Divergent status-seeking in elite clubs: Brazil, China, and the BRICS expansion in Latin America

Abstract

BRICS increased its geopolitical reach with a recent expansion. However, a divergent status-seeking, conceptualized as antagonistic strategies to gain status, emerged in BRICS during this process. While China defended the expansion, Brazil hesitated to accept it. Focusing on Latin America, where both seek to gain status, I analyzed how Brazil’s and China’s divergent status-seeking influenced the applications of Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela for BRICS. I concluded that status-seeking motivations drove the candidacies of these states. However, Brazil served as a gatekeeper, potentially hardening the acceptance of Latin American countries in BRICS due to status calculations. Argentina’s entry was more acceptable for Brazil’s strategy to garner prestige than Venezuela’s. Meanwhile, China defended a broader expansion, supporting all four candidacies.

BRICS; Status; Brazil; China; Latin America

Introduction

BRICS, an organization initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (with South Africa joining the group in 2011), underwent an expansion process with the addition of Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia as full members in 2024. Saudi Arabia would be the eleventh member; however, the government is still assessing whether it will join BRICS. Besides the new members, BRICS created the category of ‘partner countries’, with Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam entering this category from 2025 onwards. The process of expansion, however, has revealed some internal divergences within BRICS. While China promoted the inclusion of new member states, Brazil and India hesitated to accept the group’s enlargement.

As argued in this manuscript, Brazil and China had divergent status-seeking strategies, which I conceptualized as a zero-sum situation in which two or more states must employ opposing, antagonist, and incompatible strategies to gain international status. For China, having more members in BRICS represented more prestige vis-à-vis the US, its main competitor in terms of international status. Brazil competes with other emerging powers to have a higher stance in the international status hierarchy. Thus, having more emerging countries in BRICS would represent an erosion of the group’s exclusive membership. The literature on status, however, has focused mainly on the global level, needing further research to comprehend how competing strategies may emerge from within an elite club such as BRICS (Xie 2019; Røren 2024). This paper aims to contribute to the theoretical debate on status through an empirical analysis of intra-BRICS dynamics of status-seeking. As a region underrepresented in the BRICS and one where Brazil and China exert significant influence, I focused on the process of Latin American states ‘ entry into BRICS.

Therefore, this article aims to understand how the divergent status-seeking strategies of Brazil and China have influenced the expansion of BRICS in Latin America. The next chapter presents the theoretical debate about status in international politics and the conceptualization of divergent status-seeking. Then, I turned to Brazil’s and China’s strategies to improve their identity and garner international prestige, discussing how their strategies created divergent positionalities regarding BRICS and its expansion. Considering the status-seeking nature of these states, I turned to the processes of entry into the BRICS by four Latin American states: Argentina (invited to become a BRICS full member, but rejected by Javier Milei), Bolivia and Cuba (new BRICS partner countries), and Venezuela (aimed to join BRICS but was not invited).

Status-seeking, elite clubs, and divergent status-seeking

The literature on status has garnered substantial attention in recent years (MacDonald and Parent 2021). Following Deborah Larson (2015, 327), I will understand status as “a group’s overall place in the social hierarchy.” One central aspect of status is that it is always relational (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Larson 2015; Wohlforth et al. 2017). It depends on how other states recognize or not one’s status (Wohlforth et al. 2017; Duque 2018). One theoretical framework used to approach status is Social Identity Theory (SIT). The central perspective in SIT is that states, as social actors, will seek to achieve a positive identity (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Gouveia Junior 2024). SIT affirms that states can employ three distinct strategies to achieve a positive self-image and status: Mobility, Creativity, and Competition (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). Mobility refers to accepting the pre-established norms and attempting to improve one’s position in such a context (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Gouveia Junior 2024). Meanwhile, creativity emerges when states decide to reinterpret the aspects usually attributed to high status (Ward 2017). Finally, competition emerges when two or more states compete to achieve a higher level of a particular aspect related to status.

A recent development in the status literature that will guide this research is the work by Røren (2024). Røren proposes that researchers should focus on more local rather than global dynamics when investigating status. Competition for status is allegedly observed in specific social contexts, such as a region, community, or club (Røren 2024). Such a relation becomes apparent when considering the concept of social closure, which Duque (2018) proposes as influencing status. Social closure refers to the tendency of high-status states to interact more frequently with one another and with members of their high-status group than with outsiders (Duque 2018). To understand the dynamics of status-seeking within a group of states, it is essential to examine specific contexts rather than global dynamics.

Another important aspect is that due to its relational stance, status sometimes appears as a zero-sum game (MacDonald and Parent 2021; Rathbun et al. 2022). Especially those authors who focus on status as a hierarchical system tend to highlight it as a zero-sum relationship (Rathbun et al. 2022). However, not all scholars view status as a strictly defined hierarchy; some authors affirm that states can cooperate to gain status in a mutually beneficial manner (Larson 2015; Xie 2019). Larson (2015) and her work with Shevchenko (2010) affirm that through mechanisms of creativity, a state can propose aspects that contribute to a positive self-image and, consequently, status. According to Xie (2019), one mechanism used to gain prestige through cooperation is the establishment of multilateral forums.

States may employ a variety of strategies to gain status, and one of these is joining ‘elite clubs’ (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Ward 2017; Larson 2019; Johnson and Shreve 2023; Ferry and O’Brien-Udry 2024; Gouveia Junior 2024; Røren 2024). As Ferry and O’Brien-Udry (2024) assert, being a member of exclusive organizations becomes a yearning for prestige as long as membership offers an advantage compared to non-members. The level of exclusivity of a club determines the extent of the status it provides (Johnson and Shreve 2023; Røren 2024). With a restricted membership, clubs such as the G7 or the BRICS create a competitive environment for joining, as they are not open to all states (Røren 2024). Here, the concept of recognition assumes special significance. Accepting a new member into an exclusive club signifies that the club’s older members recognize the new member has met the expected characteristics required for admission (Duque 2018).

However, even though clubs can be spaces of cooperation to gain prestige, Larson (2019) acknowledges that within clubs, emerging power competes for status. In the cases of China, India, and Russia, Larson (2019) admits that they cooperate within the BRICS or the SCO because these organizations enhance their status vis-à-vis Western powers. This work by Larson, however, is an exception, and few studies have focused on the dynamics that emerge when the interests of status-seeking states clash within an elite club (Xie 2019, 173). I will refer to divergent status-seeking in such situations where states employ different strategies to garner status that can clash within an elite club. Divergent status-seeking occurs when two or more states must employ antagonist and incompatible strategies to achieve international status. Thus, divergent status-seeking is a zero-sum context in which a political decision enhances one state’s status at the expense of the other. However, the incompatibility of strategies to gain international prestige can refer to a specific political decision within a broader context of cooperation aimed at achieving status. For instance, the entry of a state into an elite club may increase the status of one member but reduce the status of another. Even in clubs created to enhance the status of all members, divergent status-seeking may emerge, as competition within elite clubs does exist (Larson 2019; Xie 2019; Røren 2024).

Considering Røren’s (2024) theoretical claim that status primarily emerges in localized dimensions, studying how divergent status-seeking unfolds within elite clubs is a fundamental approach to advancing knowledge on status-seeking. As an elite club composed of Global South states, BRICS arises as an optimal case study to fill this gap in the literature. Since the rivalry between India and China has been a focus of works discussing status (Pu 2017a; Larson 2019), I will focus on the divergences between Brazil and China within the BRICS framework. Both are status-seeking states that employ different strategies to enhance their international prestige.

Brazil’s and China’s status-seeking strategies

Brazil’s pursuit of status is one of the major driving forces in Brazilian foreign policy (Buarque 2024). Brazil is often perceived as aspiring to a higher international status (MacDonald and Parent 2021). However, significant literature has found that, internationally, Brazil still lags in the quest for status when compared to other emerging powers (Røren and Beaumont 2019; Buarque 2023; Buarque and Ribeiro 2023). Røren and Beaumont (2019) even found that, among BRICS countries, Brazil underperforms the most in terms of its material capabilities and international prestige. Despite its attempt in the 2000s to gain international recognition, Brazil seems to have failed in this objective.

A central aspect of Brazilian status-seeking is the ‘do-good’ state strategy, an attempt to apply ‘creativity’ to improve its identity (Gouveia Junior 2024). Brazil has historically sought to lead conflict resolution processes, which is perceived as an attempt to gain status (Buarque and Ribeiro 2023). Especially during Lula da Silva’s presidency, the country attempted to increase its participation in peacekeeping missions, cooperation projects, and conflict mediation. It is also crucial to consider that the Brazilian quest for status is characterized by its hybridity between the Global North and the Global South, aiming to serve as a bridge between the two (Carvalho 2020; Buarque 2023; Gouveia Junior 2024). Hybridity can be considered a strategy of mobility. Brazil acknowledges the distinction between the North and the South and seeks to improve its position in this hierarchy by occupying a middle ground between the two.

South America is a primary focus of Brazilian status-seeking, aiming to create a “consensual hegemony” in the region (MacDonald and Parent 2021, 7). Despite its winding leadership in the area, Brazil has consistently maintained its regional power status (Nolte and Schenoni 2021). However, as a regional leader, the country has historically faced challenges in being followed by other South American states (Malamud 2011; Nolte and Schenoni 2021). States such as Argentina and Venezuela in South America, as well as Mexico in Latin America, have questioned Brazil’s capacity for leadership in the region (Malamud 2011; Stuenkel 2020). Beyond Latin America, Buarque and Ribeiro (2023) demonstrate that for diplomats and elites from the Security Council’s Permanent 5, Brazil is not perceived as a significant power, holding a secondary status compared to major powers.

Similar to Brazil, gaining status is a primary driving force behind China’s foreign policy (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Wolf 2014; Gloria 2021). However, unlike Brazil, China has consistently gained international status in the past few decades. In one of the pivotal texts in the status literature, Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko (2010) discussed how China sought to regain its status as a Great Power since the end of the Cold War. The Chinese perspective, which holds that China was humiliated by Western powers in the past, has guided much of its efforts to gain recognition (Wolf 2014; Pu 2017b). Due to profound cultural and historical disparities, China is not easily accommodated within the international status hierarchy, which is primarily controlled by Western powers (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). However, to avoid potential conflicts arising from Chinese status-seeking, some argue that the US should devise mechanisms to fulfill China’s status-seeking aspirations (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Wolf 2014). Such mechanisms would mitigate the risk of China adopting a more competitive strategy.

To advance its international prestige, China has developed a series of initiatives. One example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through the BRI, China aims to foster a positive self-image, seeking to create win-win cooperation (Gloria 2021). Beyond the BRI, China has invested in organizations such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to enhance its status (Larson 2019). In these forums, China tends to increase the number of participating states as much as possible. Including more states in Chinese-led organizations seeks to demonstrate, particularly to domestic audiences, that China is regaining its status as the ‘Middle Empire.’ As Pu (2017b, 132) asserts, a significant part of Chinese elites claim to reestablish the country’s status acquired during “the Tang dynasty, as the world’s most advanced state.”

BRICS: a tool for status

Membership in elite clubs is often portrayed as a means by which states can gain status. BRICS is not an exception. Pål Røren and Paul Beaumont (2019, 429) even affirm that “the strongest commonality among the BRICS is their governments’ explicit desire to acquire higher social status.” The difficulty faced by the BRICS founding members in joining Western elite clubs is another transversal aspect. Larson and Shevchenko (2010, 67) assert that China and Russia attempted to follow Western rules but had their access refused by “Western elite clubs.” Similarly, India, Brazil, and South Africa established the IBSA forum following a G7 meeting, as they were not invited to participate in the discussions that led to the final decisions (Stuenkel 2020). Thus, for these states that sought to improve their international status and faced Western refusal to accept them in the existing elite clubs, BRICS was an opportunity to create their own elite club.

China’s embracement of BRICS is often perceived as one of the main reasons behind the group’s continuity (Hooijmaaijers 2021). As Ryan Powers and Jonathan Renshon (2021, 736) suggest, “[m]ore countries connecting to China through membership in China’s new IO thus directly implicates status.” China’s rapid economic growth and increasing political centrality in international politics may give it the capacity to challenge the existing US-led global order. Being in a club would only increase its members’ status if participating in it offers an advantage (Ferry and O’Brien-Udry 2024). As an exclusive club with a Chinese presence, BRICS offered the opportunity for some non-Western countries to gain status through an elite club perceived as being formed by the “next generation of Great Powers” (Larson 2015, 555). However, “[a]lthough dominating the BRICS through its economic resources, China has tried to accommodate the status aspirations of its club partners by agreeing to formal equality” (Larson 2019, 551). This dynamic became evident when the New Development Bank decided that all founding member states would have the same voting and financial quotas in the bank, despite the economic discrepancies among its members.

Beyond creating proximity with China, the BRICS also appears as an opportunity to gain status due to the group’s claims to advance the interests of the Global South. BRICS final declarations recurrently mention how the group seeks to create a more “just” and “democratic” international order (“Kazan Declaration: strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security.” 2024). Thus, for peripheral states, the group has a status of challenging a system that they perceive as unjust. The BRICS’ potential for change is evident in both rhetoric and practice, as seen in their claim to supplant the dollar in international commercial flows and the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides funding to projects with minimal conditionalities.

BRICS expansion: a clash of divergent status-seeking

BRIC was constituted in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In 2011, the group had its first expansion with the inclusion of South Africa. However, the group began to receive numerous expressions of interest in joining the organization, and in 2023, the BRICS underwent an expansion with five new members joining the group. As the literature and official discourses demonstrate, this process of expansion, however, was far from consensual within the group.

For Brazil, India, and South Africa, expanding BRICS membership could represent a loss in their international status. Being in BRICS has always been perceived by these states as a prime opportunity to participate in an exclusive club alongside other key international actors. At the BRICS’ inception, Brazil and India sought to establish an elite group where they would acquire full membership, a goal rejected by Western powers in the G7 (Stuenkel 2020). As the literature on status-seeking asserts, participating in elite clubs is a paramount way of gaining international status. Hence, India and Brazil were concerned about expansion without clearly established criteria (Kaura 2024, 166). Opening the group to anyone would mean that BRICS would lose its characteristic of exclusiveness. Not surprisingly, these two states also omitted the possibility of expansion at the 2019 and 2021 summits (Papa and Han 2025).

For Brazil, specifically, the country has always valued its participation in BRICS as a means to assert its leadership in Latin America. Expanding the group to include other Latin American states would undermine Brazil’s distinctiveness. Considering Brazil’s concerns about China’s economic presence in the region, other Latin American states would likely benefit from joining BRICS, which would provide them with closer access to high-level Chinese officials.

However, China and Russia were the primary drivers of the expansion. For Russia, expanding BRICS would be a crucial step in overcoming the isolationism that the West attempted to impose after the Russian invasion of Crimea (Larson 2019). For China, having more member states would represent an increase in its international influence (Papa and Han 2025). Hence, the Chinese leaders vowed to create BRICS+ as a mechanism to strengthen its soft power with smaller non-Western states (Hooijmaaijers 2021). The new BRICS members, due to their smaller economic and military capacities, do not pose a real threat to China’s status. Moreover, China has consistently viewed the BRICS as an opportunity to advance its commercial interests in a club without US participation. Not surprisingly, China attempted to create a Free Trade Agreement within BRICS in 2011, a proposal that did not receive the support of any other BRICS member (Han and Papa 2024). According to Carmody (2024), China encouraged the creation of a BRICS+ initiative, aiming to counteract its weakening economic growth by pursuing potential economic deals with the new BRICS member states. In 2022, despite the other members not being prepared for the group’s expansion, China prioritized it and included the prospect of enlarging the group in the summit’s final declaration (Papa and Han 2025).

Considering the Brazilian and Chinese strategies for acquiring international status, we can conclude that the BRICS expansion, as a whole, represented a clash of divergent status-seeking for these two states. For Brazil, a more exclusive BRICS membership would represent greater status. As the South American BRICS member competes with other emerging powers, being one of the few powers participating in the group represented a distinctive and positive identity. For China, enlarging this membership would mean more states under its closer influence and, consequently, greater status in its competition with the US. The two countries’ strategies, therefore, diverge regarding the expansion of BRICS. It is crucial to analyze how this clash of divergent status-seeking influenced the expansion of BRICS.

Methodology

This research aims to contribute to the literature on status by examining how divergent status-seeking behaviors influence a group’s dynamics. Considering that China and Brazil employed divergent status-seeking strategies during this process, the BRICS’ expansion presents a promising avenue for examining how divergence in prestige-gathering strategies can influence international politics. As the BRICS received a significant number of applications to join the group, it is necessary to define which processes of entrance to analyze in this regard. As the previous sections identified, Latin America is a region where the status-seeking strategies of Brazil and China clash. Thus, I will focus on the process of BRICS entry of Latin American states.

I will analyze four cases: Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela. All states had a well-recorded process of BRICS application. While Argentina was invited to become a full member and declined, Bolivia and Cuba became BRICS partner countries. Meanwhile, Venezuela attempted to become a BRICS partner country, but was rejected. Therefore, the four cases had differences that can contribute to our understanding of how Brazil and China influenced the process of BRICS’ expansion. Why some of these states became BRICS partners, and others did not, can clarify how divergent status-seeking influences political decisions.

To conduct this analysis, I employed a qualitative approach similar to other studies on status, which is based on a discourse analysis (MacDonald and Parent 2021). I primarily utilized official declarations issued by Brazilian and Chinese officials, as well as statements by the political leaders of Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela. Some interviews given by the presidents and ministers of these states were also utilized. All data was collected online. In addition to these primary sources, I also utilized published academic research as a secondary source. My analysis followed an interpretive design, situating meaning-making by political actors and involving an “iterative back-and-forth between theoretical frameworks and data generation” (Kurowska 2020, 95). During the analysis process, I considered as linked to status-seeking only those topics that could be explained by STI’s three strategies to achieve status (Mobility, Creativity, and Competition). Following the interpretative paradigm, such considerations must be taken into account, considering the dynamics of situated meaning and researchers’ positionality.

Argentina: the Latin American Invitee

Argentina was the only Latin American state invited to become a full member of BRICS. Several dynamics related to status-seeking influenced the country’s initial acceptance of joining the group and its later rejection. Conversations about Argentina joining BRICS did not occur only in 2023 when the official invitation was made public. At the beginning of the 2010s, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping would have allegedly encouraged Argentina to join the group, considering even the possibility of changing the acronym to BRICSA (Cooper 2016).

When former President Alberto Fernández announced that Argentina would join the BRICS, his official communication indicated that membership in the group would enhance Argentina’s international status. Fernández (2023) emphasized how being a BRICS member would enable Argentina to play a more decisive role in conflict mediation. Furthermore, the country would allegedly be in a better political position to “tackle the sovereignty dispute” over the “Malvinas Islands” (Fernández 2023). According to Alejandro Freikel (2023), the BRICS would represent a paramount forum for advancing Argentina’s claims over the islands, as all BRICS founding members agree that the United Kingdom should engage in negotiations with Argentina.

Another aspect that former President Alberto Fernández (2023) highlighted was the need to create a new international financial architecture more concerned with the needs of peripheral states. It is worth mentioning that one reason presented as leading Brazil to support Argentina’s entrance into the group was Brazil’s interest in the de-dollarization of its commercial trade with Argentina (Rizzo 2023). In an interview where he supported Argentina’s entry into the BRICS, Lula da Silva (2023) emphasized the need to use national currency in trade with Argentina. Trading in their currencies would represent an attempt to utilize mobility to go higher in the status hierarchy. It would benefit both countries in terms of status, as they would become less dependent on the US dollar.

Nevertheless, another dynamic that played a pivotal role in Brazil’s acceptance of Argentina’s entrance into the group was Brazil’s fear that an overly Asian-centered BRICS expansion would diminish its importance in the group’s geopolitical discussions (Giaccaglia 2024). Argentina emerged as the best option in Latin America for Brazil due to its political and economic proximity (Giaccaglia 2024). When defending Argentina’s entrance into the bloc, Lula da Silva (2023) affirmed that Brazil, due to its economic proximity, needs a stronger Argentina to gain prominence. Similar to Brazil, Argentina is a democratic state that seeks to establish dialogue with both Western and non-Western states (Hoffman, 2023). Thus, Argentina’s entrance into BRICS could easily be accommodated with Brazil’s status strategies. This aspect demonstrates that Røren’s (2024) theoretical proposal to examine status-seeking within a group can elucidate some internal dynamics that a global analysis may overlook. Only by understanding Brazil’s fear of an overly Asian-centered BRICS expansion can one comprehend why the country supported Argentina’s entry into the bloc, despite Argentina’s potential for regional leadership. Brazil’s and China’s strategies were not necessarily divergent in this case, as both perceived Argentina’s presence in the bloc as fostering their status.

In this case, the divergence in status-seeking strategies emerged from within Argentina. Political factions in the country viewed BRICS as seeking to transform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which they perceived as diverging from Argentina’s national interests. Argentina has opposed previous Brazilian attempts to obtain a Permanent Seat in the UNSC (Kunrath and Silva 2014). Rather than gaining status through its membership in BRICS, Argentina under Milei opted to prioritize its process to join the OECD. Instead of criticizing the dollar’s centrality in international trade, Javier Milei included the dollarization of the Argentine economy as one of his main electoral proposals to mitigate inflation and monetary devaluation (Poole-Fuller 2024, 39). On this basis, acquiring status through joining a group such as BRICS, which discursively challenges the dollar’s dominance in international trade, becomes an apparent conflict of interest, and Argentina’s strategy to garner status started to diverge from Brazil’s.

Bolivia and Cuba: The New BRICS Partner Countries

Bolivia has substantial economic interests in joining BRICS. Among Bolivia’s top 5 export destinations in 2023, four of them are BRICS members: 1º Brazil, 2º India, 3º China, and 5º United Arab Emirates (Observatory for Economic Complexity 2025). Bolivia has also received a substantial amount of Chinese investment in infrastructure, totaling more than $4 billion between 2015 and 2019 (Dussel Peters 2020, 6). Beyond the opportunity to gain closer contact with pivotal commercial partners, Bolivian President Luis Arce has made declarations that demonstrate how creating a positive self-image is at the core of Bolivia’s application to BRICS. Arce has declared that joining BRICS as a partner member represents the most significant achievement of Bolivian foreign policy, as it makes Bolivia an actor in the emergence of multipolarity (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia 2024). His statements at the 2024 BRICS summit demonstrate that changing the international order, particularly the financial order, is a significant reason behind Bolivia’s aim to join the group. Arce (2024, 1) affirmed: “It’s Bolivia’s great honor to participate in this forum, to reaffirm our conviction that the BRICS is a tangible proof of the possibility of creating a new, more balanced and just world order for humanity.” The Bolivian president criticizes unipolarity, the US blockade of Cuba, the dominance of the dollar, and neocolonialism (Arce 2024, 1). He makes his disagreement with the existing international order clear:

It is definitely a new sunrise that announces not only the expiration of the Breton Woods agreement that marked prosperity for the Western countries since 1945, using as a flagship the economy and the dictatorship of the US dollar, to dominate and economically subjugate the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to build a straitjacket to the center-peripheral relations; but it is also a new sunrise because it announces the establishment of an irreversible trend towards multipolarity (Arce 2024, 1).

President Arce’s words are a clear example of aiming to create a positive self-image through creativity, a strategy identified by the SIT as a means to garner status (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). The Bolivian President seeks to reinterpret certain aspects related to prestige (e.g., having a strong currency) to highlight the negative side of it, namely, the subjugation of peoples from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The discourse proffered by the Head of the Cuban Delegation, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla (2024) in the BRICS summit demonstrates a perspective remarkably similar to the Bolivian perspective: “Its [BRICS] expansion to other countries would help mitigate the effects of the current unjust and unbalanced international monetary system and reduce the influence of the U.S. dollar, which is often used as a tool of pressure, negatively impacting the quality of life of many of our peoples.” (Rodriguez Parrilla 2024).

For Brazil, having Cuba and Bolivia as BRICS partner countries was not problematic in terms of status. Bolivia has not historically challenged Brazil’s status as a regional power. The country has even moved closer to Venezuela’s orbit of influence during Hugo Chávez’s mandates (Malamud 2011). Bolivia’s entrance into BRICS could enhance Brazil’s influence over the country without becoming a significant competitor to Brazil’s identity as the leader of South America within BRICS. Similarly, Cuba does not pose a challenge to Brazil’s status. Brazil’s status as a regional power primarily refers to South America rather than Latin America as a whole (Malamud 2011). Moreover, Brazil has historically opposed U.S. sanctions against Cuba (Stuenkel 2020, 163). In his remarks at the 2024 BRICS summit, Mauro Vieira, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, affirmed Brazil’s commitment to ending the US blockade of Cuba, which he considered illegal (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2024). As a state that strives to gain prestige as a ‘do-good’ state, proclaiming the illegality of US sanctions contributes to Brazil’s status as an essential player in the Americas as a whole. Meanwhile, from the Chinese perspective, Bolivia and Cuba are two friendly states; incorporating them into BRICS only strengthened China’s influence over them, as having more states in BRICS increases China’s status (Hooijmaaijers 2021). Therefore, regarding the entry of Bolivia and Cuba into the group, Brazil and China did not have divergent status-seeking strategies.

Venezuela: BRICS’ Rejection

In 2024, Nicolas Maduro placed particular emphasis on Venezuela’s entry into BRICS, attending the group’s summit in Kazan, Russia. China endorsed Venezuela’s application for BRICS membership, as the two states have had significant proximity since Hugo Chávez’s ascension to power. Indeed, the Asian power has provided Venezuela with substantial loans in exchange for oil (To and Acuña 2019; Rosales 2020). According to Rosales (2020, 1), between 2007 and 2019, “China has loaned over US$62 billion to Venezuela”. As a counterpart, China established agreements with the Venezuelan government that guaranteed oil supplies at more stable prices (To and Acuña 2019; Rosales 2020). Due to Venezuela’s misuse of Chinese aid and its difficulty in paying its debts, some have identified that the Chinese-Venezuelan partnership is facing challenges and losing momentum (Moleiro 2025). However, despite this context, China supported Venezuela’s entrance into the BRICS. In 2023, Nicolas Maduro and Xi Jinping issued a joint statement that clarified the importance of oil to explain Chinese support for Venezuela’s entrance into BRICS:

As a reliable energy supplier and the world’s largest oil and fourth-largest natural gas reserve country, Venezuela can make important contributions to the energy agenda of this mechanism. China welcomes Venezuela’s positive intention to join BRICS and supports Venezuela’s efforts to achieve this goal (Uddin 2023).

In fact, with the inclusion of its new members, BRICS has become a group comprising countries that collectively account for a significant portion of global oil production. Including Venezuela in the group would potentiate it. Despite having the potential to contribute to BRICS’ energy and Chinese support, Venezuela’s application for BRICS membership was not accepted in 2024. According to Maduro, Brazil was responsible for the non-acceptance of Venezuela’s entry into the group. In an interview with the Venezuelan state-owned television, Maduro affirmed that:

Of the ten members, we had the guaranteed, secure, and written vote of nine. And the only one missing, as the only country in the Latin American and Caribbean region that, due to the very process of founding the BRICS, had to propose or could use some sort of veto power, was Brazil (…). Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira told me to my face, “President Maduro, Brazil does not veto Venezuela” (Maduro 2024, author’s translation).

Maduro, then, justified the supposed Brazilian veto by citing the desire of a Brazilian diplomat who supported the former right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro and had decided to reject Venezuela’s entrance into the BRICS “a few minutes” before the list of partner countries was made public (Maduro 2024). An official communication from the Venezuelan Ministry of External Relations suggested that the Brazilian veto resulted from the persistence of Bolsonaro’s policies among Brazilian external relations personnel (Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores de República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2024). All communications from Venezuelan officials confirmed that Brazil had vetoed Venezuela’s entry into the group. The Brazilian government did not refuse it. However, communications made by Brazilian officials indicate that the denial of Venezuela’s entrance into the BRICS was not an individual decision of a right-wing diplomat, as Maduro claimed.

According to the media, Brazil refused Venezuela’s application for BRICS due to the polemical 2024 Venezuelan national election. It is noteworthy that Venezuela was suspended from Mercosur by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 2017 due to its shift towards non-democratic governance. However, unlike Mercosur, which requires all member states to have democratic institutions through the Ushuaia Protocol, being a democracy is not a prerequisite for joining BRICS or becoming a BRICS partner. For instance, among the new partner countries, Belarus is the longest-lasting dictatorship in Europe with a poor record of human rights defense. Thus, not being a democracy is not, per se, enough to explain why Venezuela did not join BRICS.

The declarations made by Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Chief Advisor for Foreign Policy, elucidate this point. Amorim affirmed that the reason Venezuela did not enter the group was not ideological (Ribbeiro 2024). He even mentioned that Cuba joined the group to justify that. Then, Celso Amorim, in an interview with the Brazilian newspaper ‘O Globo’, affirmed that:

We are not making a moral or political judgment about the country itself. The BRICS have countries that practice certain types of regimes and other types of regimes; the question is whether they have the capacity, due to their political weight and relationship capacity, to contribute to a more peaceful world (Gularte 2024, author’s translation).

In another interview, Amorim clarifies his perspective: “I do not support Venezuela’s entry. I think we have to go slowly. There is no point in filling it [BRICS] with countries; otherwise, soon a new G-77 will be created.” (“Amorim diz à CNN ser contra entrada da Venezuela nos Brics.” 2023, author’s translation). He complemented by explaining how the international turbulence influences his viewpoint:

The entry of new countries must be carefully studied. Countries that can contribute must be considered strategically. It is important to have a strategic conception of admissions. Remember that the world is experiencing wars that could escalate into world wars. Therefore, the admission criteria are more important than the country itself. (“Amorim diz à CNN ser contra entrada da Venezuela nos Brics.” 2023, author’s translation).

One aspect to consider is that Venezuela has been perceived as one of the Latin American states that challenged Brazil’s regional power status (Malamud 2011; Stuenkel 2020). Since Hugo Chávez’s election, Venezuela has sought to champion Latin American integration on its own terms (Santander and Alonso 2018). Venezuela “supports Brazil as a regional power and leader while maintaining that Venezuela, too, could enact such roles” (Thies and Nieman 2017, 67). For instance, Venezuela increased its influence over Central America and the Caribbean between 2000 and 2015, primarily through easier access to its petroleum, which may be seen as an attempt to establish itself as a regional hegemon in this sub-region (Santander and Alonso 2018). Bringing also South American countries, such as Ecuador and Bolivia, into its sphere of influence, Hugo Chávez’s oil-based foreign policy posed a significant challenge to the Brazilian leadership in the region (Malamud 2011).

The fluctuations in oil prices and the economic crisis faced by Venezuela during Nicolas Maduro’s presidency hampered the country’s ability to maintain its more active foreign policy in Latin America. Hugo Chávez sought to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms to enhance Venezuela’s regional influence (Malamud 2011). The recent crisis, however, served as a “centrifugal force, ripping regional cooperation apart” (Bull and Rosales 2020, 13) and consequently undermined Venezuela’s capacity to lead in the region.

Another crucial aspect in Celso Amorim’s declarations is that he raises doubts about Venezuela’s capacity to contribute to “international peace.” Brazil’s strategy for gaining status relies on portraying the country as a ‘do-good state’ (Carvalho 2020; Gouveia Junior 2024). In April 2024, the Venezuelan government approved a law to proceed with the annexation of part of Guyana’s territory, known as Essequibo. The War in Ukraine had already created status dilemmas for Brazil (Gouveia Junior 2024). The possibility of a war in Latin America would represent a more direct challenge to Brazil’s status, as the country repeatedly enforces the peacefulness of its region.

The other South American state usually perceived as a potential challenger to Brazil’s regional power is Argentina (Malamud 2011; Santander and Alonso 2018; Stuenkel 2020), which was invited to join BRICS. Some differences between Venezuela and Argentina shall be drawn. As mentioned previously, Argentina shares with Brazil a strategy to garner status based on establishing bridges between the Global North and the Global South (Hoffmann 2023; Giaccaglia 2024). Venezuela has a clear anti-West stance (Santander and Alonso 2018). Brazil has historically recognized Argentina’s claims to the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (Freikel 2023). The same cannot be said concerning Venezuela’s claims to sovereignty over Essequibo. For the Brazilian strategy to gain international status, having Venezuela in BRICS would negatively impact this pursuit. Thus, considering China’s support for Venezuela’s entrance into the BRICS, we can conclude that Brazil and China had divergent status-seeking strategies about it.

Conclusions

This article aimed to contribute to the literature on status-seeking through the concept of divergent status-seeking. Although an elite club may represent a space for cooperation to garner prestige and recognition (Xie 2019), incompatible strategies to gain status can also arise. As a space where emerging powers seek to garner status, the BRICS is an optimal object for analyzing the dynamics of cooperation and competition for status. Most studies examining competition within BRICS focus on China and India (Pu 2017a; Larson 2019). As this research demonstrates, however, diverging interests in acquiring status also emerged between Brazil and China regarding the BRICS expansion. While China sought to expand membership to smaller states to spread its influence and prestige, Brazil aimed to maintain BRICS as an exclusive club with limited entrance.

As the region where Brazil aims to maintain its regional power status, and China seeks to expand its presence, Latin America has become the arena where these two divergent strategies clashed. Despite its desire to limit BRICS membership to a restricted number of states, Brazil did not perceive Bolivia or Cuba as challengers to its regional status. Similarly, Brazil viewed Argentina, especially under Alberto Fernández’s government, as a partner in its strategy to gain status through a defense of autonomy in the region without entirely severing ties with the West. Furthermore, the country feared an overly Asian-centered BRICS that would undermine its geopolitical importance (Giaccaglia 2024). Argentina appeared to be the best Latin American option for increasing the region’s significance within the group.

The analysis conducted in this research demonstrated that the rejection of Venezuela’s entrance into BRICS has a direct relation with divergent status-seeking between China and Brazil. After the 2024 presidential election, Maduro was re-elected in a highly contentious process. One well-known aspect of Brazilian status-seeking is its hybridity, attempting to dialogue with the ‘Global North’ and the ‘Global South’ (Carvalho 2020). As a democratic regime, Brazil would potentially lose prestige among its Western partners by accepting Maduro’s entry into BRICS. The situation in Essequibo also hindered Brazil’s endorsement of Venezuela’s entry. Following Celso Amorim’s declarations, Brazil questioned whether Maduro’s regime could bring “peace” to the region. Considering the Brazilian strategy of being a ‘do-good’ state, sharing BRICS membership with Venezuela could undermine this strategy if the country were to pursue a military intervention in Guyana. Hence, Brazil acted as a status gatekeeper in a meaningful club, rejecting Venezuela’s entry into BRICS.

This research contributes to the theoretical debate on status by advancing the concept of divergent status-seeking. Following Røren (2024), status dynamics happen mainly in a localized manner. Without considering intra-BRICS dynamics, it would have become difficult to identify why Brazil accepted Argentina’s entry, for instance. Further research on BRICS can examine other internal dynamics of competition and cooperation in status-seeking.

Acknowledgments

This research was funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portugal).

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• Data Availability Statement:
  Data supporting this study are included within the article.

Data availability

Data supporting this study are included within the article.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  24 Oct 2025
• Date of issue
  Sept 2025

History

• Received
  31 Mar 2025
• Accepted
  26 Aug 2025