O processo sucessório e a abertura de capital nas empresas brasileiras: objetivos conflitantes

Procianoy, Jairo Laser

doi:10.1590/S0034-75901994000400009

ARTIGOS

O processo sucessório e a abertura de capital nas empresas brasileiras: objetivos conflitantes

Jairo Laser Procianoy

Professor da UFRS, Professor Visitante da Georgetown University e Doutorando na FEA/USP

Palavras-chave: Sucessão, abertura de capital, mercado de capitais brasileiro.

Key words: Sucession, going public, Brazilian capital market.

Texto completo disponível apenas em PDF.

Full text available only in PDF format.

Artigo recebido pela Redação da RAE em dezembro/93, avaliado e aprovado para publicação em maio/94.

1. CASA GRANDE NETO, H. Abertura do capital de empresas no Brasil: um enfoque prático. 2. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1989.

2. DeANGELO, H., DeANGELO, L Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study of public corporations with dual classes of common shares. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 14, p. 33-69, 1985.

3. JENSEN, M. C., MECKLlNG, W. H. Theory of the firm: management behavior, agency costs and ownership structurs. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305-60, 1976.

4. AGRAWAL, A., NAGARAJAN, N. J. Corporate capital structure, agency costs and ownership control: the case of all-equity firms. Journal of Finance, v. XLV, n.4, p. 1325-31, Sep. 1990.

5. LEVY,H. Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock. Journal of Finance, v. 38, n. 1, p. 79-93, Mar. 1982.

6. JENSEN, M. C., MECKLlNG, W. H. Op. cit.

7. AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON,H. Liquidity, asset prices and financial policy. Financial Analysts Journal, p. 56-66, Nov./Dec.1991.

1. CASA GRANDE NETO, H. Abertura do capital de empresas no Brasil: um enfoque prático 2. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1989.
2. DeANGELO, H., DeANGELO, L Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study of public corporations with dual classes of common shares. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 14, p. 33-69, 1985.
3. JENSEN, M. C., MECKLlNG, W. H. Theory of the firm: management behavior, agency costs and ownership structurs. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305-60, 1976.
4. AGRAWAL, A., NAGARAJAN, N. J. Corporate capital structure, agency costs and ownership control: the case of all-equity firms. Journal of Finance, v. XLV, n.4, p. 1325-31, Sep. 1990.
5. LEVY,H. Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock. Journal of Finance, v. 38, n. 1, p. 79-93, Mar. 1982.
7. AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON,H. Liquidity, asset prices and financial policy. Financial Analysts Journal, p. 56-66, Nov./Dec.1991.

Datas de Publicação

Publicação nesta coleção
12 Jun 2013
Data do Fascículo
Ago 1994

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[1] 1. CASA GRANDE NETO, H. Abertura do capital de empresas no Brasil: um enfoque prático 2. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1989.

[2] 2. DeANGELO, H., DeANGELO, L Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study of public corporations with dual classes of common shares. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 14, p. 33-69, 1985.

[3] 3. JENSEN, M. C., MECKLlNG, W. H. Theory of the firm: management behavior, agency costs and ownership structurs. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305-60, 1976.

[4] 4. AGRAWAL, A., NAGARAJAN, N. J. Corporate capital structure, agency costs and ownership control: the case of all-equity firms. Journal of Finance, v. XLV, n.4, p. 1325-31, Sep. 1990.

[5] 5. LEVY,H. Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock. Journal of Finance, v. 38, n. 1, p. 79-93, Mar. 1982.

[6] 7. AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON,H. Liquidity, asset prices and financial policy. Financial Analysts Journal, p. 56-66, Nov./Dec.1991.