The Use of Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Strategic Deficit, Institutional Reforms and Operational Challenges

ABSTRACT

The following article analyzes if and how intelligence activities have reduced the strategic deficit in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations post 2001, with “strategic deficit” understood as: 1) a difficulty in complying with the mandates developed by the Security Council, 2) a low level of cooperation with member states and regional organizations and 3) any crises of legitimacy to affect the operations. Intelligence activities constitute a subsidiary (yet relevant) branch of the political authorities able to strengthen the UN’s strategic capacities. This study focuses on institutional changes observed within the UN Secretariat, as well as among the operations implemented as part of three peacekeeping missions (MINUSTAH, UNMIS and MONUSCO). The article concludes that the field of intelligence has served to improve the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions, without negatively impacting on their legitimacy. Despite this, persistent problems with coordination and cooperation effectively limit attempts to tackle strategic deficits with improvements to operations.

Intelligence activities; strategic deficit; peacekeeping operations; United Nations