The early Wittgenstein conceived of ethics and aesthetics as one and the same. This essay aims to provide an interpretation of this idea. It examines the way it is put forward in the Tractatus and in some remarks from the Tagebücher 1914-1916, and argues that the unity of ethics and aesthetics is for Wittgenstein a way of looking at the world in such a way that the world does not appear to set limits for human life. Ethics extends the ability to confer meaning that men and women use in the realm of art-making, dealing with particular objects, to the realm of life and of the world taken as a whole. Claiming that ethics and aesthetics are one Wittgenstein points out that at the roots of ethics there is a certain way of looking at the world, a certain disposition towards life. This point of view on the world does not attribute value to the world because of the way it is. The world is seen, instead, as a source of wonder, and it is this fact that makes it valuable.
Wittgenstein; ethics; aesthetics; value