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Revista Archai, Volume: 32 Supplement 1, Published: 2022
  • Introduction to Studies on Plato’s Lysis Introdução

    Szaif, Jan; Jennings, David
  • Aporetic Discourse and Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis Artigos

    Szaif, Jan

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysis functions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus.
  • “Cutting Them Down to Size”: Humbling and Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis Artigos

    Anderson, Trevor; Comstock, Reid

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: This article examines the role that humbling plays in Socratic practice. Specifically, we consider how Socrates humbles his interlocutors in order to turn them towards the pursuit of philosophical friendship. We argue against a standard interpretation of humbling in the Lysis, which holds that Socrates humbles Lysis by exposing his own ignorance to him at 210d. Instead, we argue that the humbling occurs not when Lysis is (allegedly) made aware of his own ignorance, but at 222d near the end of the dialogue, when Lysis is made to think that he is not as good a friend as he thought he was. On this reading, Socrates humbles Lysis not by exposing to him his ignorance about theoretical matters but by suggesting to him that he may be not the sort of person he thought he was.
  • The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis Artigos

    Jennings, David

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: The two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them.
  • Philia as Fellowship in Plato’s Lysis Artigos

    Payne, Andrew

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: Socrates in the Lysis discusses philia and the conditions under which two or more people can be said to engage in this relationship. Many commentators take Socrates to be attempting to discover how human beings enter into the relationship of friendship, a relationship characterized by reciprocal affection, altruistic concern and personal intimacy. Other readers of the Lysis see in the dialogue’s investigation of philia a discussion of desire and attraction at the most general level. On this view, philia is one species of the general human desire for good. The present paper develops a third reading of philia. Philia is a type of partnership or fellowship where affection and intimacy are not central features of the relationship. The fellowship involves at least one party who possesses wisdom while other members of the fellowship seek to benefit from wisdom. Thus philia is a characteristically human response to the need for wisdom. The members of such a fellowship share a common desire for a good which gives purpose to their association, and because of their common desire to benefit from this good the members can be described as fellows or partners in the pursuit of this good.
  • Egoism, Utility, and Friendship in Plato’s Lysis Artigos

    Deretić, Irina

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: Many scholars consider that Socrates in the Lysis holds that friendship and love are egoistic and utility-based. In this paper, I will argue against those readings of Plato’s Lysis. I will analyze how Socrates treats utility and egoism in the many different kinds of friendship he discusses in the dialogue, from parental love, like-to-like, and unlike-to-unlike relationships, to the accounts of friendship rooted in the human relation to the good and the ways in which we can belong with some other human beings. The upshot of my paper is twofold. I endeavor to prove that some of these relationships, as Plato’s Socrates discusses them, are not egoistic and that Plato represents and valorizes a particular type of friendship having to do with philosophy and philosophical way of life, which is for the sake of another.
  • Plato’s Lysis and the Erotics of Philia Artigos

    Roochnik, David

    Abstract in English:

    Abstract: This paper argues that the account of friendship (philia) present in Plato's dialogue the Lysis is rife with the disruptive and maddening force of eros. By its end it is no longer clear whether the familiar sorts of personal relationships that we typically count as friendships, and which Aristotle discusses with great sensitivity and appreciation in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be meaningfully sustained. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes each of the seven, relatively self-contained arguments Socrates offers. In addition, it shows how the dramatic context in which these arguments are embedded foreshadows the dialogue's principal objective: to blur the distinction between philia and eros by allowing the latter to infect the former.
Universidade de Brasília / Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra Universidade de Brasília / Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Campus Darcy Ribeiro, Cátedra UNESCO Archai, CEP: 70910-900, Brasília, DF - Brasil, Tel.: 55-61-3107-7040 - Brasília - DF - Brazil
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