ABSTRACT
This article presents a reinterpretation of three concepts addressed in Isaiah Berlin´s body of work: Negative and Positive Liberty and Freedom of Choice. In order to do so, we present two hypotheses. The first maintains that these concepts must be understood and analyzed having in mind the idea of plurality present in his work, that is, the notion that in an individual´s ordinary experiences there are several reasonable and distinct ends, which, in certain circumstances, are conflicting. This perspective establishes the centrality of the concept of Freedom of Choice. It is this idea that lends theoretical intelligibility to concepts, in the sense that they are thought and judged on the basis of Freedom of Choice. The second hypothesis considers that the concepts of Negative and Positive Freedom are not necessarily antagonistic. This fact comes from the way in which the idea of diversity is received in both cases. Freedom of Choice requires walls that protect the individual from arbitrary obstacles as well as provide him support. In addition, this freedom also requires the individual to assume the act of choosing between the various ends, that is, that he comes to understand himself as his own master. This perspective maintains the difference between the concepts, but thinks them in a non-antagonistic way.
freedom of choice; negative freedom; positive freedom; pluralism of values