Manuscrito, Volume: 41, Issue: 2, Published: 2018
  • Weather Predicates, Unarticulation and Utterances Articles

    Vallée, Richard

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT Perry contends that an utterance of (1) ‘It is raining’ must be assigned a location before being truth assessed. The location is famously argued to be an unarticulated constituent of the proposition an utterance of (1) expresses. My paper examines this view from a pluri-propositionalist perspective. The sentence (1) contains an impersonal pronoun, ‘it’ and the impersonal verb ‘to rain. I suggest that the utterance of (1) semantically determines ‘to rain’, which is an event, and that that event is instantiated at a time indicated by the tense at a location It is assumed that all event are located in space and time.
  • Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states Articles

    GUO, Yuchen

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
  • Kant and the “Mystery Hidden” in the Critique of Pure Reason: A Methodological Approach to the A-Deduction Argument* Articles

    Perin, Adriano

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT At the core of Kant’s theoretical philosophy lies the deduction of the categories: his effort to secure the distinctiveness of sensibility and understanding and to provide a necessary relation between the domains of these faculties. The argument for this claim is presented in two different versions - i.e., the A and B editions of the Critique of pure reason - and is one of the most puzzling in Kant’s corpus. The common view in the literature that considers the importance of the A-deduction and tries to present its structure is that it must be understood in the light of the B-deduction argument. I aim at contesting this view and offering an internal reconstruction of the A-deduction argument which reveals its unique methodology. The thesis advanced is that the A-deduction follows an analytical methodology and that this methodology does not allow the accomplishment of the task of the deduction stated in Kant’s effort. At first, Kant’s retrospect of the A-deduction (KrV, A XVI - XVII) is taken into account. After that, a consideration of the part of the argument described as ‘subjective deduction’ (KrV, A 94 - A 130) is carried out.
  • Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío Articles

    Otero, Manuel Pérez

    Abstract in Spanish:

    RESUMEN Según el incompatibilismo sobre el libre albedrío, la existencia de decisiones y acciones libres sería metafísicamente imposible en un mundo determinista. Las teorías de ciertos filósofos incompatibilistas están en conflicto con ideas generales sobre la naturaleza en un sentido más fuerte: postulan un concepto de libertad que tampoco es posible bajo una concepción naturalista de las acciones. Describo aquí una posición incompatibilista acorde con el naturalismo, renunciando a una suposición compartida por la mayoría de los incompatibilistas: que la indeterminación es relevante para el libre albedrío porque contribuye al control y/o a la autoría del agente respecto a sus acciones.

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT For incompatibilists about free will, the existence of free decisions and actions would be metaphysically impossible in a deterministic world. A few incompatibilist philosophers hold theories that are in conflict with some ideas about nature in a stronger sense: they postulate a concept of freedom that it is nos possible under a naturalistic conception of actions. I describe here an incompatibilist view which fits into naturalism. The key idea is to renounce to an usual assumption shared by most incompatibilists: the thesis that indetermination is relevant to free will because it contributes to the agent’s control and/or authorship over her actions.
  • BOOK REVIEW: CARNIELLI, W., CONIGLIO, M. Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, Contradiction and Negation. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Series. (New York: Springer, 2016. ISSN: 2214-9775.) Book Review

    Antunes, Henrique; Ciccarelli, Vincenzo

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT Review of the book 'Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, Contradiction and Negation' (2016), by Walter Carnielli and Marcelo Coniglio
  • BOOK REVIEW: DE PONTE, Maria & KORTA, Kepa (eds.). Reference and Representation in Thought and Language (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pages) Book Review

    Martone, Filipe

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.
  • BOOK REVIEW: PREDELLI, S. Proper Names: A Millian Account (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, ix+165) Book Review

    Guercio, Nicolás Lo

    Abstract in English:

    ABSTRACT In this review I discuss Stefano Predelli’s book Proper Names: A Millian Account. The book provides a defense of the traditional Millian view according to which proper names are non-indexical, rigid devices of direct reference. In addition, Predelli discusses (and discards) some usual interpretations as misconceptions and it contests many common objections. I provide an overview of its chapters and consider some of its strengths and weaknesses.
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