Manuscrito, Volume: 37, Issue: 2, Published: 2014
  • The role of selection in functional explanations Articles

    SANT'ANNA, André Rosolem

    Abstract in English:

    In this essay I will argue that natural selection is more important to functional explanations than what has been thought in some of the literature in philosophy of biology. I start by giving a brief overview of the two paradigms cases of functional explanations: etiological functions and causal-role functions. i then consider one particular attempt to conciliate both perspectives given by David Buller (1998). Buller's trial to conciliate both etiological functions and causal-role functions results in what he calls a weak etiological theory. I argue that Buller has not succeeded in his construal of the weak etiological theory: he underestimates the role that selective processes have in functional explanations and so his theory may not be classified as an etiologial theory. As an alternative, I consider the account of etiological functions given by Ruth Millikan (1984) and I argue that Millikan's theory is more comprehensive to assess contentious case in biology like exaptations. Finally, I conclude by analyzing where the adoption of Millikan's theory leave us. I argue, contrary to Millikan and others, that once we assume the importance of natural selection in functional explanations, there is no strong reason to resist a linguistic reform of the word function and hence that the attempts to conciliate both etiological functions and causal-role functions are misplaced.


    Abstract in English:

    This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's (1956). The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's (2011). My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in mind here are Eklund (2007, 2009) and Bennett (2009). In the fourth section, I compare Carnap's radical dismissivism with Hirsch's moderate dismissivism. My second claim is stated in section five: that Carnap's radical dismissivism is more persuasive than Hirsch's moderate one.


    Abstract in English:

    I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of self-deception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of belief and the process of belief-formation when interpreting David Velleman's (2000) thesis that belief is an essentially truth-directed attitude. I then call attention to the fact that Velleman's argument for the identity of motivational role between belief and imagining, on which Gendler's argument for self-deception as pretense depends, conflates two senses of 'motivational role'-a stronger but implausible sense and a weaker but explanatorily irrelevant sense. Finally, I introduce Neil Van Leeuwen's (2009) argument to the effect that belief is the practical ground of all non-belief cognitive attitudes in circum-stances wherein the latter prompt action. I apply this framework to Gendler's account to ultimately show that imaginative pretense fails to explain the existence of voluntary actions which result from self-deception.


    Abstract in English:

    In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.
  • Crítica al psicologismo y concepción de subjetividad en frege Artículos

    PORTA, Mario Ariel González

    Abstract in Spanish:

    La remisión del problema relativo al como de la captación de pensamientos a la psicología por parte de Frege ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración subjetiva está ausente en este autor. La crítica fregueana al psicologismo, sin embargo, se concentra en una crítica a la concepción psicologista de subjetividad y, correlativamente, implica una concepción de subjetividad novedosa en el contexto de la filosofía alemana de la segunda mitad del s. XIX que, como la husserliana, es no-naturalística e intencional.

    Abstract in English:

    The assignment to psychology by Frege of the problem concerning how a thought is grasped has made the idea that all subjective considerations are absent from this author's work a dominant one amongst its critics. The fregean critic of psychologism, however, focusses on a critic of the psychologistic conception of the subjectivity and accordingly implies a conception of the subjective that is new in the context of the German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century and that is, like Husserl´s, non- naturalistic and intentional.
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