AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY COURTS: CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE

Abstract

The study seeks, through empirical analysis, to answer the following question: Do the institutional characteristics of the Courts of Accountability, as defined in Federal Constitution of 1988, influence their performance? The response was achieved through statistical regression using the least squares method, which analyzed the relationship between performance and the capabilities of these autonomous organs. The performance was measured by the variables: number of cases judged; number of on-site inspections (initiative); amount of fines and refunds imputed; and percentage of rejection of government accounts in relation to the total of judged judgments. And the capacities for the following: value of the annual budget, total staff, percentage of permanent employees, whether there are Substitute Ministers/Substitute Judges and Prosecutors (both provided by public selection), and Ministers/Judges coming of these careers. Data were collected directly from the Courts through the Information Access Law. The article also presents important criticisms to previous studies in search of a more complete approach of the subject. This article, in search of a more real approach to the Courts of Accountability, also presents important criticisms to previous studies. Despite the focus of discussions for the improvement of the Courts of Accountability in Brazil revolving around the nominations of Ministers and Judges, the study indicates that another factor, neglected in the debates, is directly associated with an increase in the productivity and independence of these Courts, that is, the percentage of public agents coming from public selections.

Constitutional right; Administrative law; Public administration; Courts of Accounts; Empiricism