The question what is science remains pertinent. Although taken for granted by some, and over-estimated by others, the issue gets stronger every time a new subject tries to reach a scientific status. The bending - or even the replacement - of the contemporary criteria used to define what is scientific is the central topic of this discussion that has gained manichaeist aspects, focusing the opposition between positivism and post-modernism. Within this debate, many subjects are considered to be positivists, despite their philosophical, theoretical and methodological differences. Taking this into account, would it be possible to call positivism the hegemonic epistemology? The main goal of this article is therefore to show that, in spite of the influences of positivism, this is an inadequate label. This idea will be supported by three main arguments: (i) positivism is limited to a historical context; (ii) the deductive sense of contemporary investigation represents a rupture with the concept of positivism; and (iii) the rules of classification adopted by positivism groups subjects that are essentially diverse.
Epistemology; Positivism; Post-modernism; Science
