ABSTRACT
The general purpose of this article is to argue why the “luck egalitarianism” or “equality of fortune”, advocated by authors such as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson, and G. A. Cohen, is a mistaken way of conceiving the egalitarian ideal. To this end, the article proposes a distinction between two types of criticism of equality of fortune: one internal and conceptual, centered on the cutting line between voluntary choices and non-voluntary circumstances; and an egalitarian critique, whose object is the normative foundation of egalitarian theories. The paper argues that egalitarian (but not necessarily internal) criticism results in a shift in priorities from the egalitarian research agenda. In opposition to the problem of interpersonal exploitation, relational conceptions of equality prioritize the question of how we should conceive the subjects of justice, that is, how we should conceive our normative relations as reciprocally responsible for the creation of a just society. Finally, the article takes the role of personal responsibility in theories of justice as an illustrative case of the difference between the distributive view and the relational view of the moral value of equality.
theories of justice; equality; equality of fortune; accountability; equal opportunity