TRUTH, BELIEF, AND ACCURACY: SCIENTIFIC REALISM MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEASUREMENTS

ABSTRACT

The current debate on scientific realism is an entire universe. A general thesis can be put like follows: scientific activity attains a world that is independent of science itself. This “reaching out” can be thought of in terms of theoretical practices, such as the formulation of true theories, and/or experimental practices, such as the construction of suficiently accurate methods to (re)formulate and test what is said by the theories. By this latter route, the debate about scientific realism in the philosophy of science meets the discussions in the philosophy of measurement, an autonomous research area that investigates measurement practices, their concepts, applications and assumptions. As the “realism” in the philosophy of science in general, there are multiple postures that can be characterized as “realistic” through their theorizations about scientific measurements. Stating which are the criteria and reasons why these positions claim to be realistic and in what they are distinct is a complex task. This article is an attempt to do that, without exhausting the discussion or the field.

Keywords:
Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Measurement; Scientific Realism; Accuracy