This paper addresses the issue of judicial testimony from children. Based on research documents and literature, we comment the Canadian experience in this issue. We highlight what is different from it relating to the procedures under discussion in Brazil. It appears that there is no uniformity between the Canadian practice and ours, in particular with the figure of the intermediary. We observed that under the definition of special testimony, a set of different practices may be invoked and that the role of intermediary is foreseen in international guidelines and practices. Canadian practice is aligned with UN guidelines on the practice of special testimony. This alignment gives it legitimacy grounded in fundamental Human Rights principles. Furthermore, we indicate the possibility of an analysis of this field that includes the vicissitudes of memory and of testimony, such as studied by Agamben and Seligmann-Silva. We concluded that there is some degree of opacity in testimony not liable to the complete dissolution of narrative procedures.
Subjective memory; Social memory; Human rights; Justice
