourse of the other or even citing it in the body of a concrete utterance or another discourse, such as Tobler’s (1887) concept of Eigentümliche Mischung direkter un indirekter Rede [a peculiar mix of direct and indirect discourse]; G. Lerch’s concept of Uneigentliche direkte Rede [improper direct discourse]; and by Th. Kalepky’s (1899) concept of Verschleierte Rede [veiled discourse]. In opposition to Bally, E. Lork (1921) proposes the Erlebte Rede [experienced discourse]. In Voloshinov’s historical-literary investigation, he examines these formulations to base his argument according to which the category that he consecrated as discours indirect libre [free indirect discourse] shows itself to be insufficient to cover the epistemological complexity of the events that occur in the process of dialogic interaction, whose challenge is the distinctive analysis of the discursive orientation.

Contrary to possible commonly held presuppositions, Voloshinov does not show interest in proposing a new category, but rather only in formulating a problem, and in constructing critical analysis methods used in understanding new phenomenon arising from the experience of the discourse as constituting a speaker’s dialogue with his or her own speech through intonation and value accents. Thus, it seemed to him indispensable to rely on the concept of “несобственная прямая речь” [“nesobstvennaia priamaia retch”] - a discourse that is neither decidedly direct nor indirect, but actually a quasi-direct discourse - bivocalized - and which can be constituted as reported speech both in the discourse of the characters and the narrator given it is configured on the borderline. This is the theorist’s bold point: direct discourse is also manifest in the narrative voice and in the full-valence of the narrator’s discourse in dialogue with the characters. How then, can the discursive forms produced by discursive refractions of this nature be conceptualized? To formulate a critical metalanguage in the context of the historical configuration was the task Voloshinov took upon himself in the final chapter - the book’s icing on the cake -- and third part, considered, deservingly, the most radical approach in the entire book (LOCK, 2001, p.79).

As the recent Brazilian translation of the work informs us, the problem was also approached by M. M. Bakhtin who developed a proposal based on three modalities: “discourse focused on the object, the character’s objectified discourse, and discourse directed to the discourse of the other” (VOLÓCHINOV, 2017, pp.87-88, footnote 9 [T.N.]).3 Adding further:

While Marxism and the Philosophy of Language approaches the second type, Bakhtin dedicates himself to the different modalities of bivocal discourse (stylization, parody, skaz, etc.). The two works seem to participate in a common project of studying the forms of discourse that have double directions: to the object of meaning, and to the discourse of the other (VOLÓCHINOV, 2017, p.88, footnote 9).4

The analysis that Voloshinov undertakes in the third part of his book returns to the study of the second modality with indications for the third, when he concentrates on the reactive character of the discourse as it is constituted as an ideologeme.

These clarifications contribute to the thinking that in the third part of the book, beyond the syntactic question, the target are the concrete utterances in their distinct refractions, in interaction with the other’s discourse. With this, the work closes a unified proposition of the problematic of the ideological sign5 as an elementary construct of all semiotic processes of creation, and of communication, respecting an historical approach.

Voloshinov’s capacity to historically situate the examination of discursive procedures together with the construction of a critical metalanguage informed by dialogical relationships unveils surprising analytical directions, favoring possibilities for much updating. Concepts such as utterance/E, citation, the construction of meaning, discursive transmission, concrete utterance and, particularly, ideologeme, not only pervade different approaches of other works by the Bakhtin Circle, but can also be constantly revisited faced with the challenges of the dynamics of communicative processes in the culture. From this, the very structure of dialogic theory projects the basis of its relational constitution. At the far boundary, it is the entire universe of bordering relations in the conflict of encountering their limits that is uncovered.

When read in the context of the process of signifying reflection and refraction, occasioned by the uses throughout history, many of the concepts can be understood in the rigor of the critical metalanguage developed by the theorist, not always agreeing with the philosophical-linguistic theories of Western approaches, as in the case of the concept of utterance/E, formulated in the 1920s, and examined in the third part of the book.

Even prior to Émile Benveniste’s (1958) formulations, the almost thirty years that separated one study and another seem not to have been sufficient for the reconsideration of the incomparable singularity of Voloshinov’s formulation. From the 1960s, with the dissemination of various structuralisms in Western Europe, it is Benveniste’s conception that dominated studies in semiology, which reserve, actually, the most cruel silence with regard to the Russian theorist’s propositions. Consequently, a great opportunity to acquire an analytical instrument about the incorporation of the contextual relationships of alterity in the interactions was lost. This, we understand as threatening the concept of ideologeme when distancing from the irreverent bivocalized discursive utterance/E that does not submit to the transmission in such a way as to liberate the dialogism as a creative praxis in artistic composition.

Among the versions in Western languages to which we had access, with the exception of the English translation of 1973, credited to Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik, all of the others translated “nesobstvennaia priamaia retch” as equivalent to “style indirecte libre” (free indirect style), as denominated, conceptualized and consecrated by Charles Bally in 1912. If, on the one hand, the notion of “style indirecte libre” or “free indirect discourse,”6 as the Portuguese translations refer to it, responds to the needs of the translation according to the second categories conceived in stylistics, on the other, Bally’s notion does not serve the epistemological demands to apprehend the dialectical process of construction of the discourse of the other as concrete utterance forming awareness. Nor does it reach the compositional discursive diversity of the prose in the realm of written culture. It is to this apprehension that Voloshinov7 directs his concerns, and, consequently, our own. However, it is important to clarify that the problem of our concern is not linked to linguistic translation, but to the discursive episteme that Voloshinov proposes as a hypothesis in his theory about the refractions of the discourse of the other in the citations of reports. Therein lies the challenge.

Although Voloshinov recognized Bally’s theoretical systemization, he suspected that this framework, systematized by the French scholar from the point of view of the stylistic technique of the French language, was not sufficient for encompassing discursive modalities that are as specific as those Voloshinov observed in the German and Russian languages, enabling its examination in others. In his studies, he discovered instantiations which, considered to be the historical-conceptual limits, were constituted as true challenges to the possibilities of uttering the discourse of the other in its variety and diversity. With this, if the theoretical instruments available moved in the sense of objectively systematizing the processes of transmission of speech, thoughts, and feelings of the characters by the narrator, Voloshinov took a detour to examine the verbal process of discursive creation in the complexity of its refractions responsible for confrontations from the web of citations. When he recovered studies and instantiations that were situated on the border between characters’ direct discourse, and the indirect discourse of the narrator, or the direct discourse of the characters and the direct discourse of the narrator, he caught sight of discursive behaviors that were of no effect in the framework categorized by the stylistic technique that justifies the free indirect discourse. Proposing the notion of quasi-direct discourse and quasi-indirect discourse was his hypothesis for understanding the dialogical relations occasioned in the impasse between reported speech and citation. In the final analysis: his analytical method did nothing more than seek to avoid projecting the movement between reflection and refraction, maintaining, consequently, the theoretical coherence of its system of ideas constructed around the notion of the ideological sign. Not for naught, all of his critical metalanguage is directed to reaching the ideologeme - a concept that expresses the discursive dialogism in the process of active reception of the discourse of the other that operates in the sphere of forming awareness from where the constructive possibilities for critical thought emanate.

Recuperating the procedures of this precious investigation, as well as its propositions and discoveries, registering the merit and the current relevance of Voloshinov’s thinking, is the great challenge that the reading of the last chapter of his book poses us. Those who thought that the ideological sign, which opens the volume, was the only introductory innovation of the book certainly degusted the magnitude of its gran finale.

Emergence of the Quasi-Direct Discourse as a Form of Enunciative Refraction

Readers of Voloshinov know that his methodology does not dispense detailed examination of primary sources, be they literary, historical or theoretical works. With these he constructs investigative paths of propositions oriented by the objectification of the problem to be examined, supported, thus, by arguments difficult to contest. In the study of the “несобственная прямая речь” [“nesobstvennaia priamaia retch”] - or quasi-direct discourse as we shall heretofore refer to it - the methodology was no different. From the beginning of his argument, he clearly, concisely, and precisely elaborates, the problem of critical-theoretical concerns: the need to reposition a new discursive form that is insinuated between reported speech and the narrative report creating an unexpected relation between these, modifying the character of the interaction itself in the creative process.

To this end, he discusses with theorists from the Vosslerian and the Saussurean8 traditions of German and French scholars who have dedicated themselves to the examination of the problems of transmission, above all, from the point of view of narrative representation, and subjective expression. He situates different demands of the prose, and the process of development of the forms of discursive transmission in the report with regard to the challenge of uttering different enunciative constructions. Subsequently, he discovers distinctions between the approaches that treat the discursive formations as representations supported in the transmission, and those that can be understood as utterance/E from a diversity of voices irreducible to a single narrative focus. In processes of this nature the utterance/E is configured clearly as the presentation of concrete utterances - those produced in a communicative situation that comprehends the semiotic instantiations realized in word, and organized by surrounding dispositions. In the third chapter of his book, he works with these distinctions, and conceptual formulations without fixating on the theoretical framework that is consecrated in the West, fomenting the stylistic categories that are the fundamental reference for the analysis of the forms of transmission.

Aligned with his premises regarding the ideological sign, and in sync with the Bakhtinian circle’s scholarly praxis with respect to verbal creation in the context of prose developed through written culture, distant and distinct, however, from the epic world of the oral narrative, Voloshinov begins his reasoning historically situating the discursive conquests in which he learned to distinguish between the “discourse of one” and the “discourse of other,” and that is seen as faced with the challenge of not just transmitting the discursive plurality, but also consolidating forms of composition conjugated to the enunciative web. He introduces, thus, A. Tobler’s notion from the studies of Romance Philology, and formulates ways of conceptual apprehension of this process in the work, when observing the emergence of utterances/E that are poorly accommodated, whether as direct discourse, or indirect discourse, given that they are not presented as mere transmission. With a lack of more pertinent premises, Tobler understands it’s a manifestation of a mixture between discourses, which Voloshinov ponders in the following:

The first mention of quasi-direct discourse as a special form for reporting an utterance, on a par with direct and indirect discourse, was made by Tobler in 1887 (Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie [Journal of Romance Philology], Xl, 437). […] This mixed form, according to Tobler, derives its tone and word order from direct discourse and its verbal tenses and persons from indirect discourse.

As pure description, this definition may be considered acceptable. Indeed, from the superficial viewpoint of the comparative descriptive of features, Tobler has accurately indicated the resemblances and differences between the form in question and direct and indirect discourse.

But the word “mixture” in the definition is completely unacceptable, since it entails a genetic explanation - “formed from a mixture of” - which can hardly be proved. And even in its purely descriptive way, the definition is faulty inasmuch as what we have in quasi-direct discourse is not a simple mechanical mixture or arithmetical sum of two forms but a completely new, positive tendency in active reception of another person’s utterance, a special direction in which the dynamics of the interrelationship between reporting and reported speech moves. But Tobler is deaf to dynamics and registers only the abstract features of patterns (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.142; italics in original).9

Voloshinov understands, thus, that Tobler had glimpsed a new discursive phenomenon whose fundamental trace was the active perception of the discourse of the other in a qualified transmission that sows the soil of discursive bivocality as a procedure of verbal creativity. This understanding, however, was not taken into consideration in general, and, historically, at the turn of the century, there emerges a discursive systemization that, without being informed by this active perception of the discourse of the other, consolidates its premises in stylistics. In 1912, Charles Bally, attentive to the stylistic distinctions of prose, developed by Gustave Flaubert in his novel Madame Bovary (1857), conceptualizes the elaboration oriented not by the speech of the prose of everyday life, but by the emergent prose of the written text, which suggests to him the configuration of a stylistic procedure. It is only there that the discourse, which is neither direct nor indirect, is conceptualized as “free indirect style.”

Bally’s understanding, according to which free indirect discourse is characterized as a form of thought10 is valuable to a dialogic approach, and Voloshinov does not ignore how important this contribution is, as the following excerpt attests:

Bally points out, furthermore, that this variant of indirect discourse - which he appropriately enough terms style indirect libre - is not an inert form but a form in motion, moving toward direct discourse as its furthest extreme. In particularly intensive cases, Bally claims, it is sometimes difficult to say where style indirect libre leaves off and style direct begins (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, pp.144-145; italics in original).11

However, throughout the study, this is the one time that Voloshinov nominally cites style indirect libre (free direct style). To deal with the problem of his concerns - or the phenomenon as he refers to it - he uses the previously mentioned “nesobstvennaia priamaia retch.” This distinctive employment reveals not merely a terminological adjustment, but the need to comprehend a new discursive episteme in the realm of artistic creativity of verbal works, and secondly the process of the active perception of the discourse of the other.

The impasse is located, therefore, in the realm of a problematic situation. The context comprises the universe of the “emergence of prose” (KITTAY; GODZICH, 1987) - a founding mark of Western culture, and of the constitution of its “empire of signs” (borrowing an expression from Roland Barthes). It does not deal only with the consecration of writing, but of different movements of metalanguage that took on the expansion and transformation in systems of signs of another nature: reading, interpretation, intonation, rhythms, value accents, graphic signs, cartography, etc. (FELDMAN, 1995, pp.55-74; KITTAY, 1995, pp.179-186; OLSON, 1995a, pp.163-178; 1995b, pp.267-286). In this universe of prose emerges the demand not just to transmit oral utterance/E, but to represent it in writing, or rather, to create spaces for its manifestation and expansion as an artistic procedure for enunciative creation. Oral utterance/E that is not only speech, but dialogue, thought, discursive replica not always vocalized, but never deprived of rhythms, and intonational accents, oblige the written prose to submit to many refractions of a semiotic universe of potential expansion. Voloshinov showed himself to be attentive to all of this context, and to continually scrutinize Bally’s formulations, given they rely on the stylistics of the phrase, taken in its technical-grammatical structure, the capacity to express the discursive expression through the angles of its manifestation of the prose. Neither does he hold to the primacy of the indirect discourse of the narrator to encompass the complexity of what is classified as character discourse. In fact, this limitation is figured as incongruent, which fuels his indignation with respect to the formations that fuel the conflict between reported speech and the citation.

Considered mentor of the conceptions founded in abstract objectivism, such as those presented in the second part of the book, Bally’s formulations - disciple of Saussure, author of Cours de linguistique générale [Course in General Linguistics] (1916) - are examined by Voloshinov with many reservations. In light of his studies of historical-theoretical sources, he affirms that Bally incurred an error in understanding the construction of the indirect discourse of the German language as equivalent to the quasi-direct discourse of the French language, as can be seen in his reasoning:

Bally is also wrong in taking the German indirect discourse construction of his second type to be analogous to French quasi-direct discourse. It is extremely symptomatic mistake. Bally’s analogy is irreproachable from the standpoint of abstract Grammar, but from the standpoint of socioverbal tendency, the comparison cannot hold up under criticism. After all, one and the same social-verbal tendency (dictaded by identical socioeconomic conditions) in different languages may, in accordance with the grammatical structures of those languages, appear with different outer features. In any particular language, what begins to undergo modification in a certain specific direction is precisely that pattern which turns out to be the most adaptable in the necessary regard. In French it was the pattern of indirect discourse, in German and Russian - direct discourse (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.146).12

Faced with the error involving forms whose expression in prose undergoes variations in consequence of the concrete utterances of the different linguistic cultures in their sociodiscursive formation, Voloshinov understands that it is difficult to ignore the property of the variant of the quasi-direct discourse, emphasizing, not a mixture, but the intonation capable of apprehending the social dimension. Besides this, in his analyses, he examines how distant from the French the quasi-direct discourse in German appears and how much it approximates the Russian form, which leads him to infer that:

In actual fact, however, the abstract system of language where Bally’s formes linguistíques are to be found, is devoid of any movement, any life, any achievement. Life begins only at the point where utterance crosses utterance, i.e. where verbal interaction begins, be it even “face to face” verbal interaction, but mediated, literary variety (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.145).13

If there is no rationale for considering Bally’s approach within the same conceptual sphere as Voloshinov, there is no rationale impeding us from supposing that, returning to the problem of the “nesobstvennaia priamaia retch,” Voloshinov was not envisioning it as a mere correlation of the stylistic resource that Bally had conceived as free indirect discourse. The problem of his investigation was focused on concrete utterances that do not report categories, but the dialogical realizations of the discourse of verbal creation whose intonational force of the values liberate them from the limits of transmission, emphasizing the process of active reception of the other. Besides the possibility of scrambling the sources of emission - narrator and character - it bivocalizes what is presented as direct discourse without identifying the voice. With this, the quasi-direct discourse is constituted in a discursive modality that is not limited nor confused with free indirect discourse, letting escape utterances/E of the direct voice. This constitutes an emergent modality as a cultural and discursive form in the context of the prose that expands, complexifying the utterance/E that is developed on the borderline between orality and writing, thought and voice. A true challenge for the communicative process of transmission.

Voloshinov’s argument is nurtured by other historical formulations against which he examines Bally’s concepts. He relies the work of the Vosselerian Ettienne Lorck, Die Erlebte Rede (1921), who “defined quasi-direct discourse as ‘experienced speech’ (erlebte Rede),” which is distinguished from “direct discourse, defined as ‘repeated speech’” (gesprochene Rede) and from “indirect discourse - ‘communicated speech’ (berichtete Rede)” (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.147). Therefore, we are dealing with experienced discourse (Erlebnis), which is impossible to be transmitted to a third party once the enunciative scene, and the intonational environment in the experience is not communicable to a third party. In the situation of a scene from a monologue in Faust,14 cited by Lorck, it is possible to reach the subtle distinction of the experience as concrete utterance of the utterance/E.

Uttered in the first person, the phrase of the monologue is the following: “Habe nun, ach! Philosophie/Juristerei […]/Durchaus studiert mit heifem Bemühn.” [“I have, alas! studied Philosophy, / Jurisprudence and Medicine, too, / And worst of all, theology / with keen endeavor, through and through”] (GOETHE, 1963, p.93).15 In his or her experience, mediated by the perception, the listener transforms the utterance/e into the third person: “Faust has studied, alas! Philosophie.” If the listener is to pass on to Faust’s monologue, heard and mediated by his perceptive experience, he can: repeat the quotation from direct discourse [“I have, alas! studied Philosophy”]; utter the quote in the indirect discourse [“Faust says he has unfortunately studied philosophy!”]; or even the free indirect speech [“Faust had studied, what a misfortune!”].16 Even though the examples are stylistically justified, the experience to what the conception is referred to is not maintained, and undergoes refractions. Recuperating it would require that the discursive forms resonated one with the other in the name of the very dramaturgy that sustains it, as can be seen in the following.

Indeed, for an artist in process of creation, the figures of his fantasies are the realest of realities; he not only sees them, he hears them, as well. He does not make them speak (as in direct discourse), he hears them speaking. And this living impression of voices heard as if in a dream can be directly expressed only in the form of quasi-direct discourse. It is fantasy’s own form. And that explains why it was in the fable world of La Fontaine that the form was first given tongue and why it is the favorite device of such artists as Balzac and especially Flaubert, artists wholly able to immerse and lose themselves in the created world of their own fantasies.

And the artist, when he uses this form, also addresses himself only to the reader's fantasy. I t is not his aim to communicate facts or the content of thought with its help; he desires only to convey his impressions directly, to arouse in the reader's mind living figures and representations. He addresses himself not to the reader's intellect, but to his imagination. Only the reasoning and analyzing intellect can take the position that the author is speaking in quasi-direct discourse; for the living fantasy, it is the hero who speaks. Fantasy is the mother of the form (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.148).17

In Lorck’s view of the discursive form, the one manifested, is basically supported by the experience, and by what emanates from it as fantasy, which shows, according to Voloshinov, the tendency to consider discourse as a “living organism” / a “living occurrence”/ (energeia) (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.146; VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.148).

The formulations originating from the works centered on the analysis of the realizations in which the discursive forms are confronted with the expressive, communicative and perceptive needs, mediated by the distinct experiences, lead Voloshinov to seek the history of these discursive forms that are transformed in different enunciative process, initially in the French tradition and later in the German, beginning with the medieval period.

An important mark of this investment was the discovery that remote examples in the French language show that the narrative discourse does not clearly distinguish the discourse of the author, and the citation of the character. Without grammatical options for this, the narrative discourse does not guarantee the rigor of an authorial discourse that is aware of its limits as a carrier of discourses, and as a filter of the transmission of the discourses of others. They are insinuated in the uses practiced in this era, instructive clues to the construction of a discursive environment of the formations that it denominates “nesobstvennaia-priamaia retch,” as illustrated in the following excerpt.

In Old French, psychological and grammatical constructions were far from being as sharply distinguished as they are now. Paratactic and hypotactic components could still be mixed together in a great many different ways. Punctuation was still in its embryonic stage. Therefore, no clearly marked boundaries between direct discourse and indirect discourse existed then. The Old French storyteller was as yet unable to separate the figures of his fantasy from his own “I.” He participated in their words and actions from within, operating as their intercessor and advocate. He had not as yet learned to transmit another person’s words in their literal, outward shape, eschewing personal involvement and interference. The Old French temperament still stood far removed from dispassionate, cogitative observation and objective judgment. However, this dissolving of narrator into his characters in Old French was not only the result of the storyteller’s free choice, but also came about of necessity: firm logical and syntactic forms for distinct, mutual demarcation were lacking. And so, quasi-direct discourse first appears in Old French on the basis of this grammatical deficiency and not as a free stylistic device. Quasi-direct discourse in this instance is the result of the simple grammatical incapacity of the author to separate his own point of view, his own position, from that of his characters (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.150; our italics).18

If, in the Medieval times, the transmission of the alien discourse is practically inexistent, in the Renaissance it becomes intuitive since the narrator is aligned with his/her characters in a more intimate fashion. However, the personalization of the alien discourse would only occur in the 17th century when indirect discourse is organized with rules of modality and tense. The use of the imperfect marks the distinction with the present tense of the direct discourse, marking, thus, the independence of an authorial discourse. Thus, there is favorable ground configured for the appearance of the quasi-direct discourse, conceived as a demand for the distinction and coordination of the actions through time (consecutio temporum). This is the path that led Voloshinov to consider the importance of the emblematic creation of La Fontaine, as evidenced in his formulation.

The device of quasi-direct discourse, which so neatly surmounted the dualism of abstract analysis and unmediated impression, bringing them into harmonious consonance, proved very suitable for the fabulist La Fontaine. Indirect discourse was too analytical and inert. Direct discourse, though able to recreate another person’s utterance dramatically, was incapable of creating, at the same time, a stage for that utterance, a mental and emotional milieu for its perception (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.151).19

There is something revealing in the recuperation of these processes in the march of history that directly addresses the problem examined by Voloshinov: focused on the context of its historical development, the discursive forms show structural transformations that manifest different levels of maturation. Opposing the stylistic premises that consecrate free indirect discourse in the 20th century, and delineated in the realm of its constitution in the processes of transmission, the phenomenon of the form understood as “nesobstvennaia-priamaia retch,” evokes a framework of discursive possibilities whose development is not separated from the internal contradictions of its own constituents. While the forms of transmission permit a disjunctive categorization, the unstable forms of quasi-direct discourse move in a conjunctive way in the sense of overcoming its own limits. We are faced with a very significant argument for the analysis of phenomena that Voloshinov had taken on as a challenge (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.148; VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.150).

Nonetheless, Voloshinov considers the importance of the discursive creation in La Fontaine, which differs from Lorck’s presuppositions, since these are manifested as representations of experiences that, through language, become expressions of the life of the psyche. Voloshinov’s reasoning runs in the opposite direction: it considers that the discourse is not a lived experience, but an experience of language capable of reacting actively to the discourse of the other.

Ideologeme as a Process of Active Recreation of the Discourse of the Other

Without conceding the primacy nor the abstract stylistic categories supported by grammatical resources, nor the discursive forms such as expression of emotional and psychic experiences in a broad way, Voloshinov’s investigation is distinct from the studies based only on transmission and, in a way, representation. On the horizon of his indignation, only the need to understand the processes by which reported speech interacts with the citation is presented, showing the tensions that the speaker employs within his/her own discourse, when his/her speech becomes bivocalized. A discursive experience is then configured, orchestrated by the evaluative accents of intonations that denounce the active reaction of the discourse of the other. Although they are developed, in the majority of cases, as inner discourse, it is not the expression of lived experience, but the manifestation of self-awareness.

We are a long way from understanding the active reaction in the limits of discursive transmission and reception. The field of forces of the active reaction to the discourse of others is manifest as a struggle between reported speech and citation, while simultaneously showing the dislocation of the focus, centered on lived experience, to the immersion of the living world of discursive experiences of utterances/e in interaction.20

In Voloshinov’s work, the analytical process of comprehension of the active reaction to the discourse of the other relies on the context of its analysis to the ideological sign, when re-dimensioning in the word the texture of its inflections in the realm of dialogue, thanks to the forces that act in the field of its realization: the process of reflection and refraction of the ideas. At the impasse between reported speech and citation, the active reaction to the discourse of the other accentuates positionings that Voloshinov understood as authentic constitution of the “ideologeme.” With this concept, he designates the culmination of the process of self-awareness that emerges in the active reaction, and is constituted as valuative accentuation. In the segment in which he introduces the concept of ideologeme in his text, he considers self-awareness as a personality that develops itself with verbal reactions in different contexts of ideological production, as seen in the following excerpt.

The inner subjective personality with its own self-awareness does not exist as a material fact, usable as a basis for causal explanation, but it exists as an ideologeme. The inner personality, with all its subjective intentions and all its inner depths, is nothing but an ideologeme - an ideologeme that is vague and fluid in character until it achieves definition in the more stable and more elaborated products of ideological creativity. Therefore, it is nonsense to try to explain ideological phenomena and forms with the aid of subjective psychic factors and intentions: that would mean explaining an ideologeme of greater clarity and precision with another ideologeme of a vaguer, more muddled character (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, pp.152-153).21

Besides affirming the comprehension of the ideologeme as active reaction of the process of self-awareness, Voloshinov breaks out his weightier argument against linguistic studies based on the stylistics and impressionism of the utterances/E that, incapable of understanding the complexity of the processes which they analyze, end up creating categories that merely contribute to banalizing conflicts and tensions of discursive points of view, without which any dialogue is constituted.

From the view point of its discursive refractions, the analysis of the discursive relationships from the ideologeme addresses the confrontations when, “[…] in the forms of reported speech, language itself reacts to personality as the bearer of the word” (VOLOŠINOV, 1986, p.153).22 This deals with a development that elevated verbal prose to artistic elaboration, since the citation clearly mainifests as “phonic embodiment of reported speech displayed by the author’s context” (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.156; italics in original).23 Given this, the ideologeme is presented as an analytical device of apprehension, not of a category, or a classification, but of a discursive occurrence, whose communicational character is configured by the play of forces of the discursive relations in dialogue.

The presupposition of bivocality between citation and reported speech was not considered in studies by Lorck and Lerch, who, for Voloshinov, are the theorists who most closely approximate the experience of discourse with a double intonation. However, they lack consideration of the evaluative character of the intonations that are confronted in the discourse. On this point, Voloshinov infers:

Both Lorck and Lerch alike fail to take into account one factor of extreme importance for the understanding of our phenomenon: the value judgment inherent in every living word and brought out by the accentuation and expressive intonation of an utterance. Message in speech does not exist outside its living and concrete accentuation and intonation. In quasi-direct discourse, we recognize another person’s utterance not so much in terms of its message, abstractly considered, but above all in terms of the reported character’s accentuation and intonation, in terms of the evaluative orientation of his speech.

We perceive the author’s accents and intonation being interrupted by these value judgments of another person. And that is the way, as we know, in which quasi-direct discourse differs from substituted discourse, where no new accents vis-à-vis the surrounding authorial context appear (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.155).24

From the bivocalized intonation arises not only a discursive texture of the play between reported speech and citation, from which it is possible to reach the refractions of human existence in their socio-historical conditions. In this framework, the discursive form of the ideologeme is also translated both by the discursive semiosis, and by the projection of the embodied idea in its intonation, being projected, consequently, as a tri-dimensional form that is manifested in the time/space of its configuration. In general terms, it is from this refracted intonational tri-dimensionality in the discourse that active reaction of the play between reported speech and citation is addressed in the verbal work of Dostoyevsky, rigorously examined in detail by M. M. Bakhtin in the polyphonic weaving of inner discourse created by the Russian writer.

That is to say that, from the point of view of the ideologeme, defined as active reaction to the discourse of the other, the inner discourse - of the sensitive, imprecise, speculative ideas - transcend the limit of free indirect discourse. First, it does not fit in the limits of indirect discourse; secondly, it evokes a speech-in-direct; thirdly, if it is put in the tradition of the discourse that does not know its limits in the field of an author and takes it to its ultimate consequences, the bivocality of the utterances/e arrives at the polyphony in the intonational confrontation of the many accents. Thus, Voloshinov qualifies his understanding of quasi-direct discourse as investigative phenomena of verbal creation that does not shy from confronting the irreverence of the discourses of creation.

By no means does quasi-direct discourse express a passive impression received from another's utterance. It expresses, instead, an active orientation, and not one that merely amounts to a shift of person from first to third, but one that imposes upon the reported utterance its own accents, which collide and interfere with the accents in the reported utterance. Nor can we agree with Lorck in his contention that quasi- direct discourse is the form of reported speech closest to direct reception and experience of another person's speech. Each form of reported speech perceives the speech to be reported in its own particular way (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, pp.154-155).25

While it is not proposed as a category, quasi-direct discourse gains the status of a discursive form by which the idologeme can be examined. Besides the bivocality between the intonation and the authorial context and that which marks the character’s discourse, examined in the analysis of an excerpt by Pushkin, Voloshinov considers that the accents and intonations can interact to provoke isolation in which one observes a dislocation of the authorial discourse. In situations such as this,

The reported speech will begin to sound as if it were in a play where there is no embracing context and where the character’s lines confront other lines by other characters without any grammatical concatenation. Thus relations between reported speech and authorial content, via absolute acting out, take a shape analogous to the relations between alternating lines in dialogues. Thereby the author is put on a level with his character, and their relationship is dialogized. From all this, it necessarily follows that the absolute acting out of reported speech, where a work of fiction is read aloud, is admissible only in the rarest cases (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.157).26

Concluding that the quasi-direct discourse is not category, modality, and much less stylistic technique does not mean we have reached the magnitude of Voloshinov’s formulation with regard what is referred to as the generation of the process of social interaction from the basic material of the word, understood as the ideological sign par excellence. Aware that there are various investigative paths on which to approximate the phenomenon analyzed, Voloshinov opted to seek the social generation of the word in the philosophy of the word, and, particularly, in the history of the word in the word. Or rather, as he states in one of the formulations that, based on Lorck can be taken as paradigmatic thought that closes the study about “the word that really means and takes responsibility for what it says” (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.159).27

Conclusion

Voloshinov’s reasoning is dense, and its full reach is beyond the scope of the few lines of our essay. The dilemma regarding the emergence of the discourse analyzed here, if not entirely resolved, is at least presented in the rigor and complexity of the author’s perspective. The problem Voloshinov apprehended and formulated is far from being just a matter of choices in translation or adjusting terminology. On the one hand, it deals with the perception that relating the discourse of another involves difficulties that are not resolved in the linguistic sphere, but they report the problems of utterance/E of concrete semiotic experiences. On the other hand, it implies the investigation of a new phenomenon in the studies that move beyond the transmission, toward full-valence of the discursive bivocality of the dialogue. In this sense, we are faced with, in fact, a new episteme in discourse studies, in their interactive processes, in the dialogical relations, and, particularly, in the verbal creativity wherever it is manifest. These relations, we insist, extrapolate the limits of transmission and reception, and are configured as utterance citation steeped in the contrasting weaving of its own intonations. Here, citation is not to be confused with transmission exceeding the field of authorial discursive performance with which it is confronted to manifest itself in the hybridism of the forms generated by the ideas. In the process of dialogical communication, the transit of the discursive exchanges is constituted as the dialogical powers that are or can be seen as “ideologemes” in dialogical relations to their ideologues.

Voloshinov does not propose a modality, nor a category, but discovers a phenomenon potentially responsible for an episteme. Of this, he proved to be fully aware, as demonstrated in his frank testimony, strategically presented at the end of his essay:

We are perfectly well aware of the shortcomings of our study and can only hope that the very posing of the problem of the word in word has crucial importance. The history of truth, the history of artistic veracity, and the history of language can benefit considerably from a study of the refractions of their basic phenomenon - the concrete utterance - in constructions of language itself (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.158; italics in original).28

Voloshinov completes with this thought his “answer to the science of language of the 19th-20th centuries” (GRILLO, 2017, pp.7-79),29 rigorously carrying out the analysis of the fundamental problems of the theoretical approaches consecrated, without hesitating in exposing their most problematic conceptual limits. As a response, the result of the investigations remains coherent with the elementary presuppositions of the dialogical understanding of the phenomena of language in the potential extension of its verbal creativity.

TN: The terms “enunciação,” “enunciado” and “enunciado concreto” are translated here and throughout the text as “utterance/E,” “utterance/e,” and “concrete utterance” respectively, to distinguish them according to the author’s meaning, as an act, as a thing, and as a specific thing modified as concrete as explained in footnote 2.

2Utterance/E, utterance/e, and concrete utterance are correlated concepts, but not equivalent, as different theories have already elucidated (TODOROV, 1970; BRAIT; MELO, 2005, pp.78; DE OLMOS, 2006, pp.91-97; SOUZA, 1999). In the present study, utterance/E is employed in the broad sense of dialogic realization of the interactive manifestations in the act of life experience (MACHADO, 1995, pp.311; 337). It is not restricted, however, to the verbal, but encompasses the broader socio-cultural communicative semiosis. For example, the studies of utterance/E consecrated film studies in the cinema (SIMON; VERNET, 1983, p.38). On the one hand, when the analysis refers to utterance/e its objective is to focus, insofar as is possible, on the unit of the verbal interaction in the process of its realization as language. On the other hand, concrete utterance designates and distinguishes that which in the interaction is discursive realization: the discourse, in all of its capacity, is the conceptual nucleus of the concrete utterance.

3In Portuguese: “o discurso voltado para o objeto, o discurso objetificado dos personagens e o discurso orientado para o discurso do outro.”

4In Portuguese: “Enquanto em Marxismo e filosofia da linguagem aborda-se o segundo tipo, Bakhtin dedica-se às diferentes modalidades de discurso bivocal (estilização, parodia, skaz etc.) As duas obras parecem participar de um projeto comum de estudar as formas de discurso que têm dupla orientação: para o objeto de sentido e para o discurso do outro.”

5We further clarify that by ideological sign we mean the refractions of the word to constitute itself as discourse in the context of enunciation. In this sense, the conceptual key lies in the confrontation between points of view, tensing any conciliatory tendency. The ideologeme refers to the realization of the concrete discourse of the word situated in the enunciative field, having as a conceptual key the distinction of its accents and intonations. In this sense, the ideologeme is the construction of the ideologue responsible for the speech he enunciates.

6In Portuguese: “discurso indireto livre.”

7To examine Voloshinov’s premise, the present essay is informed by comparative versions, relying primarily on the Russian text by Voloshinov of 1929-1930 published in 1972 by Mouton; to the English version of 1973, with the preface by the author from 1929; to the Portuguese version of 2017 which is based on the two editions - 1929 and 1930. We also consult the French translation of 1977, on which the first Portuguese version in 1979 was based. Complete bibliographic data is cited in the references.

8Trends constituted around Karl Vossler (1872-1949), representative of German idealism or idealist subjectivism; and Ferdinand Saussure (1857-1913) linked to abstract objectivism. Voloshinov discusses both in the second part of his book. For a study on the insertion of these two lines of thought in the works of Voloshinov, see Grillo (2017, pp.7-80).

9In Russian: “Явление несобственной прямой речи, как особой формы передачи чужого высказывания, рядом с прямой и косвенной речью, было впервые указано Tobler'ом в 1887 г. (в Zeitschr. f. roman. Philol., XI, S. 437). Он определил, что явление, как “своеобразное смешение прямой и косвенной речи” (“Eigentumliche Mischung direktеr und indirekter Redem”). Из прямой речи эта смешанная форма заимствует, по Tobler'у, тон и порядок слов, а из косвенной - времена и лица глаголов. Как чисто описательное, это определение может быть принято. Действительно, с точки зрения поверхностного сравнительного описания признаков, соответствующие различия и сходства данной формы с прямою и косвенною речью Tobler'ом указаны правильно. Но слово «смешение» в данном определении совершенно неприемлемо, так как включает генетическое объяснение - “образовалось из смешения», что едва ли может быть доказано. Да и чисто описательно оно неверно, ибо перед нами не простое механическое смешение или арифметическое сложение двух форм, но совершенно новая, положительная тенденция активного восприятия чужого высказывания, особое направление динамики взаимоотношения авторской и чужой речи. Но этой динамики Tobler не слышит, констатируя лишь абстрактные приЗнаки шаблонов” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, pp.139-140).

10We know that the comprehension of free indirect discourse was developed by Charles Bally in the analysis of the stylistic techniques in the novels of Gustave Flaubert and Emile Zola, published in the essay that became a classic: Le style indirecte libre en français modern - (Free indirect style in modern French). In this essay, according to Othon Garcia (1971, p.128), “Bally called attention to the new technique, until then ignored by grammars,” recognizing in it “a form of thought” that was unreachable for grammatical forms (BALLY, 1912, p.605 apudGARCIA, 1971, p.128, note 46). The conceptual proposition would be consecrated from 1926 on, when Marguerite Lips wrote an essay about Le style indirecte libre - Free indirect style, formulating the basis of the concept (GARCIA, 1971, p.128), definitively marking the French linguistic style that had been generally consecrated in the West.

11In Russian: [...] Bally указывает что эта разновидность косвенной речи, которую он и называет соответственно style indirесt librе, не является застывшею формой, а находится в движении, стремясь к прямой речи, как к своему пределу. В найболее выразительных случаях, по ваllу, трудно бывает определить, где кончается «style indirесt libre» и начинается «style direct» (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.142).

12In Russian: “Не прав Ваllу и тогда, когда он указывает в качестве аналогии французской несобственной прямой речи на немецкую косвенную конструкцию второго типа. Эта ошибка его чрезвычайно характерна. С точки брения абстрактно-грамматической аналогия Ваllу безукоризненна, но c tочки зрения социально-речевой тенденции это сопоставление не выдерживает критики. Ведь одна и та же социально-речевая тенденци (oпределяемая одними и теми же социально-экономическими условиями) в различных языках, в зависимости от их грамматических структур, может проявиться в различных внешних признаках. В том или ином языкe начинает модифицироваться в определенном направлении именнo тот шаблон, который оказывается наиболее гибким в данном отношeнии. Таким во французском языке оказался шаблон косвенной речи, в немецком и русском - прямой речи” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.143).

13In Russian: “На самом деле, в абстрактной системе языка, где даны fоrmеѕ linguistiques Bally, нет движения, нет жизни, нет свершения. Жизнь начинастся лишь там, где сходится высказывание с высказыванием, т. е. там, где начинается речевое взаимодействие, хотя бы и не непосредстесное, ‘лицом к лицу’, а опосредствованное, литературное” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.143).

14GOETHE, J. Faust. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Anchor Books, 1963.

15For reference, see footnote 14.

16In Russian (a) and in English (b) versions we find only the synthesis of the thought. (a) “Если теперь слушатель захочет передать другому, третьему, услыанную и пережитую им речь Фауста, то он приведет ее или дословно в прямой форме: ‘Habe пип, асh! Philosophie’... или же в косвенной: ‘Faust, dass er leider’ или: ‘Er hat leider’... Если же он сам для себя пожелает вызвать в своей душе живое впечатление пережитой сцены, то он вспомнит; ‘Faust hat пип, асh, Philosophie’... или же, так как дело идет о прошлых впечатлениях: ‘Faust hatte nun, achl’” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.145). (b) “But if he should desire to summon up for himself in his own mind the living impression on the scene experienced, he will recall it as: ‘Faust hat nun, ach! Philosophie…’ or, inasmuch as it is a case of impressions in the past, ‘Faust hatte nun, ach!...’” (VOLOŠINOV, 1973, p.147).

17In Russian: “В самом деле, для художника в процессе творчества образы его фантазий являются самою реальностью; он не только видит их, но и слышит. Он не заставляет их говорить (как в прямой речи), он слышит их говорящими. И это живое впечатление от как бы во сне услышанных голосов может быть непосредственно выражено только в форме несобственной прямой речи. Это - форма самой фантазии. Потому-то она и зазвучала впервые в сказочном мире Лафонтена, потому-то она и является излюбленным приемом таких художников, как Бальзак и oсобенно Флобер, способных совершенно погрузиться и забыться в созданном их фантазией мире. И художник, употребляя эту форму, обращается тоже только в фантазии читателя. Он не стремится сообщить с ее помощью какихлибо фактов или содержания мышления, он хочет лишь непосредственно передать свои впечатления, пробудить в душе читателя живые образы и представления. Он обращается не к рассудку, но к воображению. Только с точки зрения рассуждающего и анализирующего рассудка в несобственной прямой речи говорит автор, для живой фантазии говорит герой. Фантазия - мать этой формы” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, pp.145-146).

18In Russian: “В старо-французском языке психологические и грамматические конструкции еще далеко не столь строго различались, как теперь. Паратаксические и гипотаксические сочетания еще многообразно переменнивались. Пунктуация находилась еще в зачатке. Поэтому не было рекзких границ между прямой и косвенною речью. Старо-французский рассказчик еще не умеет отделить образов своей фантазии от своего собственного «я». Он внутренне участвует в их поступках и словах, выступает, как их ходатай и защитник. Он еще не научился передавать слова другого в их дословном внешнем виде, воздерживаясь от собственного участия и вмешательства. Его старо-французский темперамент еще далек от спокойного, созерцательного наблюдения и объективного суждения. Однако, это растворение рассказчика в своих героях в старо-французском языке является не только результатом его свободного выбора, но и необходимости: отсутствовали строгие логические и синтаксические формы для отчетливого взаиморазграничения. И вот на почве этого грамматического недостатка, а не как свободный стилистический прием, и появляется впервые в старо-французском языке несобственная прямая речь. Здесь она - результат простого грамматического неумения отделить свою точку зрения, свою позицию от позиции своих героев” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.148).

19In Russian: “Баснописцу Лафонтену очень подходил этот прием несобственной прямой речи, столь счастливо преодолевающей дуализм абстрактного анализа и непосредственного впечатления, приводя их к гармоничному созвучию. Косвенная речь слишком аналитична и мертвенна. Прямая же речь, хотя она и воссоздает драматически чужое высказывание, не способна одновременно же создать и сцену для него, душевное эмоциональное milieu для его восприятия” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.149).

20It behooves us to remember the importance of the concept of Erfahrung in Walter Benjamin’s conception presented in his classic study of the storyteller. Understood as experience of a knowledge dialogically constructed by different generations in productions of language (narratives in the form of stories, fables, sagas, parables, proverbs, etc.), the Erfahrung is constituted as a type of historical-cultural atavism, distinct, however, from lived experience (Erlebnis), which does not imply the mediation of language, but only expressing behaviors. According to Benjamin, modernity, by giving excessive value to lived experience (Erlebnis), threatens experience (Erfahrung), which was aggravated with the post-war, practically annihilating the capacity to narrate through this memory of a common past of many to be transmitted to innumerable others (BENJAMIN, 2002, pp.143-144). The Benjaminian concept of Erfahrung resounds in the notion of active reception conceived by Voloshinov, accentuated its character of dialogical interdiscursive realization and how historico-cultural and socio-discursive experience of the language that is not limited to experiences lived out. [BENJAMIN, W. The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of Nikolai Leskov. In: BENJAMIN, W. Selected Writings: Volume 3 - 1935-1938. Edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings; translated by Edmund Jephcott et al. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.]

21In Russian: “Внутренняя субьективная личность с ее собственным самосознанием дана не как материальный факт, могущий служить опорой для каузального объяснения, но как идеологема. Внутренняя личность, со всеми ее субъективными интенциями, со всеми ее внутренними глубинами только идеологема; и идеологема смутная и зыбкая, пока она не определит себя в ботее устойчивых и проработанных продуктах идеологического творчества. Поэтому бессмысленно объяснять какие-либо идеологические явления и формы с помощью субъективно-психических факторов и интенций: ведь это значит объяснять более ясную и отчетливую идеологему идеологемой же, но более смутной и сумбурной” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, pp.150-151).

22In Russian: “[...] в формах передачи чужой речи, сам язык реагирует на личность как на носительницу слова” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.152).

23In Russian: “Следовательно, не слово является выражением внутренней личности, а внутренняя личность есть выраженное или загнанное во внутрь слово” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.151).

24In Russian: “И Lorck и Lerch, оба одинаково не учитывают одного чрезвычайно важного для понимания нашего явления момента: оценки, заложенной в каждом живом слове и выражаемой акцентуацией и экспрессивной интонацией высказывания. Смысл речи не дан вне своей живой и конкретной акцентуации и интонации. В несобственной прямой речи мы узнаем чужое слово не столько по смыслу, отвлеченно взятому, но прежде всего по акцентуации и интонированию героя, по ценностному направлению речи. Мы воспринимаем, как эти чужие оценки перебивают авторские акценты и интонации. Этим и отличается, как мы знаем, несобственная прямая речь от замещенной речи, где никаких новых акцентов по отношению к окружающему авторскому контексту не появляется” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.153).

25In Russian: “Несобственная трямая речь вовсе не выражает пассивного впечатления от о чужого высказывания, но выражает активную ориентацию, отнюдь не сводяшуюся к перемене первого лица в третье, а вносящую свои акценты в чужое высказывание, которые сталкиваются и интерферируют здесь с акцентами чужого слова. [...] Каждая форма передачи чужой речи по-своему воспринимает чужое слово и активно его прорабатывает [...]” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, pp.152-153)

26In Russian: “Чужая речь начнет звучать как в драме, где нет объемлющего контекста и где репликам героя противостоят грамматически разобщенные сним реплики другого героя. Таким образом, путем абсолютного разыгрывания между чужою речью и авторским контекстом устанавливаются отношения, аналогичные отношению одной реплики к другой в диалоге. Этим автор ставится рядом с героем, и их отношения диалогизуются. Из всего этого с необходимостью вытекает, что абсолютное разыгрывание чужой речи при чтении вслух художественной прозы допустимо лишь в редчайших случаях” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.155).

27In Russian: “[...] только и возможно обновление идеологического слова, тематического, проникнутого уверенной и категорической социальной оценкой, серьезного и ответственного в своей серьезности слова” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.157).

28In Russian: “Мы отлично понимаем ее недостаточность и надеемся лишь на то, что самая постановка проблемы слова в слове имеет существенное значение. История истины, история художественной правды и история языка могут много выиграть от изучения преломлений их основного феномена - конкретного высказывания - в конструкциях самого языка” (ВОЛОШИНОВ, 1930/1972, p.156).

29In Portuguese: “resposta à ciência da linguagem do século XIX-XX.”

Translated by Jennifer Sarah Cooper - jennifersarahj@gmail.com

REFERENCES

BAKHTINE, M. M. (VOLOCHINOV). Le marxisme et la philosophie du langage. Essai d’appication de la méthode sociologique en linguistique. Trad. M. Yaguello. Paris: Minuit: 1977. [ Links ]

BALLY, C. Le style indirect libre en français moderne. In: Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift, 4, 1912, p.549-556. [ Links ]

BENJAMIN, W. O narrador. In: Sobre arte, técnica, linguagem e política. Trad. Manuel Alberto, Maria Amélia Cruz, Maria Luz Moita. Lisboa: Relógio d’Água, 1992, p.27-57. [ Links ]

BRAIT, B.; Melo, R. Enunciado / enunciado concreto / enunciação. In: BRAIT, B. (org.). Bakhtin: conceitos-chave. São Paulo: Contexto, 2005, p.61-78. [ Links ]

CÂMARA Jr., J. M. Estilo indireto livre em Machado de Assis. In: CÂMARA Jr., J. M. Ensaios machadianos. Rio de Janeiro: Ao Livro Técnico, 1979. [ Links ]

DE OLMOS, C. Enunciado. In: ARÁN, P. (org.). Nuevo diccionario de la teoría de Mijaíl Bajtín. Córdoba: Ferreyra Editor, 2006, p.91-97. [ Links ]

EISENSTEIN, S. Sobre O capote de Gogol. Trad. Paulo Bezerra. Revista USP, São Paulo, n. 176, jun./jul./ago., 1989, p.71-84. [ Links ]

FELDMAN, C. F. Metalinguagem oral. In: OLSON; D. V.; TORRANCE, N. (orgs.). Cultura escrita e oralidade. Trad. Valter Lellis Siqueira. São Paulo: Ática, 1995, p.55-74. [ Links ]

GARCIA, O.M. Comunicação em prosa moderna. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1971. [ Links ]

GRILLO, S.G. Marxismo e filosofia da linguagem: uma resposta à ciência da linguagem do século XIX e início do XX. In: VOLÓCHINOV, V.N. Marxismo e filosofia da linguagem: problemas fundamentais do método sociológico na ciência da linguagem. Trad. Sheila Grillo; Ekaterina Vólkova Américo. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2017, p.7-79. [ Links ]

GRILLO, S.V.G.; AMÉRICO, E. V. Valentín Niloláievitch Volóchinov: Detalhes da vida e da obra encontrados em arquivos. Alfa. Revista de Linguística. Araraquara, SP, v. 61, n. 2, 2017 p.255-281. Disponível: https://periodicos.fclar.unesp.br/alfa/article/view/8962/6735. Acesso: 18/07/2018. [ Links ]

KITTAY, J. Pensando em termos de cultura escrita. In: OLSON; D. V.; TORRANCE, N. (orgs.). Cultura escrita e oralidade. Trad. Valter Lellis Siqueira. São Paulo: Ática, 1995, p.179-186. [ Links ]

KITTAY, J.; GODZICH, W. The Emergence of Prose. An Essay in Prosaics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. [ Links ]

LIPS, M. Le style indirect libre. Paris: Payot, 1926. [ Links ]

LOCK, C. Double Voicing, Sharing Words: Bakhtin’s Dialogism and the History of the Theory of Free Indirect Discourse. In: Bruhn, J.; Lundquist, L. (orgs.). The Novelness of Bakhtin: Perspectives and Possibilities. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001. [ Links ]

MACHADO, I. A. O romance e a voz: a prosaica de Mikhail Bakhtin. Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1995. [ Links ]

MACHADO, I. Cinema como literatura: procedimentos e teorias à maneira dos russos. Estudos de Cinema. FAPESP/PEPG em Comunicação e Semiótica PUC-SP, n. 2, 1999, p.193-210. [ Links ]

OLSON, D. R. Cultura escrita e objetividade: o surgimento da ciência moderna. In: OLSON; D. V.; TORRANCE, N. (orgs.). Cultura escrita e oralidade. Trad. Valter Lellis Siqueira. São Paulo: Ática, 1995a, p.163-178. [ Links ]

OLSON, D. R. A escrita como atividade metalinguística. In: OLSON; D. V.; TORRANCE, N. (orgs.). Cultura escrita e oralidade. Trad. Valter Lellis Siqueira. São Paulo: Ática, 1995b, p.267-286. [ Links ]

SAUSSURE, F. Cours de linguistique générale. BALLY, C.; SECHEHAYE, A. (orgs.). Lausanne/Paris: Payot, 1916. [ Links ]

SAUSSURE, F. Curso de linguística geral. Trad. Antônio Chelini et al. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1973. [ Links ]

SIMON; J.-P.; VERNET, M. (eds.). Enonciation et cinema. Communications, n. 38. Paris: Seuil, 1983. [ Links ]

SOUZA, G. T. Introdução à teoria do enunciado concreto do Círculo Bakhtin/Volochinov/Medvedev. São Paulo: Humanitas, 1999. [ Links ]

TODOROV, T. (org.). L’énonciation. Langages, n. 17. Paris: Didier-Larousse, 1970, p.3-11. [ Links ]

ВОЛОШИНОВ, В. Н. Марксизм и философия языка: основные проблемы социологического метода в науке о языке. Ленинград, 1930. The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1972. [ Links ]

VOLÓCHINOV, V. (Círculo de Bakhtin). Marxismo e filosofia da linguagem. Problemas fundamentais do método sociológico na ciência da linguagem. Trad. Sheila Grillo e Ekaterina Vólkova Américo. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2017. [ Links ]

VOLOŠINOV, V. N. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Translated by Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. New York: Seminar Press, 1973. [ Links ]

Received: July 09, 2019; Accepted: October 20, 2019

Creative Commons License Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto (Open Access) sob a licença Creative Commons Attribution, que permite uso, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, sem restrições desde que o trabalho original seja corretamente citado.