Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN Trabajos recientes han propuesto un tratamiento de la fundación “a la imagen de la causalidad”. Hay importantes analogías entre la fundación y la causalidad: ambas parecen ser relaciones de ‘construcción’, ambas parecen ser órdenes estrictos y ambas parecen ser representables por modelos de ecuaciones estructurales (cf. Schaffer, 2016; Wilson, 2018). Pero también parece que hay importantes diferencias, porque la causalidad es usualmente considerada como una relación externa, mientras que la fundación es interna; hay casos de causalidad probabilística, pero no hay nada como una fundación probabilística; la fundación se considera una relación ‘bien fundada’, pero no la causalidad; la fundación implica superveniencia ontológica, pero no la causalidad. Se argumenta aquí que la mayoría de estas supuestas diferencias están motivadas por una concepción humeana de la causalidad en la que no hay conexiones necesarias entre causa y efecto. Una perspectiva no humeana de la causalidad, sin embargo, hace que la unificación de la fundación y la causalidad sea mucho más razonable que cualquier tratamiento separado.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT Recent works have proposed a treatment of grounding “in the image of causation”. There are important analogies between grounding and causation: both seem to be ‘building’ relations, both seem to be strict orders, and both seem amenable to representation by models of structural equations (cf. Schaffer, 2016; Wilson, 2018). But it seems also that there are important differences, because causation is usually considered as an external relation, while grounding is internal; there are cases of probabilistic causation, but there is nothing like probabilistic grounding; grounding is taken to be a well-founded relation, but not causation; grounding entails ontological supervenience, but not causation. It is argued here that most of those supposed differences are motivated by a Humean conception of causation in which there are no necessary connections between cause and effect. A non-Humean view of causation, though, makes the unification of grounding and causation much more reasonable that any separate treatment.

Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN En este trabajo analizaremos las consideraciones sobre la neutralidad y la sexualidad del Dasein en sus articulaciones con la dispersión fáctica y la libertad en las elaboraciones de Heidegger entre 1927 y 1929.En este marco nos proponemos argumentar que tales consideraciones tienen como función poner de manifiesto el carácter primario de la estructura ontológica del Ser-con y el horizonte originario de la temporeidad, desde la cual circunscribe el empuje de las dinámicas respectivas. Para ello, en primer lugar analizaremos la consideración de la neutralidad y la dispersión en Sein und Zeit en el marco de sus especificaciones respecto del Dasein cotidiano. Luego, distinguiremos las especificaciones y reelaboraciones en su curso de Marburg (1928), respecto del estatuto ontológico que le confiere a la neutralidad en sus relaciones con la concreción fáctica y la libertad. Finalmente dedicaremos el último apartado al análisis e interpretación del sentido de la neutralidad y la dispersión que articula de modo diferencial en su curso de Freiburg (1928-1929). Junto a ello, buscamos aportar con la clarificación del lugar que ocupa las consideraciones de la corporalidad física en este período, en diálogo con interpretaciones relevantes de su obra.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT In this work we will analyze the considerations about Dasein´s neutrality and sexuality in their articulations with the factual dispersion and freedom in Heidegger’s elaborations between 1927 and 1929. In this framework we propose to argue that such considerations have the function of highlighting the primary character of the ontological structure of Being-with and the original horizon of temporality, from which it circumscribes the thrust of the respective dynamics. To do this, we will first analyze the consideration of neutrality and dispersion in Sein und Zeit within the framework of its specifications regarding everyday Dasein. Then, we will distinguish the specifications and reworkings in his course from Marburg (1928), regarding the ontological status that he confers on neutrality in its relations with factual concretion and freedom. Finally, we will dedicate the last section to the analysis and interpretation of the meaning of neutrality and dispersion that he articulates in a differential way in his Freiburg course (1928-1929). Next to it, we seek to contribute with the clarification of the place occupied by the considerations of physical corporeality in this period, in dialogue with relevant interpretations of his work.

Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN Existe cierta interpretación restringida de la metodología humeana que entiende su experimentalismo únicamente en términos de la reducción de los enunciados epistémicos a impresiones sensibles de carácter privado accesibles mediante la introspección. Nos proponemos revisar esta interpretación a partir de la crítica a la vinculación que establece entre la máxima de no ir más allá de la experiencia y el principio de la copia. Mostraremos que esta interpretación no se condice con el modo en que Hume concibe el método experimental, ya que hay evidencia textual para proponer que la experiencia no debe entenderse sólo en términos de impresiones sensibles, y que la ciencia de la naturaleza humana no se restringe al estudio de los contenidos mentales exclusivamente, sino que se nutre de la observación de la interacción social de igual modo. Finalmente, dejaremos en claro que el método que Hume propone no impide la verificación intersubjetiva de la evidencia empírica, ya que el principio de la simpatía posibilita la comunicación de los estados mentales, lo que los despoja de su carácter privado.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT A restricted interpretation of Humean methodology understands his experimentalism solely in terms of reducing epistemic statements to private sensory impressions accessible via introspection. My aim is to revise this interpretation by means of criticizing the connection it establishes between the maxim of not going beyond experience and the copy principle. I will show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the way Hume conceives the experimental method, since there is textual evidence to affirm that experience should not be understood in terms of sensory impressions only, and that the science of human nature is not restricted to the study of the mental contents only, but it is nourished in the same way by the observation of social interaction. Finally, I will argue that the method Hume proposes does not prevent intersubjective verification of the empirical evidence, since the principle of sympathy enables the communication of mental states, which makes them devoid of their private character.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT In the previous Hegel literature, Schlegel is mostly treated as Hegel’s antipode. In contrast to this, my interest in the present work is directed towards showing that Hegel’s presentation of comedy in the „Phenomenology of the Spirit“ may have developed under the influence of Schlegel’s texts on comedy. In order to be able to prove this, the significance of Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes from 1974 and the reputation he gained in the intellectual public of the time are shown first. It will then be shown to what extent there are structural overlaps between Hegel’s and Schlegel’s presentations of comedy. At the center of the argument, however, is the fact that both authors use the parabasis as the central element of the presentation. In the last part of the work, the attempt is made to show that Hegel goes beyond Schlegel, insofar as the comedy in Hegel’s system displays the potential to reach absolute knowledge beyond the way of representation.

Resumo em de:

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG In der bisherigen Hegel-Literatur wird Schlegel zumeist als Hegels Antipode behandelt. Im Gegensatz dazu richtet sich mein Interesse in der vorliegenden Arbeit darauf, zu zeigen, dass Hegels Darstellung der Komödie In der „Phänomenologie des Geistes“ unter dem Einfluss von Schlegels Texten über die Komödie entstanden sein könnte. Um dies belegen zu können, werden zunächst die literaturgeschichtliche Bedeutung von Schlegels Aufsatz über Aristophanes aus dem Jahr 1974 und der Ruf gezeigt, den er in der damaligen intellektuellen Öffentlichkeit erlangte. Daraufhin soll dargelegt werden, inwieweit es strukturelle Überschneidungen zwischen Hegels und Schlegels Darstellungen der Komödie gibt. Im Zentrum der Argumentation steht aber, dass beide Autoren die Parabase als das zentrale Element der Darstellung verwenden. Im letzten Teil der Arbeit wird aber versucht zu zeigen, dass Hegel über Schlegel hinausgeht, sofern die Komödie in Hegels System das Potenzial darstellt, über die Art und Weise der Vorstellung hinaus zum absoluten Wissen zu gelangen.

Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN Francis Bacon y René Descartes han sido presentados tradicionalmente como pioneros de corrientes filosóficas opuestas entre sí. Sin embargo, son cada vez más los estudios que muestran importantes continuidades entre sus filosofías. Este artículo explora una de ellas: sus perspectivas sobre la medicina. El dominio sobre la naturaleza y el instinto de autoconservación son los elementos centrales del marco teórico dentro del cual se inserta su valoración de la medicina como la disciplina más destacada por sus beneficios para el cuidado del ser humano. A partir de ahí son muchas sus coincidencias acerca del estatus, la práctica y la reforma de la medicina.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT Francis Bacon and René Descartes have traditionally been presented as leaders of opposed philosophical currents. However, more and more studies show important continuities between their philosophies. This article explores one of them: their perspectives on medicine. The dominion over nature and the instinct for self-preservation are the central elements of the theoretical framework within which they inserted their assessments of medicine. Medicine is valued as the most outstanding discipline for its benefits for the care of the human being. Departing from this start-point, one finds further coincidences about the status, practice, and reform of medicine.

Resumo em Português:

RESUMO Um uso recorrente do predicado, “ser colonizado”, é um que o aplica imprecisamente, não em referência aos africanos e aos povos indígenas originais escravizados pelos europeus ou a descendentes de pessoas escravizadas, mas, sim, a acadêmicos que são cidadãos de ex-colônias como o Brasil, seus modos de pensar, trabalhos filosóficos, comunidades acadêmicas etc. Mas sob quais condições se deve proceder desse modo? E como é possível evitar que tal predicado seja atribuído a si ou a um trabalho autoral? Essas questões não têm recebido muita atenção. Ao dialogar com autores associados aos estudos decoloniais, filósofos brasileiros, continentais e analíticos, este artigo procura contribuir para mudar essa situação. Ele assim o faz ao propor um uso alternativo do predicado, “ser ‘sutilmente’ colonizado filosoficamente”, segundo o qual esse predicado deve ser aplicado em referência a trabalhos filosóficos que possuem as treze características descritas neste artigo ou ao menos a maioria delas. Argumenta-se que esse uso alternativo deve ser aceito porque ele é: preciso; exemplificado de modo detalhado por ao menos um trabalho filosófico; e “inexplosivo” ao não sugerir a alegação “explosiva” de que praticamente todos os trabalhos filosóficos ocidentais são colonizados pela metafísica ocidental.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT An often-adopted use of the predicate, “to be colonized”, is one that applies it loosely, not in reference to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of enslaved persons, but to academics who are citizens of former colonies like Brazil, their ways of thinking, philosophical works, academic communities, etc. But under what conditions one is to do that? And how can one avoid the attribution of such predicate to oneself or one’s works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, “to be ‘subtly’ philosophically colonized”, according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have the thirteen features described in the essay or at least most of them. It is argued that this alternative use is to be endorsed because it is: precise; exemplified in a detailed way by at least one philosophical work; and “inexplosive” in not suggesting the “explosive” claim that practically all Western philosophical works are colonized by Western metaphysics.

Resumo em Português:

RESUMO Este artigo busca levantar algumas questões a respeito da proposta do filósofo alemão Peter Sloterdijk ao Antropoceno, termo em debate que define a época na qual o ser humano (ocidental e moderno, para autores como Déborah Danowski e Eduardo Viveiros de Castro) se configurou como um agente de transformação geológica e climática. O debate faz-se pertinente por conta da proximidade de Sloterdijk com nomes como Bruno Latour e Yuk Hui, autores que, de forma central ou tangencial, se debruçam sobre este problema. Neste artigo, começaremos trazendo alguns dos principais conceitos sloterdijkianos de sua obra recente (esfera, imunidade, homeotécnica) para, em seguida, analisar suas propostas de ‘paradigma homeotécnico’ e de ‘coimunismo’, levantando, ao fim, questões pertinentes às propostas mencionadas.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT This paper aims to raise some questions concerning the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk’s propositions regarding Anthropocene, a debatable term that serves to define the epoch in which human being (a Western and Modern one, according to authors like Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro) made itself an agent of geological and climatic transformation. This debate is important because of Sloterdijk’s closeness with names such as Bruno Latour and Yuk Hui, authors that, in a more or less central manner, engage with such a problem. Here, firstly we will gather some of the main concepts of Sloterdijk’s recent work (sphere, immunity, homeotechnology) in order to analyze the ‘homeotechnological paradigm’ and the ‘co-immunism’ propositions, raising, at last, some relevant questions to the aforementioned propositions.

Resumo em Português:

RESUMO Este texto pretende discutir a célebre restrição imposta às sociedades parciais no Capítulo III do Livro II do Contrato social. Defende-se a hipótese de que essa proibição pode frutiferamente ser considerada à luz das especificidades da dinâmica de cooperação/competição entre grupos e seus efeitos no processo legislativo e, por extensão, na coesão social.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT This text intends to discuss the famous restriction imposed on partial associations in Social Contract, Book II, Chapter III. It is suggested that this prohibition can be fruitfully considered in the light of the specificities of the dynamics of cooperation/competition among groups and its effects on the legislative process and, by extension, on social cohesion.

Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN En sintonía con algunas reflexiones del campo de la estética que han señalado cómo, al postular un relego o incluso desprecio de Theodor W. Adorno por el cine, la mayoría de las recepciones empobrecieron el potencial crítico del pensamiento adorniano, el presente artículo avanza en algunos aspectos de la reflexión estética de Adorno sobre el cine. Por un lado, ponemos de relieve una lectura materialista y dialéctica de la afamada categoría de industria cultural. Por otro, llamamos la atención sobre el lugar central que tienen las primeras películas y reflexiones teóricas de Alexander Kluge para la postulación adorniana de una estética específica del cine. En ese marco, el artículo presenta uno de los problemas estéticos más interesantes que surgen del planteo de Adorno en diálogo con Kluge - y que, además, marca la actualidad de la empresa: pensar el cine contra la imagen. De allí se desprenden las consideraciones sobre un tipo de cine autoconsciente de sus aspectos formales, una reflexión sobre la imagen más allá de su carácter referencial y la centralidad de la técnica del montaje. Hacia el final, exponemos cómo en Adorno el cine muestra su afinidad con la experiencia subjetiva y con la escritura.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT In accordance with some contributions from the field of aesthetics that point out how, by postulating a relegation or even contempt of Theodor W. Adorno for cinema, most receptions have impoverished the critical potential of Adorno’s thought, this paper moves forward on some aspects of Adorno’s aesthetic consideration of cinema. On the one hand, we highlight a materialist and dialectical reading of Adorno’s famous category of culture industry. On the other, we draw attention to the central place of Alexander Kluge’s early films and theoretical insights for Adorno’s postulation of a specific aesthetics of cinema. In this context, the paper revisits Adorno’s thought on cinema, considering one of the most interesting aesthetic problems that arises from his relation to Kluge: thinking cinema against the image. In this point, we highlight the reflection on a cinema that is self-aware of its formal aspects, on the image beyond its referential character and on the montage technique. At the end, we set out how cinema, from Adornos point of view, shows its affinity with writing and subjective experience.

Resumo em Português:

RESUMO Este texto discute alguns problemas metodológicos e históricos concernentes à fenomenologia da consciência de imagem (Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins) elaborada por Edmund Husserl e algumas de suas repercussões teóricas. Primeiramente será tematizado o escopo mais amplo em que a abordagem filosófica das imagens auferiu relevância no século XX, a saber, a assim chamada “virada icônica” (ikonische Wenke) ou “pictórica” (pictorial turn), conforme as respectivas formulações de Gottfried Boehm e William Mitchell. Será situada nesse contexto a fenomenologia da imagem e, mais especificamente, a fenomenologia da consciência de imagem elaborada por Husserl, considerando-se, em especial, os eixos norteadores dos três direcionamentos que sobressaem nas teorias contemporâneas da imagem, a saber: as abordagens antropológica, semiótica e perceptiva. A partir da retomada de nuances semióticas remanescentes na fenomenologia da consciência de imagem, serão apresentados alguns pontos críticos acerca da classificação das análises de Husserl no escopo do direcionamento perceptivo e, finalmente, apontadas implicações do copertencimento à apresentação intuitiva da imagem (anschaulicher Darstellung des Bildes) daquilo que se denominará “circunstancialidade indicativa”.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT This text addresses some methodological and historical problems concerning the phenomenology of image consciousness (Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins) elaborated by Edmund Husserl as well as some of its theoretical repercussions. At first, I examine the broader scope in which the philosophical approach to images became relevant in the 20th century, the so-called “iconic turn” (ikonische Wenke) or “pictorial turn”, according to the respective terms proposed by Gottfried Boehm and William Mitchell. In this context I situate the phenomenology of image and, more specifically, the phenomenology of image consciousness elaborated by Husserl, considering, in particular, the guiding axes of three directions that stand out in contemporary theories of image, namely: the anthropological, the semiotic and the perceptual approach. By the resumption of semiotic nuances remaining in the phenomenology of image consciousness I present some critical points about the classification of Husserl’s analyses in the scope of perceptual approach. Finally, I point out some implications of the co-belonging to the intuitive image presentation (anschaulicher Darstellung des Bildes) of what can be called “indicative circumstantiality”.

Resumo em Espanhol:

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se buscará dar cuenta diagramáticamente del alcance y extensión del concepto de vida en Freud y Nietzsche, al pensar sus límites en términos de polos -instancias no alcanzables vitalmente, que marcan la frontera a partir de la cual se extiende el ‘más allá’ de la vida. Dicho de otro modo: haciendo uso de un diagrama, se buscará dar cuenta del carácter de lo vital para Nietzsche - al pensar a la vida como Wille zur Macht - y Freud - desde su último modelo pulsional - no solo en cuanto a su particularidad, sino en función de lo que resulta en cada caso el límite mismo de la vida - es decir, aquello que marca el pasaje a otra cosa que la vida.

Resumo em Inglês:

ABSTRACT In the present work, we will seek to give a diagrammatic account of the scope and extension of the concept of life in Freud and Nietzsche, by thinking about its limits in terms of poles - vitally unreachable instances, which mark the border from which the ‘beyond ‘of life extends itself. In other words: making use of a diagram, we will seek to account for the character of what is vital for Nietzsche - thinking of life as Wille zur Macht - and Freud - from their latest drive model - not only in terms of their particularity, but rather as a function of what the very limit of life results in each case - it means, that which marks the passage to something other than life.