The following research investigates the analytical assumptions used in the hegemonic theories of the economy of the public sector (Welfare Economics, Public Choice Theory and New Institutional Economics) in the study of interjurisdictional competition, by identifying its limitations. It suggests, subsequently, a new conceptual form of the subject using a historical-concrete approach. The federative dynamic is conceived from this hegemonic theories as the product of a "game", composed of maximizing rational agents. It disregards, however, the influence exerted by social macro-structures in the composition of its movements. In light of this, the approach to the outlines assumed by the federative arrangement, from the contradictions expressed in its own institutional existence, is proposed here, while conceiving this as a constitutionally interdependent phenomenon to the conformance of the of space-time matrices of the standard of accumulation.
interjurisdictional competition; federalism; methodological individualism