Manuscrito, Volume: 41, Issue: 1, Published: 2018
  • Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach Articles

    Boccardi, Emiliano

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages (and thinking), are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation.
  • Existencia y substancia del mundo en el Tractatus Articles

    Vidal, Javier

    Abstract in Spanish:

    RESUMEN En este artículo trato de establecer que, según el Tractatus, la posibilidad de pensar que el espacio lógico fuera vacío es equivalente a la posibilidad de pensar que el mundo no hubiera existido. Tal representación viene dada por la última línea de una tabla de verdad que es una descripción completa del espacio lógico: es la línea en la que todas las proposiciones elementales son falsas. En primer lugar, argumentaré que una proposición elemental sería falsa -más que no tener un valor de verdad- si fuera evaluada con respecto a un mundo posible en el que alguno de los objetos nombrados en esa proposición no existe. A continuación, tendré que mostrar que es posible que los objetos tractarianos no hubieran existido para poder concluir que es posible pensar que los objetos tractarianos no hubieran existido. Por último, estoy obligado a ofrecer una nueva interpretación del pasaje sobre la substancia (T 2.021-2.0212).

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT In this paper I intend to establish that, according to the Tractatus, the possibility of thinking that the logical space were empty is equivalent to the possibility of thinking that the world had not existed. Such a representation is given by the bottom line of a truth-table which is a complete description of logical space: it is the line where all elementary propositions are false. Firstly, I will argue that an elementary proposition would be false -rather than lacking a truth-value- if it were evaluated with respect to a possible world in which some named object in that proposition does not exist. Then I will have to show that it is possible that the tractarian objects had not existed in order to conclude that it is possible to think that the tractarian objects had not existed. Finally, I am bound to offer a new interpretation of the substance passage (T 2.021-2.0212).
  • Singularidade fenomênica e conteúdo perceptivo Articles

    Alves, Marco Aurélio Sousa

    Abstract in Portuguese:

    RESUMO As principais teorias do conteúdo perceptivo são incapazes de explicar o caráter fenomênico singular da experiência perceptiva. Tal dificuldade, conforme argumento, se origina da ausência de uma série de distinções que acaba tornando o problema aparentemente insolúvel. Após analisar brevemente as principais deficiências da teoria representacionalista e do realismo ingênuo, apresento uma proposta que pretende tornar não problemático o fato trivial de percebermos objetos particulares que se apresentam enquanto tais em nossas experiências perceptivas. A proposta, assim como a crítica às demais alternativas, são reconhecidamente apresentadas de forma breve e esquemática. Espera-se ao menos justificar que o caminho proposto é promissor e vale a aposta.

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware of the sketchy and schematic way in which my proposal is advanced and the other alternatives are criticized, I hope this paper is still worth its ink at least insofar as it is capable of pointing to a novel and promising way out of old and resilient difficulties that have been haunting philosophers of perception. If not a fully developed theory, at least I deliver here a sketch that, or so I sell, is worth the bet.
  • Pensamento Singular e Atos de Pensamento Episódicos Artigos

    Ludovic, Soutif

    Abstract in Portuguese:

    RESUMO No debate acerca da singularidade de, pelos menos, alguns de nossos pensamentos sobre o mundo, assume-se corriqueiramente que o responsável pela natureza singular do episódio mental não é o próprio episódio e, sim, a proposição singular expressa quer por um proferimento assertórico de sentença singular autônoma, quer pela cláusula complementar em um relato de atribuição de atitude proposicional. As rotas semânticas padrão assumem que a singularidade do episódio mental (conceitual) é por assim dizer “herdada” da singularidade do conteúdo. Argumento que este pressuposto apresenta uma lacuna, pois desconsidera o papel desempenhado em certos atos de pensamento, chamados de episódicos, por habilidades cognitivas tais como a capacidade de perceber objetos particulares, de vivenciar (novamente) ou de projetar-se mentalmente em direção a acontecimentos particulares pessoais, diretamente responsáveis por sua singularidade. No entanto, contra a tese de que haveria capacidades episódicas aí envolvidas, argumento que a singularidade dos atos de pensar episódicos se dá pelo exercício pontual no espaço e no tempo dessas capacidades e há, portanto, um sentido não derivado em que eles podem ser qualificados como singulares.
  • Book Symposium: Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst (Princeton University Press, 2015, xiii + 236 pages) Book Symposium

    Pritchard, Duncan; Veber, Michael; Salvatore, Nicola Claudio; Borges, Rodrigo

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.
  • Book review: UFFELMANN, Sarah Anna. Vom System zum Gebrauch: Eine genetisch-philosophische Untersuchung des Grammatikbegriffs bei Wittgenstein. Bergen: University of Bergen, 2016. 242 pp. ISBN 978-82-308-3234-9. Book Review

    Venturinha, Nuno

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT This review discusses Uffelmann’s thesis that Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar underwent important changes in the different phases of his philosophizing. I claim that if we do not accentuate the shifts in approach and terminology that naturally exist in Wittgenstein’s thought, we can see that grammar and logic go hand in hand all along the way, from the Tractatus to the very end, and that grammar was simply a mode he found to conceive of logic in a completely different way from what Frege and Russell did.
  • Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) Book Review

    Nascimento, Laura

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation.
  • Book Review: GABRIEL, Gottfried and SCHLOTTER, Sven, Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie (Münster, Mentis, 2017, 251 pages) Book Review

    Porta, Mario

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT A review of the book by Gottfried Gabriel and Sven Schlotter Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie (Münster, Mentis, 2017)
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