Participação acionária da administração e valoração no mercado: uma análise empírica

Morck, Randall; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.

Resumos

Investigamos a relação entre a participação acionária dos administradores e a valoração da empresa no mercado, medida pelo Q de Tobin. Em um corte longitudinal de 371 empresas da Fortune 500 em 1980, encontramos evidências de uma relação não-monotônica signifi cativa. O Q de Tobin aumenta, depois diminui e, finalmente, apresenta novo e leve aumento à medida que cresce a participação dos membros do conselho no capital. Para empresas mais antigas, há evidências de que o Q é menor quando a empresa é administrada por um membro da família fundadora do que quando administrada por um executivo sem parentesco com o fundador.

Participação acionária; valoração; conselho; governança corporativa; teoria da agência

We investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the fi rm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 fi rms, we fi nd evidence of a signifi cant nonmonotonic relationship. Tobin's Q fi rst increases, then declines, and fi nally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises. For older fi rms, there is evidence that Q is lower when the fi rm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an offi cer unrelated to the founder.

Management ownership; market valuation; board of directors; corporate governance; agency theory

RAE CLÁSSICOS

Participação acionária da administração e valoração no mercado: uma análise empírica

Randall Morck^I; Andrei Shleifer^II; Robert W. Vishny^III

^IAlberta

^IIHarvard

^IIIChicago-GSB

RESUMO

Investigamos a relação entre a participação acionária dos administradores e a valoração da empresa no mercado, medida pelo Q de Tobin. Em um corte longitudinal de 371 empresas da Fortune 500 em 1980, encontramos evidências de uma relação não-monotônica significativa. O Q de Tobin aumenta, depois diminui e, finalmente, apresenta novo e leve aumento à medida que cresce a participação dos membros do conselho no capital. Para empresas mais antigas, há evidências de que o Q é menor quando a empresa é administrada por um membro da família fundadora do que quando administrada por um executivo sem parentesco com o fundador.

Palavras-chave: Participação acionária, valoração, conselho, governança corporativa, teoria da agência.

ABSTRACT

We investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the fi rm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 fi rms, we fi nd evidence of a signifi cant nonmonotonic relationship. Tobin's Q fi rst increases, then declines, and fi nally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises. For older fi rms, there is evidence that Q is lower when the fi rm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an offi cer unrelated to the founder.

Key words: Management ownership, market valuation, board of directors, corporate governance, agency theory.

Texto completo disponível apenas em PDF.

Full text available only in PDF format.

Aprovado em 16.01.2008.

Randall Morck

Professor do Department of Finance and Management Science, University of Alberta School of Business

Interesses de pesquisa nas áreas de governança corporativa e estrutura de propriedade

E-mail: randall.morck@ualberta.ca

Endereço: Department of Finance and Management Science, 4-20G School of Business, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T6G 2R6

Andrei Shleifer

Professor do Department of Economics, Harvard University

Doutor em Economia pelo Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Interesses de pesquisa nas áreas de economia da informação, teoria dos contratos e fi nanças comportamentais

E-mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu

Endereço: Havard University, Department of Economics, Littauer M-10. Cambridge, MA, 02138

Robert W. Vishny

Professor da Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

Doutor em Economia pelo Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Interesses de pesquisa nas áreas de governança corporativo, fusões e aquisições e mercados de ações.

E-mail visghny@chicagogsb.edu

Endereço: The University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL, 60637

Artigo convidado.

BERLE JR., A. A.; MEANS, G. C. The modern corporation and private property New York: Macmillan, 1932.
CORPORATE DATA EXCHANGE, INC. Stock ownership directory: Fortune 500. New York: CDE, 1981.
CUMMINS, C.; HALL, B.; LADERMAN, E. The R&D master file: documentation. NBER, 1982. Mimeo.
DEANGELO, H.; DEANGELO, L. Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 14, n. 1, p. 33-69, 1985.
DEMSETZ, H. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 26, n. 2, p. 375-390, 1983.
DEMSETZ, H.; LEHN, K. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, v. 93, n. 1, p. 1155-1177, 1985.
FAMA. E. F. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, v. 88, n. 2, p. 288-307, 1980.
FAMA, E. F.; JENSEN, M. C. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 26, n. 2, p. 301-325, 1983.
HART, O. D. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics, v. 14, n. 2, p. 366-382, 1983.
HERMAN, E. S. Corporate control, corporate power Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
JENSEN, M. C.; MECKLING, W. H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, n. 4, p. 305-360, 1976.
JENSEN, M.; RUBACK, R. The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 11, n. 1, p. 5-50, 1983.
JOHNSON, B.; MAGEE, R.; NAGARAJAN, N.; NEWMAN, H. An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: implications for the managerial labor market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 7, n. 1-3, p. 151-174, 1985.
LELAND, M.; PYLE, D. Information asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, v. 32, n. 2, p. 371-387, 1977.
LEWELLYN, W. The ownership income of management New York: NBER, 1971.
LINDENBERG, E.; ROSS, S. Tobin's Q ratio and industrial organization. Journal of Business, v. 54, n. 1, p. 1-32, 1981.
MORCK, R.; SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. In: AUERBACH, A. J. (Ed). Corporate takeovers: causes and consequences Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
MURPHY, K. J. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 7, n. 2, p. 11-42, 1985.
SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, v. 94, n. 3, p. 461-488, 1986.
SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Value maximization and the acquisition process. Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 2, n. 1, p. 7-20, 1988.
STULZ, R. M. On takeover resistance, managerial discretion, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 20, p. 25-54, 1988.
WALKING, R. A.; LONG, M. S. Agency theory, management welfare, and takeover bid resistance. Rand Journal of Economics, v. 15, n. 1, p. 54-68, 1984.
WESTON, J. F. The tender takeover. Mergers and Acquisitions, v. 14, p. 74-82, 1979.
WHITE, H. A heterokedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heterokedasticity. Econometrica, v. 48, n. 4, p. 817-838, 1980.

Datas de Publicação

Publicação nesta coleção
23 Nov 2012
Data do Fascículo
Jun 2008

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[1] BERLE JR., A. A.; MEANS, G. C. The modern corporation and private property New York: Macmillan, 1932.

[2] CORPORATE DATA EXCHANGE, INC. Stock ownership directory: Fortune 500. New York: CDE, 1981.

[3] CUMMINS, C.; HALL, B.; LADERMAN, E. The R&D master file: documentation. NBER, 1982. Mimeo.

[4] DEANGELO, H.; DEANGELO, L. Managerial ownership of voting rights: a study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 14, n. 1, p. 33-69, 1985.

[5] DEMSETZ, H. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 26, n. 2, p. 375-390, 1983.

[6] DEMSETZ, H.; LEHN, K. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, v. 93, n. 1, p. 1155-1177, 1985.

[7] FAMA. E. F. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, v. 88, n. 2, p. 288-307, 1980.

[8] FAMA, E. F.; JENSEN, M. C. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 26, n. 2, p. 301-325, 1983.

[9] HART, O. D. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics, v. 14, n. 2, p. 366-382, 1983.

[10] HERMAN, E. S. Corporate control, corporate power Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[11] JENSEN, M. C.; MECKLING, W. H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, n. 4, p. 305-360, 1976.

[12] JENSEN, M.; RUBACK, R. The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 11, n. 1, p. 5-50, 1983.

[13] JOHNSON, B.; MAGEE, R.; NAGARAJAN, N.; NEWMAN, H. An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: implications for the managerial labor market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 7, n. 1-3, p. 151-174, 1985.

[14] LELAND, M.; PYLE, D. Information asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, v. 32, n. 2, p. 371-387, 1977.

[15] LEWELLYN, W. The ownership income of management New York: NBER, 1971.

[16] LINDENBERG, E.; ROSS, S. Tobin's Q ratio and industrial organization. Journal of Business, v. 54, n. 1, p. 1-32, 1981.

[17] MORCK, R.; SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. In: AUERBACH, A. J. (Ed). Corporate takeovers: causes and consequences Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

[18] MURPHY, K. J. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 7, n. 2, p. 11-42, 1985.

[19] SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, v. 94, n. 3, p. 461-488, 1986.

[20] SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. W. Value maximization and the acquisition process. Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 2, n. 1, p. 7-20, 1988.

[21] STULZ, R. M. On takeover resistance, managerial discretion, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 20, p. 25-54, 1988.

[22] WALKING, R. A.; LONG, M. S. Agency theory, management welfare, and takeover bid resistance. Rand Journal of Economics, v. 15, n. 1, p. 54-68, 1984.

[23] WESTON, J. F. The tender takeover. Mergers and Acquisitions, v. 14, p. 74-82, 1979.

[24] WHITE, H. A heterokedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heterokedasticity. Econometrica, v. 48, n. 4, p. 817-838, 1980.

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Participação acionária da administração e valoração no mercado: uma análise empírica

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