ABSTRACT
The present article intends to restore, from the Sartrean work L'être et le néant (1943), the ontophenomenological examination of ipseity and temporality, understanding this examination in two moments: phenomenology of the three temporal dimensions and ontology of temporality. This double exam could not be thought without a previous definition of for-itself’s as temporal ipseas lack of from… to…, that is, as a for-itself which, while nothingness of being, is a lack of being (lack of coincidence) that constantly seeks to fill it. The impossibility of this fill-up (or impossibility of coincidence), as we shall see, is ontologically necessary so that the temporality of the being-for-itself does not let itself infest with the typical inertia of the being-in-itself.
Keywords
Temporality; Ipseity; Ontology; Phenomenology