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Licitações com preço de reserva secreto e negociação: Uma análise de teoria dos leilões para o caso de valores privados Os autores agradecem a Luciano I. de Castro e a Gil Riella pelas discussões e sugestões. Agradecem também as importantes sugestões de dois pareceristas anônimos. Maurício Bugarin agradece o apoio à pesquisa do CNPq por meio de Bolsa de Produtividade em Pesquisa 308830/2019-9. Todos os possíveis erros e/ou omissões remanescentes, bem como as opiniões expressas neste trabalho são de responsabilidade exclusiva dos autores.

Abstract

This article compares alternative mechanism designs for the procurement of public works or services. It analyzes the simple reverse auction with no reservation price, the reverse auction with public reservation price, with secret reservation price and, finally, with secret reservation price and the possibility of negotiation when the winning bid is above the reservation price. We make use of the framework of auction theory with symmetric, independent, and identically distributed private values and risk neutral participants. The theoretical analysis and the simulations suggest that setting a reservation price yields better results for the government. Moreover, it is more advantageous to announce the reservation price if this price is low, and more advantageous to keep it secret if that price is high. Ex post negotiation in the secret reserve price model induces an increase in participants’ bids. However, if the social welfare that the public works or services create sufficiently exceeds its reservation cost, then the negotiation mechanism may be desirable.

Keywords:
Public procurement auctions; Public reservation price; Secret reservation price; Ex post negotiation in procurements

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