The Recognition of the Independence and the Empire of Brazil The Foreign and Diplomatic Policy of the Holy See

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic negotiations between the Holy See and Brazil regarding the recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire, which occurred from August 7, 1824, to January 23, 1826. The objective is to highlight the Holy See’s foreign and diplomatic policy, along with the numerous interests and challenges involved in the negotiations. This study contributes to the research on international relations between the Holy See and Brazil, as well as providing insight into the pontificate of Leo XII (1823-1829). Leo XII adopted a cautious and prudent strategy, opting to await reconciliation between King John VI and Emperor Pedro I. This approach aimed to safeguard the principle of legitimacy in foreign policy and respect the royal patronage of the King of Portugal. The diplomatic sources facilitating the development of this research were obtained from the Vatican Apostolic Archive, the Historical Archive “Propaganda Fide,” the Archive of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, and the Historical Archive of Itamaraty.

Holy See; international relations; Independence of Brazil

RESUMO

Pretende-se neste artigo analisar as negociações diplomáticas entre a Santa Sé e o Brasil para o reconhecimento da Independência e do Império brasileiro, que ocorreram de 7 de agosto de 1824 a 23 de janeiro de 1826. Nosso objetivo é destacar a política externa e diplomática da Santa Sé e os inúmeros interesses e desafios que envolveram as tratativas, com vistas a contribuir para os estudos sobre as relações internacionais entre a Santa Sé e o Brasil, assim como para a compreensão do pontificado de Leão XII (1823-1829). Leão XII adotou uma estratégia cautelosa e prudente, optando por aguardar a reconciliação entre D. João VI e D. Pedro I, a fim de resguardar o princípio de legitimidade na política externa e respeitar o padroado régio do rei de Portugal. As fontes diplomáticas que permitiram o desenvolvimento da pesquisa foram obtidas no Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, no Archivio Storico “de Propaganda Fide”, Archivio della Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari e no Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty.

Santa Sé; relações internacionais; Independência do Brasil

The purpose of this article is to analyze the diplomatic negotiations between the government of Rio de Janeiro¹ and the Holy See, which were utilized for the recognition of Brazil’s Independence and Empire. The period in question extends from August 7, 1824, when Francisco Correa Vidigal was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, to January 26, 1826, the date on which Leo XII recognized Brazil’s independence. The aim is to contribute to the investigation of diplomatic and political relations between the Holy See and Brazil. This subject remains little explored by Brazilian and European historiography. It also seeks to offer new perspectives for understanding the pontificate of Leo XII (1823-1829) and the administration of Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia in the Secretariat of State.²

In the field of foreign relations, the Holy See’s foreign and diplomatic policy is scarcely studied despite its significance in the international context. In Brazil, research on the international recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire predominantly focuses on the courts of Lisbon, London, Paris, and Vienna, as well as the United States and the states of the River Plate Basin. Only the research by Vasconcellos (2018 [1922]) and Azeredo (1932) concentrates on international recognition by the Holy See. These scholars relied on diplomatic correspondence preserved in the Itamaraty Historical Archive. Their narratives are connected to the foundation and consolidation of the Imperial State and for this reason, they emphasized the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Pedro I in conducting foreign policy, as well as the actions and performance of Brazilian agents.

With regard to the pontificate of Leo XII (1823-1829), recent research indicates the shortcomings of classical interpretations. As highlighted by Jankowiak (2019, p. 20), most studies tend to bpolemical than critical. Historiographical approaches often emphasize aspects of the personalities of Leo XII and Somaglia, who are frequently portrayed as methodical, rigid, and inflexible. Scholars also idealize the figures of Ercole Consalvi³ and Pius VII (1800-1823) and maintain that there was a rupture in both internal and external policies during Leo XII’s pontificate, as proposals and reforms introduced by Consalvi were suppressed (Leturia, 1959; Colaprieta, 1963; Pásztor, 1984; Truscello, 2019). In most studies, Leo XII is associated with the project of the Zealots, the majority faction of the Roman Curia, which opposed the Politicians.⁴ According to Jankowiak (2019, pp. 19-20, 26), the problem lies in equating the Zealots with the conservatives, thereby shaping the image of a rigid, inflexible, backward pontificate linked to medieval models and principles. However, when examining the political and religious aspects, elements of ‘modern’ government were observed in the pontificate of Leo XII, indicating a continuity, rather than a rupture, between Pius VII and Leo XII. For Regoli (2019, p. 28-51), Leo XII sought to satisfy the reformist expectations of his time by promoting changes, especially of a juridical-administrative nature. His pontificate was characterized by dynamism, an effervescence of ideas, projects, and reforms.

LEO XII AND INDEPENDENCE IN SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE AMERICA

The independence movements in America introduced new political challenges as the principle of legitimacy was challenged. The Holy Alliance members supported Spain’s rights, and later Portugal, to regain control over their colonies. The impact of these transformations, however, did not escape the notice of the Holy See, which, under the leadership of Pius VII and Consalvi, positioned itself in support of Spain and Portugal. These countries’ alliances dated back to the Crusades and the privileges of royal patronage, emphasizing the defense of the principle of legitimacy.

In December 1823, Leo XII summoned Consalvi to discuss the Catholic Church’s most pressing and immediate problems. Of the six topics discussed, the independence of the Americas, particularly that of the Spanish-American countries, received extensive attention during the debate (Montor, 1843, pp. 168-169). The question of America was causing internal divisions within the Roman Curia, especially among those opposed to recognizing governments established through revolutions.

In analyzing the international situation, Consalvi advised against the Holy See’s recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American countries, although he acknowledged that Ferdinand VII no longer ‘exercised any authority’ over his former colonies and would likely be unable to regain his sovereignty. He believed that the independence movements had a good chance of consolidation and that their governments would soon gain international recognition; consequently, the Holy See would do the same. Nevertheless, at that time, it was crucial to uphold the principle of legitimacy and wait for these movements and governments to be recognized by Portugal, Spain, and other European Catholic powers. For this reason, Consalvi suggested that Leo XII adopt a policy of neutrality⁵ on European and international issues and establish harmonious relations with the governments of America and with the Portuguese and Spanish Cortes (Montor, 1843, pp. 168-169).

This pendulum policy, swinging between liberalism and absolutism, aimed to prevent any form of opposition against the Holy See. Consalvi also argued that any form of government, except anti-religious ones, could be compatible with Catholicism and recognized as legitimate.⁶ This flexibility allowed for adaptation to new circumstances, ruptures, and challenges instead of clinging to rigid principles. When advising the Nuncio to Spain, Giacomo Giustiniani, on the Holy See’s policies, Consalvi stated, “The problem we must solve is not to avoid every kind of evil, but to find the way to suffer as little as possible.”⁷

Consalvi argued that the Holy See should separate political and religious matters to preserve the Church’s pastoral mission and the pontiff’s authority over local Churches. Therefore, the recognition of a country’s independence or a new government should be a purely political matter, separate from religion or antagonism, promoting the secularization of society.

Consalvi advised Leo XII to follow ‘these policies, but with prudence and without contradictions.’ He also recommended, ‘Holy Father, you are a personal friend of the Court of Madrid. Your Holiness will know how to reconcile tenderness with the duties of a pontiff’ (Montor, 1843, pp. 168-169). Leo XII accepted this advice, seeking to balance the papacy’s diplomatic and political relations with other nations and powers while preserving the authority and integrity of the Catholic Church, especially in a constantly changing international geopolitical scenario.

THE HOLY SEE AND BRAZILIAN INDEPENDENCE

Brazil’s independence in 1822 altered the dynamics of political relations with Portugal and the Holy See. Despite not acknowledging the rupture, King João VI continued to exercise the right of patronage in Brazil. He renewed the faculties granted to bishops, authorized the election of a vicar capitular for the Archdiocese of Bahia, and transferred bishops. In Brazil, bishops and superiors of religious orders were uncertain about whom to consult to resolve religious issues. Some turned to the Pope, others to the Portuguese nuncio, and others to the Portuguese diplomat to the Holy See. For Pedro I, however, João VI and Leo XII were considered foreign authorities with no jurisdiction over the Church in Brazil. As the sovereign of a newly established Catholic nation, he deemed it imperative to re-establish Brazil’s relations with the Holy See. The Holy See was regarded as one of the primary courts in Europe, especially concerning ecclesiastical matters. Consequently, five months after the swearing-in of the Constitution of 1824, a diplomatic mission was established. This mission, possessing full powers, was tasked with negotiating the recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire, alongside matters beneficial to the Church’s interests, such as signing treaties, conventions, and concordats.

Father Francisco Correa Vidigal⁸ was appointed by imperial decree on August 7, 1824, as the Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of Brazil to the Holy See. Father Vicente Antônio da Costa⁹ was subsequently appointed secretary and Agent for Ecclesiastical Affairs.¹⁰ Vidigal informally brought along Bernardo Francisco Rangel to Rome to assist him, and Rangel eventually aided Costa in the secretariat. The primary political and religious objectives of the diplomatic mission included negotiating the solemn recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire and the regularization of ecclesiastical affairs.

Leo XII and Somaglia were well-informed about major developments in Brazil and Portugal and maintained a keen interest in both political and religious news. The pontifical representatives to the Portuguese government, Giuseppe Cherubini (1817-1823) and Giacomo Felippo Franzoni (1823-1826), as well as the nuncios to France, Vincenzo Macchi (1819-1826), and to Spain, Giacomo Giustiniani (1817-1826), served as informants. Recognized as astute observers of political and ecclesiastical circles, they promptly communicated news and shifts in the political landscape of the Portuguese monarchy to the Secretary of State. Thus, they played an instrumental role in shaping the Holy See’s diplomatic and political strategies and actions.

In conversations or meetings with the diplomatic corps, ministers, and deputies, information was obtained through visits to King João VI or Queen Carlota Joaquina. Other sources included news brought by ships that docked in the port of Lisbon, especially those from London and Brazil, as well as reading periodicals, particularly those from London and Paris. This approach facilitated the acquisition of up-to-date data, most of which was secret and confidential, along with official documents to which there was full access. In this context, original documents, transcripts, and reports were promptly sent to the Secretary of State. Despite these efforts, Somaglia did not possess all the details about the progress of the diplomatic talks between Brazil and Portugal, which impaired his understanding of the geopolitical arrangements.

A significant amount of news originated from Brazil. Missionaries, bishops, and superiors of religious orders reported the disorganization of the Catholic Church, the clergy’s support for the cause of independence, and the persecution of religious individuals of Portuguese nationality.¹¹ On September 6, 1824, the Bishop of Rio de Janeiro, José Caetano da Silva Coutinho, communicated with Pope Leo XII to report the imminent departure of the Brazilian delegation to Rome, led by Francisco Correa Vidigal. The bishop also reported that in Brazil, there was only one archbishopric (Bahia), six bishoprics (Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Maranhão, Pará, Mariana, and São Paulo), and two prelatures (Goiás and Cuiabá). Of the nine ecclesiastical circumscriptions, only three were filled, but these bishops were discouraged and infirm, the youngest being 60 years old, and one of them was blind.¹²

The Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (AAEESS), Giuseppe Antonio Sala, was perplexed by the religious scenario in Brazil, describing it as distressing; he therefore suggested that additional information be obtained from Vidigal. Considering the political situation between Brazil and Portugal, Leo XII recommended utmost moderation in addressing the matter.¹³

The news of the imminent arrival of Vidigal and Costa prevented Somaglia and Leo XII from being taken by surprise. They adopted the same strategy that Pius XII and Consalvi had employed in relation to José Ignacio Cienfuegos, sent by the Chilean government on June 19, 1822. These instructions became norms applied to the other representatives of the governments of America. Upon the arrival of Ignacio Sànchez de Tejada, sent by the Colombian government in 1824, Somaglia instructed Macchi, the nuncio in Paris, to convey that “since European sovereigns did not recognize the government of the Republic of Colombia, Leo XII could not admit him to the Papal States as a diplomat” to avoid infringing on the rights of Ferdinand VII. However, with equal sincerity, he was to state that the pope would not refuse to “listen to a person who came from distant lands to explain the spiritual needs of those faithful.” To prevent potential diplomatic incidents, his passport was to read “traveler” instead of “Chargé d’Affaires of the Republic of Colombia.”¹⁴ Thus, deprived of public character, in other words, of credentials, he could not engage in negotiations. Macchi regarded the instructions as “worthy of the consummate prudence and high wisdom of the pontiff” and promised to implement them rigorously.¹⁵ Regarding Vidigal, Macchi assured Somaglia that making the passports available would pose no problem as long as the journey did not possess “any public and diplomatic character [...] in order to avoid any misunderstandings or displeasure with the Royal Court of Lisbon.”¹⁶ By receiving diplomats from America, Leo XII aimed to establish a distinction between political and religious aspects, thereby reconciling his duties as leader and father of all Catholics with respect for the rights of the monarchy.

The diplomatic mission’s trip to Italy commenced at the beginning of October 1824 and endured for 74 days, exceeding the initially planned duration of just 49 days. They arrived at the British port city of Falmouth on November 10. Here, they stayed for a few hours to address customs issues before proceeding to London to deliver government letters and acquire new information on the progress of diplomatic affairs.

On December 8, 1824, Franzoni, the nuncio of Portugal, was informed about Vidigal’s presence in London by Pedro de Sousa e Holstein, Portugal’s Foreign Minister at that time. Holstein alerted the nuncio that Leo XII could not permit Vidigal to engage in discussions concerning political and ecclesiastical matters. This information was swiftly relayed by Franzoni to Somaglia and Macchi, the nuncio in Paris.¹⁷ Later, on December 11, 1824, Franzoni received more precise information: the priest had departed from London in mid-November for Paris, where he intended to stay for a few days. He also mentioned that Vidigal was a Brazilian priest of mixed race, chaplain of the royal chapel, and a fervent defender of liberal ideals.¹⁸

On November 29, Vidigal was in Paris and, accompanied by Domingos Borges de Barros, Brazil’s diplomat at the Court of Charles X, met with the apostolic nuncio. Macchi, having disclosed the conditions for issuing the passports, cautioned Vidigal that, while in Rome, he should refrain from expressing the political and ecclesiastical objectives of his journey. He also informed Vidigal that Leo XII would only initiate negotiations or consider other requests after Portugal had officially recognized Brazil’s independence. Vidigal attempted to alert him to the urgent needs of the Catholic Church in Brazil, which should not be overlooked by Pope Leo XII, but without success. Faced with the nuncio’s inflexibility, Barros recommended Vidigal comply with the imposed conditions, alleviating the unfavorable impression created by his premature reaction.¹⁹ According to Macchi, Vidigal acquiesced to the conditions stipulated, that is, the sole purpose of the trip was to present the status of the Catholic Church in Brazil to the pontiff.²⁰ Vidigal and Costa arrived in Rome on January 5, 1825.

THE HOLY SEE’S FOREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARDS BRAZIL

The Holy See’s foreign policy towards Brazil pursued a different direction than that adopted towards other Latin American countries. This divergence was due to the acceptance of the arguments presented by the government of Rio de Janeiro in the ‘Manifesto to the Peoples of this Kingdom,’ dated August 1, 1822, and in the ‘Manifesto to Governments and Friendly Nations,’ dated August 6, addressing the governments of other countries, especially those in Europe. These documents served political and diplomatic interests by justifying the reasons for separation with the aim of securing domestic support and, above all, international recognition, especially from European nations, for Brazil’s independence. The manifesto addressed to foreign nations was published in the European press to generate public opinion in favor of Brazil’s claims.²¹

Both manifestos portrayed Pedro as the bastion of resistance against the recolonization of Brazil imposed by the Constitutional Courts. In this context, they challenged Brazil’s political autonomy as a United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves and its Regency, previously established by João VI. Consequently, Pedro was depicted as the savior of both Brazil and Portugal, as he endeavored to extricate João VI from the derogatory state to which the Portuguese Cortes had reduced him, thereby posing a threat to the existence of the Bragança dynasty. Additionally, the manifestos promoted the image of Pedro as the architect of the construction of an independent and constitutional monarchy, and a rampart against republican, demagogic, and democratic doctrines.

Other arguments, of a political and diplomatic nature, disseminated in Europe, underscored the fact that King João VI, before his return to Portugal in 1821, sought to quell the ‘monstrous revolution’ by reinforcing Pedro’s authority, investing him with broad powers, including the power to declare war and peace, to safeguard dynastic legitimacy. King João VI is reported to have given his son the ‘fatherly advice’: ‘Pedro, if Brazil separates, it would be preferable for it to be under you, who will honor me, than under some adventurer.’ Consequently, his actions were characterized as anti-revolutionary and legitimist, as he was not opposing his father, the King of Portugal, but the policies of the Lisbon Cortes, thus, preserving the principle of legitimacy.

To avoid international recognition of Brazil’s independence and justify the country’s recolonization, the Portuguese government contended that the movement was revolutionary in nature. As a result, Brazilian diplomats, in conducting the negotiations, prepared new political memoirs about Independence, aiming to counter these arguments and enhance the discourse. The objective of these revisions was to dissuade the Court of Lisbon from attempting to reclaim sovereignty over Brazil and to convince it to recognize Brazil’s Independence and the Brazilian Empire. British diplomacy also resisted associating Independence with the liberal revolutions. George Canning, Foreign Secretary, in advising Charles Stuart on March 14, 1825, argued that Pedro’s actions were anti-revolutionary and legitimist, as he was authorized by his father to combat republican and democratic initiatives, prevent the separation of the provinces, preserve the institution of the monarchy, and protect the honor and continuity of the House of Braganza.²²

Faced with the arguments and counter-arguments regarding Brazil, the Holy See came to the understanding that Pedro’s actions were anti-revolutionary and legitimist. The disputes between Portugal and Brazil were less of a revolution, a political revolt, but rather a family conflict. In addition, another distinction lay in dynastic legitimacy since Pedro was the legitimate successor to João VI. There was also the suspicion that the rupture had been arranged between father and son, with João VI being the mastermind of the emancipation movement. This was because he had delegated broad powers to his son and advised him to occupy the throne before an adventurer usurped it. Somaglia also suspected that Brazil’s independence had the support of the Austrian court. Francisco José I’s sympathy for the Brazilian cause was evident in the mediation of reconciliation between Brazil and Portugal, in competition with England, as well as in the lack of impediments to the presence and activities of Vidigal and Costa Rome. In addition, for Pedro I, the support of his father-in-law was seen as beneficial, since through it he would be able to mobilize other European courts.²³ Austria was one of the Catholic powers in Europe and its foreign policy served as a foundation and starting point for directing the foreign policy of the Holy See, which even adopted its positions as a guide.

Hence, in order to avoid diplomatic incidents with Portugal and the Catholic powers of Europe, Somaglia maintained his strategy of not entering into direct negotiations with Vidigal, nor allowing any contact with the pontiff. He also refrained from issuing written documents that could be interpreted as favoring one of the parties in the dispute or as international recognition by the Holy See, even indirectly. All communications were transmitted verbally by a trusted member of the Secretariat of State team. In this context, the Roman Curia was divided over the approach to the question of America proposed by Consalvi and later by Somaglia. Many cardinals interpreted Brazil’s independence as a revolution and considered Pedro’s government illegitimate and therefore disagreed with the establishment of any international negotiations, even the possibility of hearing and dealing with purely religious matters. The opponents attempted to persuade Leo XII not to enter into negotiations, as well as criticizing the policies adopted by Somaglia, undermining his authority by questioning his competence. As a result, Leo XII and Somaglia had to deal with different proposals, interests, and internal divisions.

On January 7, 1825, Costa approached Somaglia to arrange an audience with Vidigal. Somaglia was helpful and took advantage of the meeting to question him, in order to obtain information about Brazil and the progress of the negotiations for the recognition of Brazilian Independence and the Empire. According to Costa, the questioning lasted around 60 minutes. Somaglia also emphasized that the Pope could not provoke incidents with Portugal or the Catholic powers that would result in the interruption of political and diplomatic relations with the Holy See. For this reason, he would not accept Vidigal’s credentials until Portugal and other European powers had recognized Brazil’s independence. For these reasons, he could not deal with political issues either but would receive all the supplications of the Catholics of America that related to their spiritual needs. Finally, Somaglia recommended that, during their stay in Rome, they be discreet and not wear badges with the national colors so as not to show that they were ‘in charge of a public mission.’ If they were asked what brought them to Rome, they should answer ‘religious business for Brazil.²⁴

Somaglia was later authorized by Leo XII to meet with Vidigal, and the conversation was scheduled for January 13, 1824. Vidigal was informed of the meeting on a confidential basis by an emissary, Abbot Girolamo Galanti, secretary of the General Treasury. Somaglia took all the necessary measures to ensure that Portugal’s ambassador to the Holy See, Domingos Antônio de Souza Coutinho, was not aware of the meeting, in order to avoid diplomatic incidents. During the conversation with Somaglia, Vidigal, denying the commitment he had previously made to Macchi, tried to present his credentials, but to no avail. He did not receive them and was not allowed to enter into any kind of negotiation. However, Somaglia assured him that Leo XII would ‘listen and deal’ with the affairs of the Church in Brazil.²⁵ In this way, he was confidentially expressing Leo XII’s support for the Brazilian cause.

Somaglia’s warnings had a positive effect, as Vidigal and Costa were discreet in their public appearances. They wore no official rank, that is, uniforms and hat bands with the national colors. Somaglia even revealed to Franzoni, “He had no complaints from them up to that point.²⁶ Furthermore, in order to avoid diplomatic conflicts with Portugal, Somaglia hastened to inform the Portuguese government of the resolutions taken by the Holy See. He assured Coutinho and King João VI that, “[Here] nothing will be done that might give rise to just objections from His Most Faithful Majesty, whose religion and attachment to the Holy See deserve every respect.”²⁷

Coutinho, when informed by Somaglia of the presence of the Brazilian diplomatic mission, was pleased to hear that Vidigal had not been admitted on a political and diplomatic basis, and that the principle of legitimacy had been respected. For his part, John VI was pleased to learn that Pope Leo XII had taken the “wise step” of not recognizing Vidigal “as the representative of a government that claims to be independent, separating itself from its legitimate sovereign.²⁸

As a result, bilateral relations between Portugal and the Holy See were preserved. King João VI was considered a very religious king, faithful to the pontiff and willing to defend the Catholic Church, and therefore could not be deprived of his rights, interests, and prerogatives. The political strategy was to maintain neutrality in geopolitical matters and cultivate good relations with both governments since Portugal and the European powers could recognize Brazil’s independence in the future. The political approaches of Leo XII and Somaglia were, therefore, not without political calculation, balancing institutional interests with bilateral relations with the European powers, especially the Catholic ones. For Somaglia, the strategies and positions adopted by the Holy See were categorized as “high diplomacy.” It was based on the premise that the pontiff should not transgress international political conventions, thereby avoiding diplomatic incidents with Portugal and other European powers and possibly being accused of supporting rebellions against legitimate sovereigns. It was, therefore, imperative that Leo XII did not anticipate John VI recognizing Brazil’s independence to safeguard the principle of legitimacy in foreign policy and respect for his rights. This international policy was in line with the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance, that is, the defense of the principles of European equilibrium, restoration, and dynastic legitimacy.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE HOLY SEE

Somaglia imposed upon Vidigal the status of a mere traveler, devoid of any political character; his only mission, in this context, was to present the situation of the Catholic Church in Brazil to the pontiff. Such conduct paralyzed the political negotiations and generated conflicting interests between the two parties. Vidigal stated that his first intention was to leave Rome immediately and await orders from Pedro I in another Italian city. He also assured that he would not permit any communication with the Holy See until the authority with which he had been invested was recognized.²⁹ Thus, he chose voluntary isolation, leaving his residence only to attend Mass and to visit friends. Among the friendships he cultivated was that with Cardinal Bartholomeu Pacca, who showed support for Brazil’s cause. The cardinal’s friendly relations with the Brazilian legation provided him access to privileged information, and Pacca also acted as an intermediary with the Roman Curia and Leo XII. Brazilian agents attempted to resume diplomatic talks on three occasions. Vidigal and Costa were in haste and pressed for the prompt recognition of Independence, as this would strengthen Pedro I’s government and consolidate the constitutional monarchy.

The strategy was to persuade Somaglia to act on impulse so that he would remove the barriers imposed on the negotiations and recognize Brazil’s Independence and the Empire before Portugal and the European countries did so. Somaglia, however, considered the variables from a political and diplomatic point of view. He knew how to act in situations of pressure or conflict and, under such circumstances, followed the typical procedures of Holy See diplomacy: he exhibited ambiguous postures that ranged from sobriety to avoid hostilities and direct conflicts to the search for conciliation to maintain a climate of optimism, and a firm and imperious determination to defend the rights and prerogatives of the Holy See. It was only natural that Somaglia would be required to have patience, plasticity, and immense resourcefulness. Therefore, when exercising his diplomatic skills, he adopted polite and serene postures and always reaffirmed Leo XII’s sympathy for Brazil’s cause in order to reassure Vidigal and Costa.

The first attempt was due to the misinterpretation of a letter from Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes, Minister Plenipotentiary in London, dated January 14, 1825, which led them to believe that England had recognized Brazil’s independence. In reality, it was an unofficial overture from the British cabinet.³⁰ The second situation occurred on June 2, 1825, when foreign newspapers, newly arrived in Rome, erroneously reported that Portugal had recognized Brazil’s independence. On June 8, Costa attempted to persuade Somaglia that the Holy See should also recognize the movement, citing the pressing needs of the Catholic Church in Brazil. On both occasions, Somaglia claimed that it was necessary to wait for official documents and that he had not received any communication from the Portuguese government.³¹

The third circumstance occurred on June 25, when Costa visited Somaglia, claiming to have received new recommendations from the government of Rio de Janeiro. The visit aimed to persuade Somaglia to precede other nations internationally in recognizing Brazil’s independence and the empire. The Secretary of State repeated his previous arguments, namely, the need to receive official confirmation from the Portuguese government and highlighted the fact that the Austrian government had not yet accepted the credentials of the Brazilian diplomat. In an attempt to persuade him, Costa claimed that, to preserve Catholicism, Pedro I would need to adopt measures without the consent of the Holy See, even suggesting the possibility of an ecclesiastical schism. This was a dissuasive and sensitive argument to the Holy See.³²

Somaglia, continuing with measures to postpone decisions and seeking a deeper understanding of the situation in Brazil, requested Costa to present a memorial detailing only the religious issues and the urgent justifications for Pope Leo XII’s assistance. To protect the Holy See, the document should be signed by Costa and addressed to Abbot Girolamo Galanti, thus preventing it from assuming an official and political character.³³ This consultative document would be presented to the pontiff so that he could deliberate and establish action strategies. Somaglia’s political objective was to demonstrate the pontiff’s willingness to negotiate and seek solutions that would satisfy the parties involved.

The memorial was presented on July 2, 1825, along with two petitions to address the spiritual needs of the Catholic Church in Brazil. With Vidigal’s permission, Costa wrote the text to highlight the religious disorders in Brazil, which necessitated the urgent intervention of the pontiff. The religious state of Brazil was described as “unfortunate,” “decadent,” and “calamitous” due to demographic and urban growth and the limited number of dioceses, priests, and bishops. As a result, problems in managing the dioceses emerged, ecclesiastical indiscipline increased, and the population remained underserved, making it urgent to promote the spiritual interests of the Empire’s subjects. Costa requested Leo XII to elevate the prelatures of Mato Grosso and Goiás to the status of dioceses, appoint Friar Giuseppe Maria de Macerata to the diocese of Mato Grosso, designate the bishop of Rio de Janeiro to oversee the processes of candidates for the episcopate, and to dispatch six missionaries from the Propaganda Fide to Brazil.³⁴

In his memorial, Costa refuted the classification of Pedro I’s government as revolutionary and illegitimate, arguing that he had acted on the advice of João VI to contain revolutionary ideals and safeguard both the monarchical regime and the Braganza dynasty. Later, for the same reasons and objectives, Pedro declared Brazil’s independence, was acclaimed Protector and Perpetual Defender, and crowned Emperor. In this way, Costa presented the government of Pedro I as politically stable and legitimate, in addition to the good dispositions of Portugal and other countries to recognize it as an independent country. On the religious side, he was committed to fighting the ‘evils of the century’ and restoring the glories of the Catholic Church. He intended to fill vacant bishoprics, promote the observance of religion among the population, restore the discipline of the clergy, and combat the enemies of the Catholic Church. If Leo XII failed to act, Pedro I considered the possibility of an ecclesiastical schism in order to appoint bishops and erect new dioceses.³⁵

In the political instability that Brazil was experiencing, Costa drew an idyllic panorama: of a consolidated monarchy that would boost the civilizing process. Leo XII convened the AAEESS, a consultative body designed to advise on complex, delicate, and crisis-ridden political, doctrinal, disciplinary, and ecclesiastical issues. The Congregation was made up of cardinals who favored opening up the Church to the changes taking place in society.

In the plenary session, the members had to analyze the memorial and issue opinions on various political issues concerning Brazil. The commission included Somaglia, Bartolomeo Pacca, Francesco Saverio Castiglioni, Emanuele De Gregorio, and Placido Zurla. Giuseppe Antonio Sala acted as secretary of the Congregation and was responsible, after the discussions and the formulation of decisions, for drawing up a protocol, which was then submitted to Leo XII. The Pope could accept or reject the opinions, thus defining the political and diplomatic conduct of the Holy See. For the meeting, Giuseppe Antonio Sala analyzed the memorial and suggested the policies to be adopted by the Holy See. His instructions were based on caution, wisdom, and moderation, aimed not only at preventing potential dangers and problems for the Holy See but also at aligning its institutional interests with the political positions of the European powers. He also considered the internal resistance within the Roman Curia and the dicasteries regarding the acceptance of American independence and social transformations, as well as the Portuguese Court’s plans to resist Brazil’s pretensions and vice versa, which created obstacles to negotiations. When analyzing the information in the memorial, Sala made comparisons with other documents and news about Brazil and Portugal, which allowed him to understand international geopolitical issues. After cross-referencing the information, he found that Costa’s arguments should be viewed with reservations due to their imprecision and incoherence. Among them, the indication that everything was settled between father and son, as well as with other European cabinets, especially Austria’s, and that negotiations were being finalized. Therefore, the Holy See’s political decisions should not be based on supposition, conjecture, and optimism, but on real and verifiable evidence, such as authentic facts and official documents. As a result, it was essential to understand the current political state of Brazil in relation to Portugal and the other European powers since Brazil’s independence had not been recognized by Portugal or the other European countries.³⁶ In other words, the Holy See’s political and diplomatic strategies had to be articulated on the basis of a political framework that was precarious.

Thus, when considering the new international order produced by the liberal revolutions and the progress of negotiations between Portugal and Brazil, Sala argued that it was crucial to consider the damage and potential political and diplomatic problems arising from the Holy See’s international recognition of Brazil’s Independence and Empire. This recognition would favor the son over the father and cause friction with Catholic powers that might accuse the Holy See of recognizing governments formed during the revolution. Given this, the Holy See should maintain the prudence it has historically practiced, avoiding diplomatic conflicts with political allies by being one of the last states to recognize new governments. In this case, the Holy See was committed to the King of Portugal and the King of Spain, who faced similar circumstances with the revolutionary processes in America.³⁷

According to Sala, the needs of the Catholic Church in Brazil were significant. However, he advised against granting the request to establish new bishoprics and fill vacant sees. This was due to Costa’s disregard for the legitimacy and rights of King João VI over the Catholic Church in Brazil, and, consequently, King Pedro I’s inability to exercise patronage. If the Holy See acquiesced to the requests, the Secretariat of State would have to officially inform Coutinho and João VI, who would likely protest vigorously, potentially demanding the expulsion of Vidigal and Costa from Rome or even severing diplomatic relations. At the same time, the Holy See would be recognizing Brazil’s separation from Portugal, infringing upon João VI’s legitimate rights, and ignoring the authority of the apostolic nuncio resident in Lisbon, whose jurisdiction still extended to Brazil. Sala believed these problems were avoidable. If the Holy See’s decisions were questioned by governments and society, its authority and prestige would be at risk, providing no concrete benefits. Therefore, the needs of the faithful and the Catholic Church in Brazil should be addressed with a “slight delay” and without serious detriment.³⁸Faced with this scenario, Sala recommended that the Holy See adopt cautious and meticulous postures, waiting for Portugal and other Catholic powers to recognize the independence of Brazil and the Empire. However, if negotiations were protracted and there was no reconciliation between the parties through a treaty, the Holy See, after verifying the authenticity and official nature of these facts, should “adopt measures to favor one party over the other,” thereby separating political and religious matters, as proposed by Consalvi. Interventions in the Brazilian Church would be justified by the salvation of souls, “a supreme law of the Catholic Church,” and the pontiff could not shirk this duty.³⁹

For the meeting, Sala formulated several questions for the Congregation to address: Should the prelatures of Mato Grosso and Goiás be elevated to diocesan status? Should Friar Giuseppe Maria of Macerata be confirmed as bishop? Was it necessary to issue a bull to the bishop of Rio de Janeiro instructing the processes for candidates for the episcopate? What would be the appropriate response if the Congregation denied Costa’s requests? Finally, should the pontiff send six Propaganda Fide missionaries to Brazil?⁴⁰

The meeting of the AAEESS was held on August 22, 1825, during which the political objectives of the documents presented by Costa were analyzed. Several cardinals prepared their statements to be read during the meeting. Somaglia observed that Brazil was experiencing political turbulence and instability, making its future uncertain. News from Spain on August 20 altered the perception of the political situation. There were indications that reconciliation, mediated by Stuart and based on secret agreements between Pedro I and João VI, was moving towards the maintenance of the United Kingdom. Conversely, reports concerning Brazil indicated political instability and uncertainty about its future as conflicts between the Legislative and Executive branches intensified. According to Somaglia, demonstrations were occurring in various regions of the country, urging Pedro I to abolish the 1824 Constitution and rule with absolute power. In light of this, he was convinced that it was essential to wait for the developments in Brazil, which were nearing resolution. Meanwhile, it was advised that harmony between the two governments be maintained.⁴¹

One of the cardinals noted that the Holy See faced a dilemma, attributing the Portuguese government’s predicament to a lack of common sense and political acumen, as it acted impulsively rather than strategically. He believed that King João VI was making a significant diplomatic error by politically undermining his son, thus hampering his ability to confront the republicans and liberal monarchists. The Portuguese government was also erroneous in opposing Leo XII’s approval of Pedro I’s requests, as endorsing them could be advantageous. Supporting them could bring benefits since the Catholic Church, as the institution that regulates society, would pacify the people.⁴²

In their report to Leo XII, the members of the Congregation concluded that Costa’s arguments suggested that Independence was a result of João VI’s counsel to his son and that Portugal would soon acknowledge it. They also highlighted Pedro I’s favorable disposition towards the Catholic Church. However, the geopolitical scenario was delicate and required caution. Reconciliation between Portugal and Brazil and the recognition of Independence by the European Courts remained uncertain, although there were hopes for a positive outcome in the future. They considered that while spiritual needs were pressing, the patronage guaranteed the rights of King João VI. Any ‘innovations’ in foreign policy would disclose the Holy See’s position in favor of Brazil and could create ‘embarrassing’ situations with ‘fatal consequences’ for the Portuguese government and the European Courts. Conversely, disregarding Pedro I’s requests and his favorable stance on religion would have relatively minor impacts, resulting in ‘harmful’ effects. Therefore, it was inadvisable for the pontiff to comply with Pedro I’s pleas.⁴³

In light of ‘recent news’ and ‘doubts’ about the negotiations, the members of the Congregation believed that the Holy See should refrain from innovating in its foreign and diplomatic policies. It was necessary to wait for the outcomes of the Stuart mission’s negotiations. If recognition was not forthcoming in a short time, the interests of souls had to be prioritized, as the Pope, as the supreme head of the Church and common father of all Catholics, could not overlook them, fulfilling one of the duties of his office.⁴⁴

Regarding the issues to be analyzed by the members of the Congregation, there was consensus that decisions should be left ‘in abeyance,’ meaning they should be delayed as a strategy to avoid diplomatic incidents, weather the revolutionary era, and seize crises to expand the Catholic Church’s influence. When considering the specifics of Costa’s requests, the members of the Congregation concluded that the matter was about appointing bishops and establishing two dioceses. Consequently, the Holy See could not ignore these actions’ political and pastoral dimensions. They then decided that sending missionaries did not imply recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire by the Holy See or interference in the country’s internal affairs, as the dispatch of missionaries was a religious measure dependent on Propaganda Fide.⁴⁵

As a result, the Congregation decided that the Holy See would not give Costa any verbal or written answer, hoping for his silence. If there was any insistence on a response, the strategy was to “gain time” by “taking a long time to respond” and “asking for clarification,” as well as promoting debates and controversies regarding the Brazilian Legation’s requests.⁴⁶ Therefore, the policy of foresight and procrastination had political and institutional aims: to avoid compromising the Holy See and to wait for the opportune moment. They believed a peace agreement between Brazil and Portugal would be reached within “two or three months” and that the Holy See should not anticipate this essential consecration. A few days later, Cardinal Pacca instructed Costa on the Congregation’s resolutions, contradicting the decision to remain silent and wait to be questioned before providing an answer. He communicated that Leo XII, as the leader of Christendom, should not “condescend or interfere in opinions or political matters, yet he was obliged to listen to and hear as soon as possible the mission of the Emperor of Brazil, which Monsignor Vidigal had been tasked with presenting to the Holy See.” It was necessary to wait for the outcome of the Stuart mission, but if the negotiations were prolonged, the pontiff would respond to the pleas “whether [there was] recognition or not.” Pacca stated that the delay in making decisions was to avoid causing offense to Portugal and, above all, to consider the esteem in which King João VI held the Pope. He also mentioned that the Emperor of Austria, Francis I, expressed his support for Pedro I through his representative in Rome.⁴⁷

THE HOLY SEE’S RECOGNITION OF BRAZIL’S INDEPENDENCE AND EMPIRE

In late 1824 and early 1825, with British mediation, negotiations between Portugal and Brazil made significant progress.⁴⁸ On January 13, Canning appointed Charles Stuart to a special diplomatic mission in Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro. For Somaglia, one of the challenges was to quickly obtain up-to-date and reliable data on the negotiations between Portugal and Brazil, brokered by England and Austria, to guide the Holy See’s foreign and diplomatic policy. He argued that the lack of information prevented him from actively fulfilling his role as Secretary of State. Being well-informed gave him advantages in negotiations, such as challenging Vidigal and Costa’s arguments, refuting false or unknown reports, and formulating proposals. Consequently, Somaglia advised Franzoni to seek information from reliable sources, such as the Portuguese diplomatic corps, ministers, and King João VI. Later, he urged Franzoni to further investigate the negotiators’ identities, intentions and objectives, and terms of the agreement, obstacles, and progress made.⁴⁹

Franzoni, however, claimed that everything was obscure and it was impossible to ascertain the truth, assuming that the negotiations would lead to a trade treaty or promote reconciliation.⁵⁰ He stated that “matters were handled with such secrecy that nothing reached the public”; he believed, however, that Portugal would soon recognize Brazil’s independence.⁵¹

Later, detailed information on the proposals and counter-proposals discussed in the negotiations was provided to Somaglia by Macchi, the French nuncio, Giacomo Giustiniani, the Spanish nuncio, and Franzoni. Somaglia considered this information pertinent because it offered “certain details” that he was previously unaware of. Upon analyzing the contents, he pondered that he could not predict the outcomes of Stuart’s diplomatic mission, with success dependent on the influence England, as a mediating power, could exert on Portugal, given that the conditions imposed on Brazil might be rejected.⁵²

The Treaty of Peace, Alliance, and Friendship between Brazil and Portugal was signed in Rio de Janeiro on August 29, 1825, and ratified by King João VI on November 15. News reached Lisbon on November 9, 1825, via London newspapers. On November 15, the newspaper Gazeta de Lisboa published King João VI’s Letter of Law, ratifying the Treaty without detailing its terms.⁵³ Nonetheless, Somaglia wanted to know the specifics of the Treaty, the political arrangements made, and its reception in Europe. The succession to the Portuguese throne was another topic of strategic interest. The news reached Paris on November 30, when Macchi considered the benefits the Holy See would gain by acknowledging Brazil’s independence and Empire. This included, for example, the establishment of an apostolic nunciature in the country, which would extend its jurisdiction over Brazil and other Latin American countries.⁵⁴

On December 8, Vidigal received a letter containing a copy of the Treaty of Alliance and Peace, through which King João VI recognized Brazil’s independence. The document was presented to Somaglia with the intention that he would organize an audience with Leo XII to present his credentials. However, Somaglia claimed he had “no official documents” from the Portuguese government and, in their absence, could not schedule the audience.⁵⁵ Ever cautious, he consulted Coutinho to verify the accuracy of the news and documents Vidigal presented.⁵⁶

On December 12, following the Portuguese government’s orders, Coutinho communicated to the entire diplomatic corps at the Holy See the decree bestowing upon King João VI the titles of Emperor of Brazil and King of Portugal and the Algarves, which had been added to the crown’s previous titles. Accompanying the letter was a copy of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance.⁵⁷

On December 17, Vidigal once more urged Somaglia to promptly arrange an audience with the pontiff so that, as minister plenipotentiary, he could present his credentials and convey Dom Pedro I’s sentiments of respect and filial veneration.⁵⁸ On December 21, Somaglia sent Abbot Galanti to inform Vidigal “he could walk freely in Rome, but he should request a new credential since the existing one was signed before Brazil was recognized by Portugal.”⁵⁹

However, the demand for a new credential initiated a series of conflicts as Vidigal deemed it excessive and likely to delay negotiations by five to six months. He then sought assistance from Pacca, who proposed a practical diplomatic solution offering to bring the matter before Pope Leo XII.⁶⁰

Somaglia’s dealings with Brazil were characterized by strategic caution, aiming to observe the positions adopted by Catholic powers such as Austria and France. He believed that “the more the horizon seems clouded, the more the representative of the Holy See should maintain, as far as possible, a merely passive stance” and await the decisions of other European governments.⁶¹

Somaglia thus sought confidential information regarding the Portuguese government’s appointment of a plenipotentiary minister for Brazil, whether the title of Emperor of Brazil, ascribed to D. João VI, would be used in the foreign diplomatic corps correspondence, and the succession to the Portuguese throne, specifically whether Portugal would be governed from Brazil or whether D. Pedro I would abdicate in D. João VI’s favor.⁶²

The purpose of this consultation was to anticipate Portugal’s political future, to assess whether the Holy See had properly conducted its foreign policy, and to understand and analyze the European geopolitical scenario and its interactions with Portugal and Brazil. Somaglia expressed his apprehension about the political fate of Portugal, which had been experiencing various political changes and conflicts since the 1820s. He also noted the repercussions of the recognition of Brazil’s independence in Europe and Portugal, with tensions arising from dynastic succession and disputes between liberals (both radicals and moderates) and absolutists. In this context, the Holy See leaned towards the restoration of absolutism and the ascension of King Miguel to the throne.

Franzoni consulted the diplomatic corps and found that Austria, England, Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, and Switzerland had already officially conferred the title of Emperor of Brazil on João VI. He anticipated that other European countries would soon follow, given the consensus among the European powers. England and Austria would also extend this recognition to Pedro I. The only exception was Spain, which was reluctant to recognize Brazil’s independence. Regarding the succession to the Portuguese throne, Franzoni considered the challenges of keeping the two empires united and viewed the possibility of alternating on the throne of Portugal as positive:

1º Austria, England, Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, and Switzerland have already recognized the title of Emperor of Brazil in the King of Portugal and use it in their diplomatic correspondence. England and Austria have extended this recognition to Emperor Pedro I. As for the other four sovereigns [Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, and Switzerland], nothing has yet been reported, but they are believed to soon do the same. The accession of Russia, Prussia, France, and the Netherlands is currently lacking and is expected all the time. Only Spain is reluctant.

2º The title of hereditary prince of Portugal was purposely reserved for the Emperor of Brazil for succession to the crown of Portugal. Some supposed that there was a secret article guaranteeing him this right. From all that has been said here, Your Eminence will be able to deduce that what has been written in the newspapers about Prince Miguel seems, for the moment, to be unfounded. I say, for the time being, given the difficulty of keeping the two empires united in the same sovereign, it could give rise to some change.⁶³

The recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire by the Court of Vienna on December 27, 1825, was advantageous for Brazil, as it was one of Europe’s Catholic powers. According to Somaglia, the Holy See followed the “analogous example of Austria [and] just induced the Holy Father to take this step, which nothing could contradict after the formal and free recognition of the new monarchy, made by the one who could do it legitimately, that is, the emperor and king, father of the [emperor] of Brazil.”⁶⁴

Thus, on January 13, 1826, Vidigal was admitted into the presence of the pontiff, where he presented his credentials and other documents. Later, on January 20, a letter from Antônio Teles da Silva Caminha e Meneses, written in Vienna, was included. This letter recognized Vidigal as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Pedro I.⁶⁵ The documents were translated into Italian at the request of Cardinal Pacca, who added a peroration in favor of Brazil’s cause.⁶⁶

The solemn audience took place on January 23, 1826. Pope Leo XII received Vidigal’s credentials, and through this act, the Holy See recognized the Independence of Brazil and D. Pedro I as Emperor. Official and permanent diplomatic relations were also established between the Holy See and Brazil.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The revolutionary wave that swept across Europe also necessitated a geopolitical reordering. The defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte empowered the victorious powers, who asserted their dominance at the Congress of Vienna and through the Holy Alliance. The Holy See’s foreign policy during the pontificates of Pius VII and Leo XII was guided by the defense of dynastic legitimacy, the balance of powers, and political neutrality. The commitment was to protect European monarchies and the legitimate rights of monarchs while acknowledging the benefits of independence. Portugal, for instance, was a secular ally that collaborated closely with the Holy See, making it essential to preserve bilateral relations. Therefore, there was an emphasis on maintaining the balance of power in Europe, avoiding diplomatic conflicts, and preserving the institutional interests of the Holy See, including the supremacy of Catholicism, the Papacy, and the maintenance of the Pope’s temporal power over the Papal States, which relied on the support of Austria and other European powers.

Political conduct was driven by the expectation that the Portuguese government would soon recognize Brazil’s sovereignty, while the Holy See would defer any international recognition ahead of Portugal and other Catholic powers in Europe. During this period of waiting, foreign and diplomatic policies were characterized by caution and moderation, delaying decisions. These approaches did not reflect indecision, weakness, or hesitation, but rather a strategic effort to protect the Holy See from diplomatic conflicts. The foreign and diplomatic strategies were based on observing and analyzing the positions of the Rio de Janeiro government and major European powers. In other words, the strategies were not devoid of political and religious calculations but were guided by potential advantages. These strategies led to tensions with Vidigal and Costa, who attempted to resume negotiations. However, the negotiations with Brazil failed to achieve consensus between the parties and were marked by substantial conflicts and disagreements.

Thus, the primary aim of the Holy See’s foreign and diplomatic policy during the pontificate of Leo XII was to navigate the era of revolutions and capitalize on it to ensure survival and expand, regaining prestige among nation-states. To address the needs of the people, sustain papal authority, and strengthen its jurisdiction over local churches, it was crucial to advance Consalvi’s proposal to separate religion from politics. This initiative would foster new relations between Church and State, granting the pontiff greater autonomy from governments and reinforcing his universal jurisdiction.

References

• AZEREDO, Carlos Magalhães de. O reconhecimento da Independência e do Imperio do Brasil pela Santa Sé. Roma: Industria Tipografica Romana, 1932.
• COLAPIETRA, Raffaele. La Chiesa tra Lamennais e Metternich. Il pontificato di Leone XII. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1963.
• JANKOWIAK, François. "Por algum tempo mantido no escuro...". Breves observações sobre a historiografia da Cúria e do governo dos Estados Pontifícios durante o pontificado de Leão XII. In: REGOLI, Roberto. et al. (org.). Governo della Chiesa, governo dello Stato: Il tempo di Leone XII. Ancona: Consiglio regionale delle Marche /Assemblea Legislativa delle Marche, 2019. p. 19-27.
• LEMOS, Jerônimo de. Monsenhor Francisco Correia Vidigal e o reconhecimento da Independência pela Santa Sé. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, n. 328, p. 29-46, jul./set. 1980.
• LETURIA, Pedro de. Relaciones entre la Santa Sede e hispano-américa, 1493-1835. Roma: Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1959.
• LÓPEZ-BREA, Carlos Maria Rodriguez. La Santa Sede y los movimientos revolucionarios europeos de 1820. Los casos napolitano y español. Revista Ayer, v. 45, n. 1, p. 251-273, 2002.
• MONTOR, Alexis-François Artaud de. Histoire du Pape Léon XII. Paris, LeClere, 1843. v. 1.
• PÁSZTOR, Lajos. La Segreteria di Stato e il suo archivio, 1814-1833 Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 1984.
• REGOLI, Roberto. Ordini, contrordini e disordini. Riforma della Curia e dello Stato. In: REGOLI, Roberto et al. (org.). Governo della Chiesa, governo dello Stato: Il tempo di Leone XII. Ancona: Consiglio regionale delle Marche /Assemblea Legislativa delle Marche, 2019. p. 28-51.
• SANTINI, Cândido. O padroado no Brasil. Direito Real. Perspectiva Teologica, n. XI, p. 154-204, 1974.
• SANTOS, Guilherme de Paula Costa. No calidoscópio da diplomacia: Formação da monarquia constitucional e reconhecimento da Independência e do Império do Brasil. Tese (Doutorado em História) - Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2015.
• TRUSCELLO, Paolo Daniele. A Secretaria de Estado e a "direção suprema de todos os assuntos" durante o pontificado de Leão XII. In: REGOLI, Roberto et al. (org.). Governo della Chiesa, governo dello Stato: Il tempo di Leone XII. Ancona: Consiglio regionale delle Marche /Assemblea Legislativa delle Marche, 2019. p. 136-151.
• VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros. Motivos de história diplomática do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1930.
• VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros et al. (org.). Representação brasileira em Roma - Correspondência recebida. In: VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros et al. (org.). Arquivo diplomático da Independência, França, Santa Sé, Hespanha. v. 3, Ed. fac-similar. Brasília: FUNAG/ Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2018 [1922]. p. 293-317.
• VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros. Vidigal e Vicente A. da Costa em Roma. In: VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros et al. (org.). Arquivo diplomático da independência, França, Santa Sé, Hespanha. Ed. fac-similar. Brasília: FUNAG/ Ministério das Relações Exteriores, [1922] 1972c. v. 3, p. LV-LXXIX.

• 1
  The diplomatic agents represented the government of Rio de Janeiro, rather than the ‘Brazilian government,’ as the monarchical regime was not yet fully consolidated due to political differences among the provinces and disputes over control of the state. According to Santos (2015, pp. 59-60), ‘the diplomatic negotiators in Europe, if anything, were the political expression of these groups, which had formed the social foundations of Dom João’s government and which, even as they evolved and incorporated additional agents, sought to establish an independent, monarchical, and liberal state that aligned with their political and economic expectations.”‘
• 2
  He was appointed Patriarch in partibus of Antioch on December 15, 1788, and elevated to Cardinal on June 1, 1795. Somaglia held significant positions within the Roman Curia, including Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars; Prefect of the Congregation of Rites; Secretary of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith; Vicar General of Rome; Prefect of the Congregation for the Discipline of Regulars and Indulgences; Prefect of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Work; Secretary of the Holy Office; and Administrator of the Papal State. On March 23, 1808, he, along with twelve other cardinals, was expelled from Rome by Napoleon Bonaparte and was not released until April 2, 1814. Subsequently, he negotiated concordats with Tuscany (1815), France (1817), Bavaria (1817–1818), the Kingdom of Naples (1818), Spain (1820), Germany (1820), Belgium (1821), and handled various political-religious issues concerning Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, and Latin America. He was a member of the Congregations of Propaganda Fide, the Index and Apostolic Visitation, and of the Congregations for the correction of the books of the Eastern Church and the Census. He also held significant honorary and ceremonial titles, such as Cardinal-Bishop of Frascati, Damaso, Porto, Santa Rufina, and Ostia. On September 28, 1823, Somaglia was appointed to the Secretariat of State, the principal governmental body close to the pope and responsible for the political and diplomatic activities of the Holy See. At the time, aged 80, he was the Dean of the College of Cardinals. He remained in this position until the end of May 1828.
• 3
  Pius VII appointed Ercole Consalvi as Secretary of State on March 15, 1800, a position he held until the Pope’s death on August 20, 1823. After Leo XII was elected on September 28, Consalvi was removed from his position and subsequently appointed as Prefect of Propaganda Fide. He passed away on January 24, 1824.
• 4
  In this interpretative perspective, on one side were the politicanti, a minority who advocated for continuing the Church’s policy of limited openness to the transformations occurring in Europe, ’provided it did not compromise the faith. On the other side were the zelanti, a majority group attached to traditional forms and privileges, who opposed the administrative centralization proposed by Consalvi and were reluctant to accept social transformations (López-Brea, 2002, p. 253).
• 5
  After Napoleon’s fall, the powers gathered at the Congress of Vienna (1815) restored Pius VII’s temporal power over the Papal States. Pius VII chose not to sign the minutes of the Holy Alliance to avoid involvement in military interventions and wars, as well as to steer clear of adhering to Gallican and Josephine principles. He also sought to conduct foreign policy independently, yet in line with international conventions. However, his foreign policy was characterized not by neutrality and impartiality, but rather by detachment and non-participation in international conflicts or alliances. According to López-Brea (2002, pp. 220, 251-259, 263-269, 272), Consalvi strategically prevented the pontiff from becoming the ideological arm of the Holy Alliance to maintain a reputation of neutrality towards governing regimes and preserve diplomatic independence. Despite this, the Holy See served the interests of the Holy Alliance without formally belonging to it.
• 6
  ARCHIVIO APOSTOLICO VATICANO (AAV), Arch. Nunz., Madrid, 276, Ofício de Ercole Consalvi a Montmorency, May 25, 1823.
• 7
  ARCHIVIO STORICO DELLA SEGRETERIA DI STATO - Sezione per i Rapporti con gli Stati e le Organizzazioni Internazionali (ASRS), Fondo Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (AA.EE.SS.), Spagna, 1820, pos. 69-70, fasc. 18, f. 45v. Draft letter from Ercole Consalvi to Giacomo Giustiniani, November 30, 1820 (our translation).
• 8
  Vidigal was born in São Gonçalo, Rio de Janeiro, on an unknown date, estimated to be in 1761. He began his studies at the São Joaquim Seminary before studying in Lisbon and later at the University of Coimbra, where he spent two years completing his preparatory studies in law. He subsequently moved to Rome, where he was ordained a priest by special concession from the Holy See, as the Bishop of Rio de Janeiro had prohibited ordinations outside Brazil. He then returned to the University of Coimbra and graduated in Canon Law and Mathematics. Back in Brazil, he served as a lawyer at the Tribunal of the Legation in Rio de Janeiro alongside nuncios Lorenzo Calleppi and Giovanni Compagnoni Marefoschi, who accompanied King João VI in 1808. In 1821, he was elevated to the dignity of monsignor by imperial letter on October 12, 1823, and appointed as vicar general of the diocese of Rio de Janeiro and rector of the São José Seminary, positions he held until his appointment to a diplomatic mission. Vidigal was also a member of the Emperor’s Council, a monsignor of the imperial chapel, and a professed knight of the Order of Christ (Lemos, 1980, pp. 30, 42; Santini, 1974, p. 159).
• 9
  Little is known about Vicente Antônio da Costa. According to Vasconcelos (1930, p. 155) and Lemos (1980, p. 42), he was born in Portugal, served as a priest, and was connected with high-ranking members of the Catholic Church in Brazil. He also worked as an official in the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs and was a member of the Legation in Rome during the period of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves, noted for his fluency in Italian.
• 10
  According to Vasconcelos (1972 [1922], p. LVII), it was customary for countries to separate ecclesiastical affairs from the responsibilities of the heads of diplomatic missions.
• 11
  ARCHIVIO STORICO “DE PROPAGANDA FIDE” (APF), Fondo Scritture Riferite nei Congressi, America Meredionale dall’Istmo di Panama allo Stretto di Magellano, Cod. 5 (1804-1825). Ofício de Giuseppe Antonio Sala para Pietro Caprano, 19 jan. 1825, p. 586-587.
• 12
  APF, Fondo Scritture Riferite nei Congressi, America Meredionale dall’Istmo di Panama allo Stretto di Magellano, Cod. 5 (1804-1825). Ofício de José Caetano da Silva Coutinho para Leão XII, 6 set. 1824, p. 588r-588v.
• 13
  APF, Fondo Scritture Riferite nei Congressi, America Meredionale dall’Istmo di Panama allo Stretto di Magellano, Cod. 5 (1804-1825). Ofício de Pietro Caprano para Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, 24 jul. 1824, p. 567.
• 14
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Parigi, Heading 248, Busta 416, Fascicolo 1, Anno 1824. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Vincenzo Macchi, May 23, 1824 (our translation).
• 15
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Parigi, Rubrica 248, Busta 416, Fascicolo 1, Anno 1824. Letter from Vincenzo Macchi to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, June 8, 1824 (our translation).
• 16
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Parigi, Rubrica 248, Busta 416, Fascicolo 1, Anno 1824. Letter from Vincenzo Macchi to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, November 30, 1824 (our translation).
• 17
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, 8 Dec. 1824 (our translation).
• 18
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somagliai, 11 Dec. 1824 (our translation).
• 19
  Letter from Domingos Borges de Barros to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, Dec. 1, 1824, p. 204-207. In: VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros et al. (eds.). Brazilian Representation in Paris, Correspondence sent. In: VASCONCELLOS, Mario de Barros et al. (eds.). Arquivo diplomático da Independência: França, Santa Sé, Hespanha. v. 3, facsimile edition. Brasília: FUNAG/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018. [1922], p. 61-277 .
• 20
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Parigi, Rubrica 248, Busta 416, Fascicolo 1, Anno 1824. Letter from Vincenzo Macchi to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, Dec. 7, 1824 (our translation).
• 21
  ITAMARATY HISTORICAL ARCHIVE (AHI), Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Francisco Vilela Barbosa, Jan. 25, 1826 (our translation).
• 22
  Dispatch from George Canning to Charles Stuart, 14 Mar. 1825, In: WEBSTER, Charles K. Britain and the independence of Latin America, 1812-1830: select documents from the Foreign office archives [v. I]. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press 1939, p. 265-267.
• 23
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Letter from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to the Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, August 22, 1825.
• 24
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Vicente Antonio da Costa to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, Jan. 16, 1825.
• 25
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, January 15, 1825 (our translation).
• 26
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, Jan. 21, 1825; Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, Mar. 31, 1825. 1825 (our translation).
• 27
  ARCHIVIO APOSTOLICO VATICANO, Index 1032, Segretaria di Stato, Esteri, Rubrica 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, January 30, 1825 (our translation).
• 28
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, 22 Feb. 1825 (our translation).
• 29
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, January 15, 1825.
• 30
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Vicente Antonio da Costa to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, June 26, 1825.
• 31
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Vicente Antonio da Costa to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, June 12, 1825.
• 32
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Vicente Antonio da Costa to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, June 12, 1825.
• 33
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 34
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 35
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 36
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 37
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 38
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 39
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 40
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 41
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 42
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 43
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 44
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 45
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 46
  ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Brasile I, Anno 1825, Pos. 7, Fascicolo 139. Circa il progetto d’erigere Cuyabà e Matto-Grosso in Vescovato da conferirsi al P. Giuseppe Maria di Macerata, 2º d’inviare sei Missionario della Propaganda, 3º l’autorizazione del Vescovo di Rio Janeiro a formar i processi dei nominandi vescovi per le sedi vacante.
• 47
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Vicente Antonio da Costa to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, Aug. 28, 1825 (our translation and emphasis).
• 48
  Political instability in Portugal, exemplified by the Vilafrancada in 1823 and the Abrilada in 1824, posed a threat to European equilibrium. In Brazil, the spread of republican ideals was worrisome. In response, the Austrian and British governments collaborated in diplomatic efforts to expedite the recognition of Brazil’s independence and empire.
• 49
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, June 30, 1825 (our translation).
• 50
  AAV, Index 1032, SS - Esteri, Portogallo, Rubrica 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia, March 26, 1825. 1825 (our translation).
• 51
  AAV, Index 1032, Segretaria di Stato, Esteri, Rubrica 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia, April 9, 1825 (our translation).
• 52
  ARCHIVIO APOSTOLICO VATICANO, Índice 1032, Segretaria di Stato, Esteri, Madrid, Rubrica 249, Busta 435, Fascicolo 2. Draft letter from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Giacomo Giustiniani, August 30, 1825.
• 53
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, November 15, 1825 (our translation).
• 54
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Parigi, Rubrica 248, Busta 416, Fascicolo 1, Anno 1824. Letter from Vincenzo Macchi to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, November 30, 1825 (our translation).
• 55
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, Dec. 13, 1825.
• 56
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Portogallo, Rubrica 263, Busta 550, Fascicolo 9. Draft dispatch of letter from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Domingos Antônio de Souza Coutinho, Dec. 9, 1825 (our translation).
• 57
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Portogallo, Rubrica 263, Busta 550, Fascicolo 9. Letter from Domingos Antônio de Souza Coutinho to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, Dec. 12, 1825 (our translation).
• 58
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Portogallo, Rubrica 263, Busta 550, Fascicolo 9. Letter from Francisco Corrêa Vidigal to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, Dec. 17, 1825 (our translation).
• 59
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, 22 Dec. 1825.
• 60
  AHI, Vatican City Offices - Secretariat of State (1824-1843) 408/1/4. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, January 12, 1826.
• 61
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 6. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi Della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, 26 Oct. 1825 (our translation).
• 62
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, 30 Dec 1825 (our translation).
• 63
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, Feb. 4, 1826 (our translation).
• 64
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Draft dispatch from Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia to Giacomo Felippo Franzoni, January 30, 1826 (our translation).
• 65
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Esteri, Brasile, Rubrica 264, Busta 552, Fascicolo 1. Letter from Francisco Correa Vidigal to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, January 20, 1826 (our translation).
• 66
  AAV, Index 1032, SS, Lisbona, Heading 250, Busta 442, Fascicolo 5. Letter from Giacomo Felippo Franzoni to Giulio Maria Cavazzi della Somaglia, Feb. 4, 1826 (our translation).
• FINANCING
  The research that resulted in this article was funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development - CNPq (call no. 26/2021 - Support for Scientific, Technological, and Innovation Research: Scholarships Abroad).

• Editor in charge:
  Ely Bergo de Carvalho

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  11 July 2025
• Date of issue
  2025

History

• Received
  31 May 2024
• Reviewed
  10 Dec 2024
• Accepted
  18 Dec 2024