Distribution of resources for protection against terrorist actions
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Strategic threats |
The attacker's preferences change according to the prior allocation of defense resources. |
(Powell, 2007aPowell, R. (2007a). Defending against terrorist attacks with limited resources. The American Political Science Review, 101(3), 527-541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070...
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Non-strategic threats |
The opponent is not attacked where it is the weakest and where the expected gains will be greater. Preferences of attackers are unchanged. |
(Banks & Anderson, 2006Banks, D., & Anderson, S. (2006). Combining game theory and risk analysis in counterterrorism: a smallpox example. In A. G. Wilson, G. D. Wilson & D. H. Olwell (Eds.), Statistical methods in counterterrorism (pp. 9-22). New York: Springer.; Farrow, 2007Farrow, S. (2007). The Economics of homeland security expenditures: foundational expected cost-effectiveness approaches. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(1), 14-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006.00029.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.20...
; Powell, 2007aPowell, R. (2007a). Defending against terrorist attacks with limited resources. The American Political Science Review, 101(3), 527-541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070...
; Zhuang & Bier, 2007Zhuang, J., & Bier, V. M. (2007). Balancing terrorism and natural disasters: defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort. Operations Research, 55(5), 976-991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0434. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0434...
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Synergic defensive measures |
A single defense measure may result in reducing the vulnerability of more than one target. |
(Farrow, 2007Farrow, S. (2007). The Economics of homeland security expenditures: foundational expected cost-effectiveness approaches. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(1), 14-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006.00029.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.20...
; Powell, 2007aPowell, R. (2007a). Defending against terrorist attacks with limited resources. The American Political Science Review, 101(3), 527-541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070...
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Uncertainties inherent to attackers and defenders
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Defender uncertainties about how the attacker's preferences change over targets. |
Centralization of resources protecting high valued targets performs better than those acting in a decentralized manner. |
(Bier et al., 2007Bier, V. M., Oliveros, S., & Samuelson, L. (2007). Choosing what to protect: strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9(4), 563-587. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00320.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.20...
; Major, 2002Major, J. A. (2002). Advanced techniques for modeling terrorism risk. The Journal of Risk Finance, 4(1), 15-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb022950. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb022950...
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With scarce resources the uncertainty becomes more significant and it is more difficult to protect targets that are more valuable. |
(Wang & Bier, 2011Wang, C., & Bier, V. M. (2011). Target-hardening decisions based on uncertain multiattribute terrorist utility. Decision Analysis, 8(4), 286-302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1110.0218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1110.0218...
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A robust type optimization can circumvent the uncertainties about the attacker's parameters. |
(Nikoofal & Zhuang, 2011Nikoofal, M. E., & Zhuang, J. (2011). Robust allocation of a defensive budget considering an attacker’s private information. Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis, 32(5), 930-943. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01702.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.20...
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Attacker’s uncertainty related to the targets. |
Game modeling can be performed as signaling games. Allocating too much resource to protect a target can signal high value target. |
(Powell, 2007bPowell, R. (2007b). Allocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability. The American Political Science Review, 101(04), 799-809. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070530. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070...
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Uncertainties about the targets’ values and about the attacker’s target preference. |
Uncertainty about attackers' preferences has little impact on how defense resources are allocated. |
(Bier et al., 2008Bier, V. M., Haphuriwat, N., Menoyo, J., Zimmerman, R., & Culpen, A. M. (2008). Optimal resource allocation for defense of targets based on differing measures of attractiveness. Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis, 28(3), 763-770. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01053.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.20...
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Advantages and disadvantages of making resource allocation public
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It is better for the defense to make its strategy public than to make it a secret. |
(Farrow, 2007Farrow, S. (2007). The Economics of homeland security expenditures: foundational expected cost-effectiveness approaches. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25(1), 14-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006.00029.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.20...
; Major, 2002Major, J. A. (2002). Advanced techniques for modeling terrorism risk. The Journal of Risk Finance, 4(1), 15-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb022950. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb022950...
; Zhuang & Bier, 2010Zhuang, J., & Bier, V. M. (2010). Reasons for secrecy and deception in homeland-security resource allocation. Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis, 30(12), 1737-1743. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01455.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.20...
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The balance between disclosure of defense strategies and maintaining the secrecy of this information is the best strategy. |
(Brown et al., 2005Brown, G. G., Carlyle, M. W., Salmerón, J., & Wood, K. (2005). Analyzing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to attack and planning defenses. In H. J. Greenberg & J. C. Smith (Eds.), Tutorials in operations research: emerging theory, methods, and applications (pp. 102-123). Catonsville: INFORMS.) |
Redundant protection of critical targets
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It is more advantageous to protect more critical components than to opt for redundancy. |
(Brown et al., 2005Brown, G. G., Carlyle, M. W., Salmerón, J., & Wood, K. (2005). Analyzing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to attack and planning defenses. In H. J. Greenberg & J. C. Smith (Eds.), Tutorials in operations research: emerging theory, methods, and applications (pp. 102-123). Catonsville: INFORMS.) |
The author emphasizes the validity of redundancy as a defensive strategy. |
(Bier, 2006Bier, V. M. (2006). Game-theoretic and reliability methods in counter-terrorism and security. In In A. G. Wilson, G. D. Wilson & D. H. Olwell (Eds.), Statistical methods in counterterrorism (pp. 23-40). New York: Springer.) |
Tradeoff analysis in the distribution of resources for the protection of several targets
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Analysis of how considering equity and efficiency impacts on the distribution of resources for the protection of various targets. |
(Shan & Zhuang, 2012Shan, X., & Zhuang, J. (2012). Cost of equity in homeland security resource allocation in the face of a strategic attacker. Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis, 33(6), 1083-1099. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01919.x. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012...
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