Weiss (1985Weiss, M. A. (1985). A multivariate analysis of loss reserving estimates in property-liability insurers. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 52(2), 199-221.) |
16 biggest auto insurers (USA) |
1955- 1975 |
Smoothing (+) and external economic factors |
Grace (1990Grace, E. V. (1990). Property-liability insurer reserve errors: A theorical and empirical analysis. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 57(1), 28-46.) |
61 ins. (USA) |
1966- 1979 |
Tax incentive (+), smoothing (-), and external factors |
Petroni (1992Petroni, K. (1992). Optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15(4), 485-508.) |
324 ins. (USA) 1,322 firm-year obs. |
1979- 1983 |
Regulatory incentive (+) obs .: sacrificing the reduction of taxes |
Gaver and Paterson (1999Gaver, J. J., & Paterson, J. S. (1999). Managing insurance company financial statements to meet regulatory and tax reporting goals. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(2), 1-40, 1999.) |
ins. (USA) 4,173 firm-year obs. |
1990- 1995 |
Tax incentive (+) obs .: reduction of regulatory incentive after CBR |
Beaver et al. (2003Beaver, W. H., McNichols, M. F., & Nelson, K. K. (2003). Management of the loss reserve accrual and the distribution of earnings in the property-casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(3), 347-376.) |
ins. (USA) 11.460 firm-year obs. |
1988- 1997 |
Small profits - underestimation Big profits - overestimation |
Gaver and Paterson (2004Gaver, J. J., & Paterson, J. S. (2004). Do insurers manipulate loss reserves to mask solvency problems? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(3), 393-416.) |
ins. (USA) 6,233 firm-year obs. |
1988- 1993 |
Regulatory incentive (+) |
Rodrigues (2008Rodrigues, A. (2008). Accounting information management and regulation: Evidences in the Brazilian insurance market (Doctoral thesis). Faculty of Economics, Business and Accounting, São Paulo University, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.) |
60 ins. (BRA) 360 firm-year obs. |
2001- 2006 |
Tax incentive (+), regulatory incentive (+), size (+), and performance (+) |
Eckles and Halek (2010Eckles, D. L., & Halek, M. (2010). Insurer reserve error and executive compensation. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(2), 329-346.) |
63 ins. (USA) 348 firm-year obs. |
1992- 2000 |
Executive compensation package with more bonuses (-) |
Eckles et al. (2011Eckles, D. L., Halek, M., He, E., Sommer, D. W., & Zhang, R. (2011). Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance: Evidence from the property-liability insurance industry. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(3), 761-790.) |
54 ins. (USA) 311 firm-year obs. |
1992- 2004 |
Higher bonuses and stock awards (-) and board structures (+) |
Grace and Leverty (2012Grace, M. F., & Leverty, J. T. (2012). Property-liability insurer reserve error: Motive, manipulation, or mistake. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79(2), 351-380.) |
ins. (USA) 5,459 firm-year obs. |
1990- 1997 |
Tax incentive (KFS error) (+), weak evidence of smoothing, rate regulation (+), and financial weakness (+) |